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ABSTRACT
The Chilean military performed a distinctive role
during the late eighteenth century— it was engaged in an
on-going frontier war against the Araucanian Indians, a
conflict which over a period of nearly three centuries had
diminished but not subsided.

This was in sharp contrast to

other areas of Spanish America where the subjugation of the
native race had been completed in a few years after the
conquest.

While other colonies were approaching the zenith

of their development, Chile was engaged in a debilitating
war of attrition along its southern frontier.
As a result of its active role in protecting Spanish
society, the military became one of the most influential
institutions of the colony.

This prominence was character

ized by the presence of a continuously mobilized army, a
network of forts along the Araucanian frontier, and a
military budget which nearly equaled all other expenses of
the colonial treasury combined.

Throughout the South, all

of these features combined to create a strong military
tradition, personified by the intimate association between
the army and society.
Most of the army was stationed in the South, a
factor which largely isolated it from contact with the

capital of Chile and the mainstream of its society.

However,

there was also a great deal of status isolation, brought on
by the army's predatory role and a reputation for crime and
corruption.

Lawlessness and violence within the army were

closely linked to the rough frontier existence and were also
factors which set the military apart culturally from the
rest of the colony.
One of the most influential features in the develop
ment of the Chilean army was the dominant role played by
Peru.

The influence of the viceroys was solidified through

the situado, a mechanism for supplying the isolated garrisons
in the far South.

This, combined with Peruvian jurisdiction

over the fortresses of Valdivia and Chilo6, partially drove
a wedge between the army and the government in Santiago.
These characteristics of the colonial army were
influential in the formation of its political loyalties
during the early phase of the independence movement, or the
patria vieja (1810-1814).

They were factors which ultimately

turned the army against the patriot forces and made it a
staunch arm of the royalist cause.
After the creation of the first patriot junta in
Santiago in 1810, the veteran forces in the South became
even more distant from the capital and the course of the
liberal movement.

In Santiago, the civilian militia and

creole aristocracy emerged as the base of a new patriot
viii

array, which rivaled the regular veteran forces in size.
Enthusiasm for the independence movement and efforts by
political leaders (such as Jose Miguel Carrera) to insure
their continued political power, made possible the creation
of this new army.

While the veteran troops in the South

should have logically served as the nucleus for the new
army, they were almost completely disregarded.

Dissension

and rivalry between competing patriot factions and preoccupa
tion with the defense of the capital against possible
royalist invasion from Peru prevented the army of the South
from being incorporated into the patriot camp and left it
dangerously exposed to Peruvian subversion.
When hostilities broke out in 1813, Chile was split
into a patriot north and a royalist south.

The success of

the royalist forces in counteracting the patriot movement
was directly related to the loyalty of the veteran troops in
the South to the king.

This was due to the army's tradi

tional geographic and status isolation from central Chile
and a long history of economic and administrative dependence
on the Peruvian viceroys.
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INTRODUCTION
The objectives of this study are twofold:

first, to

examine the Chilean military during the late eighteenth
century, especially with regard to its basic characteristics
and its role in colonial society; and second, to ascertain
how this colonial role influenced the army's political
orientation during the early phase of the independence move
ment, or the period known as the patria vieja (1810-1814).
The army is defined as veteran troops, those regular
soldiers paid by the crown and serving on a full-time basis.
Very little research has been done on its organization and
structure.

American scholars have limited their research to

the Araucanian Indians and cultural aspects of their
struggles with the Spanish.

Surprisingly, few Chilean

scholars have undertaken investigations of the eighteenthcentury army, despite the existence of a long military
tradition in colonial society.

For the most part, they have

concentrated only on specific aspects of its organization.
The most comprehensive Chilean study is that of
Roberto Onat and Carlos Roa, Regimen legal del ej6rcito en
el reino de Chile, a general study of the army throughout
the colonial period which emphasizes the effect of Spanish
military legislation on the Chilean army.
xii

A work by

Jorge de Allendesalazar Arrau, Ej^rcito y milicias del reino
de Chile, 1737-1815, is largely a survey of the genealogy of
veteran and militia officers.

Another Chilean, Pedro Toledo

S&nchez, has examined the application of Spanish military
penal codes in the colony in his book Esquema del derecho
penal militar indiano y su jurisprudencia chilena.

Also of

value are several works by the Jesuit priest, Gabriel
Guarda, concerning the history of southern Chile and the
fortress of Valdivia.
Each of these works has contributed to an under
standing of a particular aspect of the subject.

However,

there is a need to combine these various topics into a
cohesive, overall concept of the army and its role in
society.

This encompasses more than simply a blow-by-blow

narrative of the Araucanian wars.

Recent emphasis on such

topics as the racial composition and socioeconomic back
ground of the troops, the political effects of Bourbon
military reforms in America, and conflicts between the army
and civilian institutions, are increasingly important for an
understanding of the military as an institution in society.
These studies also help to isolate colonial factors which
may have determined military behavior during the independence
period and the subsequent development of praetorianism. This
specialized study of the Chilean military is a contribution
to the growing reservoir of knowledge of the colonial armed
forces in America.
xiii

The thesis of this dissertation is that the army in
the south of Chile was royalist in 1813 because of geographi
cal, cultural, and status isolation from central Chile and a
tradition of economic and administrative dependence on Peru.
This is significant in that the initial phase of the inde
pendence movement, and to a large extent the wars which
lasted until 1820, consisted of a division between a patriot
north and a royalist south.

The army in the South comprised

a majority of all the colony's forces, nearly all of whom
followed the royalist banner.

These forces were the deciding

factor in the initial defeat of the patriot army in 1814,
and they were the backbone of the royalist opposition in the
protracted struggle which followed.
The first part of this dissertation is a study of
several basic features of the Chilean army which character
ized its colonial existence.

Foremost among these was the

distinct geographic and cultural separation of the southern
army from the center of colonial population in the central
valley and the Santiago area.

Most of the troops were

isolated along the southern frontier or in coastal garrisons,
effectively segregated from the mainstream of society in
central Chile.

The rigors of army life bred a soldiery that

was frequently undisciplined, prone to corruption and
violence, and professionally lax.

Numerous soldiers were

former convicts, impressed into the service to fulfill
manpower shortages.

Social flux within the army accentuated
xiv

its isolation from the capital and earned it a reputation as
a predatory institution.

Because the coastal fortresses in

the South were supplied and administered from Peru, the
troops there inevitably developed closer ties with the
viceroys in Lima than with the Chilean government.
The second part of this work deals with the role of
the army during the first three years of Chilean indepen
dence, up to the Peruvian invasion in 1813.

The majority of

studies of this period have emphasized the patriot viewpoint
and events in Santiago, center of the movement for autonomy
from Spain.

There has been a corresponding neglect with the

participation of the South, perhaps because of its royalist
sympathies and reactionist stance.

Yet, the South was the

scene of equally vigorous political movements, one of which
occurred within the military.

In part, the royalist

attitudes of officers in 1813 was due to internal dissension
within the patriot camp and the failure to actively court
the political support of this influential institution.

The

personal ambitions of Jos6 Miguel Carrera and other leaders
led to a series of revolts in Santiago during 1811 and 1812,
resulting in complete disregard for the potential of the
southern forces.

Political discord between the provinces of

Concepcidn and Santiago was another powerful factor in the
neglect of strong veteran forces in Valdivia, Chilod, and
along the Bio Bio River.
However, there had always been a pervading royalist
xv

sentiment in the army, instilled by factors of its colonial
existence„

Geographic segregation from the capital, close

ties with Peru, and the volatile character of army life were
not conducive to strong bonds with Santiago.

A steady flow

of peninsular or Peruvian officers to the southern forts
almost guaranteed troop loyalty to the crown.
Research for this study was carried out in the
National Archives in Santiago, Chile, during 1973-1974, with
the assistance of a research fellowship from the Organization
of American States.

Primary sources constituted a major

portion of the materials analyzed, and among the more useful
archival collections were those of the Capitania General,
Real Audiencia, and the Contaduria Mayor.

Of additional aid

were the holdings of the Sala Medina in the Biblioteca
Nacional.

Of particular use were the Coleccibn de documentos

in6ditos para la historia de Chile, original documents
transcribed by the historian Jos6 T. Medina.
A number of published documents proved useful, one
of which was the Coleccidn de historiadores y de documentos
-
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para la historia nacional, relating to the colonial history
of Chile.

Included in this collection are such works as the

Relacidn hist6rico-ieogr£fica del reino de Chile, by the
army officer Vicente Carvallo y Goyeneche.

This is an

extremely rich source of data about the army, as perceived
by a participant in the frontier Indian campaigns.
hand accounts and diaries of soldiers have been used
xvi

First

whenever possible to gain a picture of how the military
functioned.
Another useful collection of documents used was the
Coleccibn de historiadores y documentos relativos a la
independencia de Chile.

This contains many of the important

papers relating to the independence period, including the
acts of the various governing juntas.

For a general inter

pretation of the colonial period, the Historia general de
Chile of Diego Barros Arana has been followed most closely.

xvii

Chapter 1
ARMY ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION
The war between the Spanish and Indians in southern
Chile lasted throughout the colonial period, considerably
influencing the course of the colony's development.

At the

time of the Spanish arrival the aboriginal population
numbered perhaps 500,000.1

The most notable of the tribes

were the Araucanians, an appellation which the Spanish
improperly applied to all of the natives living in southern
Chile.

2

Unlike the Incas or more advanced races, the

Araucanians never attained a high degree of social or
political organization.

The

very simplicity of their

tribal structure rendered them nearly unconquerable by the
Spanish, as there was no central government which could be
toppled to bring about the surrender of all its subjects.
Each tribe was an autonomous unit which must be subdued
individually.
The conqueror of Chile, Pedro de Valdivia, stood

1Preston James, Latin America (4th ed.; New York:
Odyssey Press, 1969), 548.
York:

^Louis C. Paron, The Mapuche Indians of Chile (New
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968),9.
1

apart from many of his colleagues by his intellect and
farsightedness.

In contrast to the widespread greed for

gold of that time, he envisioned Chile as a land of future
agricultural wealth, of colonists who would reap the more
3
lasting benefits of the soil.
He was an ambitious man,
however, and in his zeal to pacify the land, he committed an
error common to many early Spanish— he attempted to conquer
too much territory with too few resources.

From the

founding of Santiago in 1540 until his death in 1553, he
founded eight cities in the heart of Araucanian lands, all
4
isolated and defended by only a handful of soldiers.
His
ultimate goal was that of conquering all the territory down
to the southern tip of the continent (see Map 1).
Valdivia persuaded himself that he had reduced the
colony to Spanish control, when in fact he had only
imprudently diffused his troops throughout a vast, hostile
territory.

After an initial period of shock, the Araucanians

regrouped their forces and launched an implacable war which
was to continue intermittently until the end of the colonial
period.

This proliferation of frontier settlements, without

adequate colonists to populate them, was one of the great

^Luis Galdames, A History of Chile (New York:
Russell and Russell, Inc., 1964), 39.
^Alamiro de Avila Martel, "Regimen juridica de la
guerra de Arauco," III Congreso del Instituto Internacional
de Historia del Derecho Indiano (Madrid: In'stituto Nacional
de Estudxos Jurldicos, 1973T, 326.
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5

The overextension of Spanish civilization into
hostile Indian lands affected the entire development of the
southern half of the colony.

During the early 1600's, a

chain of forts was constructed, stretching from the foot
hills of the Andes mountains to the sea, along the Bio Bio
River (see Map 2).

By fortifying this perimeter it was

hoped that Spanish settlements to the north could be pro
tected, and that this line could be gradually pushed south
ward as the Indians were either pacified or conquered.

Yet,

the colonizing force of the Spanish was not forthcoming;
there was an acute shortage of settlers, and the Indians
7

stubbornly resisted the colonization of their lands.

In the 17008s, this line of forts remained roughly
the same as it had in previous times, and the lands to the

^Miguel Luis Amun&tegui, Los precursores de la
independenc ia de Chile (Santiago; Imprenta Barcelona,
1910), II, 65-66.
®The strategy of a fortified line along the Bio Bio
River was part of a broad policy of defensive warfare imple
mented during the term of President Alonso de Ribera (16011605) . A short interlude of peace followed, but hostilities
had resumed by 1613. The Bio Bio remained the demarcation
line between Indian and Spanish lands until the end of the
1700 8s (Eugene H. Korth, S.J., Spanish Policy in Colonial
Chile. The Struggle for Social Justice, 1535-1700 [Stanford
Stanford University Press, 1968], 121-23.
7

For a Spanish account of the sixteenth and seven
teenth century Araucanian wars, see Alonso de Ovalle,
Histbrica relacibn del reyno de Chile (Santiago: Editorial
Univer's it aria, 1969) .

5
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Map 2
Military Forts Along the Araucanian Frontier, 1800*
*Indalicio Tell6z, Historia militar de Chile, Appendix, Vol. I.
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Map 3
Layout of the Fort of Los Angeles, 1794*
* "Expediente sobre renovar los Edificios, Quarteles, y foso
de la Plaza de los Angeles, 1794," ACG, DCCCLXIX, 18.

south were hardly more than uncharted forests.8

Valdivia,

Concepcidn, the frontier forts and settlements on the island
of Chilo6, all continued their solitary existence.

However,

they were isolated in the heart of Indian lands, deprived of
commercial and social contact with the rest of the colony
and forced into a crude, backward existence.

Thus, a

principal tenet of Spanish military policy widened to include
not only territorial expansion but also the defense of
existing settlements in the South.
By the mid-1700's, the veteran army consisted of
roughly 1,700 men.

The wars of attrition of previous times

had subsided to the level of an uneasy truce, marked by
occasional outbreaks of violence.

During the course of the

century, there were only a handful of what could properly be
called Indian revolts and only two major, extended clashes
(1723 and 1767).

The situation was more indicative of what

the Chilean historian Mario G6ngora terms a "little war"-— an
interminable procession of cattle thievery, robbery,
9
smuggling, and occasional killings.

Still, this violence

was a sufficient threat to necessitate a standing army.
In terms of strategic location, the army was divided

8During the 1700 's there were approximately eighteen
of these forts in operation. For a description of these,
their construction, defenses and population, see "Instruccidn y noticia...," [c 1755], Doc. No. 4292, JMDI,
CLXXXVIII, 14-25.
Q
Mario Gdngora, Vagabundaje y sociedad fronteriza en
Chile, Monograph of the Centro de Estudios Socioecondmicas,
Universidad de Chile, Santiago (1966), No. 2, 22.

8
into two broad groups.

In the far south was one portion,

consisting of an infantry battalion on the island of Chilod
and another battalion in the coastal fortress of Valdivia.
Together, they comprised almost forty percent of all veteran
forces and were primarily designated to protect the coasts
against corsairs or European invasion.

Both garrisons were

segregated from the rest of the colony by the Indian lands
and were regularly supplied by the Peruvian viceroy.

Near

Concepcidn was stationed the second major division of the
army, guarding the chain of forts along the Bio Bio River.
The presiding chief of the army was the president,
who did not necessarily have to possess a career background
in the army.

His additional title of captain-general made

him the automatic commander-in-chief of all military
forces.10

Below him were four military governors, each

appointed by the king and each entrusted with the civil
administration and military security of his district.

11

Foremost among these was the Intendant of Concepcidn
(usually of brigadier rank), whose jurisdiction included the
entire southern half of the colony.

Following him was the

governor of Valdivia, likewise a brigadier or colonel, who
governed the town and its infantry battalion.

The governor

lOThe leader of the colony combined in his person
the positions of governor, captain-general of the army, and
president of the audiencia, and could be referred to by any
one of these titles.
11Diego Barros Arana, Historia general de Chile
(Santiago: Rafael Jover, 1884-1902), VII, 341.

9
of Valparaiso administered a similar jurisdiction but one of
less prestige, for the only regular troops under his command
was a single company of artillerymen.

Finally, there was a

governor on the island of Juan Fernandez, in charge of a
handful of soldiers and several hundred civilian

resi

dents.^
Infantry comprised the major branch of the army, and
its troops bore the brunt of the Indian attacks along the
frontier.

It was composed of two battalions, one stationed

in Concepcibn and one in Valdivia.

The Valdivia battalion

was composed of six companies of whites, or soldiers of
sangre limpia. and one caste company, the compania de
13
pardos.

The latter was alternately referred to as the

compania de obreros. as its lower racial status relegated
the members to performing menial tasks and doubling as con
struction laborers.

Because Valdivia served as a penal

colony, its battalion contained many convict draftees who
were of decidedly lower quality than other enlisted troops.^
The batallbn fijo, or fixed battalion of Concepcibn, had
originally been a unit of peninsular troops and was composed
of eight companies of fusiliers and one of grenadiers.
These companies were distributed throughout the various forts

12Ibid., 341.
l3"Razbn de los Sueldos..., 1800," ACM, XLIX, No. 5.
■^^Lucas Molina to President 0 'Higgins, Valdivia,
October 15, 1792, AMV. XXI, 318.

10
along the Bio Bio River, with one company being stationed on
the island of Juan Femiadez.

15

Mounted dragoons composed the second major division
within the army.

Dragoons were a product of the sixteenth-

century French army, originally consisting of .mounted
arcabus troops capable of fighting either on horse or on
foot.'*'®

Chilean horse troops were identical in their

armament, possessing both a musket and sabre, whereas regular
17
cavalry used only swords and pikes.

The bulk of these

troops were formed into the escuadra de dragones de la
frontera (frontier dragoon squadron), consisting of eight
companies distributed throughout the forts along the
frontier.

An additional company of dragoons was stationed

in Santiago, known as the compania de dragones de la Reina
Luisa.

This company was created by President Manuel de Amat

y Junient in 1758 as a police force to combat rampant crime
•IQ

in the capital, which the militia could not contain.
Several decades later. President Gabriel de Aviles found
that the original company was insufficient for the needs of
patroling and police duty, and in 1797 increased the force

15"Raz6n de los Sueldos..., 1800, " ACM, XLIX, No. 3.
■*"®Barros Arana, Historia general, VI, 393.
^ Ibid. According to a review of 1808, each dragoon
possessed three horses, two of his own and one furnished by
the crown ("Revista de..., 1808," ACM, CCVI).
•*-®Royal c6dula of October 12, 1760, Doc. No. 8773,
JMDI. CCXCII.

by thirty additional men, all foot soldiers.
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Admittance to this company was a mark of social dis
tinction .

Membership was restricted to appointment only,

and the applicants were of upper-class origin, endowed with
20
the title of "don."
Their duties were not only con
stabulary, but included serving as the president's personal
bodyguard, administering the customhouse and participating
in public ceremonies.

At times when European invasion

appeared imminent, they were divided into picket detach
ments to serve in the coastal ports.
The artillery branch was composed of three companies,
one assigned to each of the coastal ports of Valparaiso,
Concepcibn and Valdivia.

In Spain, the artillery corps had

always enjoyed a unique status, much as the royal engineers,
and qualified for privileges such as its own tribunals.

21

In Chile, the artillery companies were somewhat less than
special; if anything, they were set apart only because of
the inexperience and ineptitude of their members.

There

were far too few artillerymen to be distributed among the
coastal garrisons, in some cases less than one man per
22
gun.
Most of these men were of lower-class origins.

They

^■0"Raz6n de los Sueldos..., 1800, " ACM. XLIX, No. 1.
20J o r g e de Allendesalazar Arrau, Ejbrcito y milicias
del reino de Chile, 1737-1815 (Santiago: Ministerio de
Defensa Nacional, 1960), 127.
21Ibid., 167.
22"Razbn de los Sueldos..., 1800," ACM. XLIX, No. 7.
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were either enlisted or drafted from the regular infantry
companies, hardly the best method of grooming skilled
gunners*

According to a military ordinance of 1753, artil

lerymen were required to drill every two weeks in summer and
once a month in winter, but due to shortages of ammunition
and a general laxity in their training, there was little
compliance with such regulations. J
A single company of officers and non-commissioned
personnel was stationed in Santiago, called the asamblea de
caballeria.

Contrary to its title the company was not a

cavalry unit, but a group of instructors brought from Spain
24
in 1768 to train civilian militia in the military arts.

The members of the company were assigned to the various
frontier towns or to northern port cities such as La Serena,
Coquimbo and Valparaiso, where they helped to bring the
militia up to the level of competent support troops for the
veterans.

The king alone conferred commissions to this

small but prestigious unit, which was theoretically entrusted
with the training of over 15,000 militia.

25

In response to the permanency of the Araucanian wars,
the Spanish crown created a group of Indian officials to

23pemando Guarda Geywitz, Historia de Valdivia,
1552-1952 (Santiago: Imprenta Cultura, 1953), 162.
^Allendesalazar, Ej6rcito y milicias, 126-27.
25Ibid.
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serve as liaison agents, interpreters and guardians of
Indian welfare.

Usually, these men were soldiers, theoret

ically selected on the basis of their empathy with Indian
problems and their ability to resolve disputes between the
two races.

The most important of these officials were the

capitanes de amigos, or captains of friends, who were
soldiers assigned to live among those tribes which had
Of,

declared themselves peaceful to the Spanish.

The position

of capitan was roughly analogous to that of the corregidor,
but adapted to the unique circumstances of Chile.
The Indian lands were the scene of much contraband
trade between the tribes and itinerant merchants, which
invariably led to quarrels and bloodshed as both sides
97
attempted to cheat each other.
Capitanes were charged
with suppressing this illegal commerce before isolated dis
putes escalated into war.

The opportunities for self-gain

naturally led to a certain amount of despotism among the
captains, which was taken into consideration by their
superiors.

A just but practical captain could increase his

meager income by serving as a commercial middleman, while at
the same time generally promoting the Indians' welfare.
Unfortunately, many were unscrupulous and a cause of
animosity, rather than peace.

They conspired with traders

26,,InstrucciOn y noticia..., " [cl755] , Doc. No. 4292,
JMDI, CLXXXVIII, 28.
27Ibid.
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to defraud their wards or sold the Indians into slavery.

28

By 1800, the army remained constant at a level of
around 2,000 men, distributed in the following manners

Table 1
Army Strength Around 1800, Including Staff,
Officers and Enlisted Men29

Units

Personnel

Dragoon Company of the Reina Luisa (Santiago). . . .

84

Dragoon Squadron of the Frontier (Los Angeles) . . .

436

Infantry Battalion of the Frontier (Concepcibn). . .

689

Infantry Battalion of Valdivia .

..................

535

Artillery Company of Valparaiso.................

64

Artillery Company of Concepcibn.

. . . . . . . . . .

55

Artillery Company of Valdivia.......................

23

Asamblea de Caballeria (Santiago)................

.

TOTAL

50
1,936

The selection of upper-echelon military officers
paralleled that of the civilian hierarchy; both were con
trolled from Spain.

The king had always reserved the

immutable right of personally selecting such positions as
president, audiencia oidores, treasury officers, as well as
high-ranking army officers and members of the general staff.

2®Francisco Encina, Historia de Chile desde la
prehistoria hasta 1891 (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento,
1942-1952), IV, 473.
29,,Razbn de los Sueldos..., 1800, " ACM. XLIX, No. 5.
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The crown also jealously guarded the right of confirming
many other civil posts and army personnel, some of whom were
appointed from Peru.30
At the heart of this paternalism was the goal of
implanting quality administration, but there was also a
desire that positions of importance be occupied by penin
sulars .

This mentality was personified by the Spanish

Minister of State, the Conde de Fioridablanca, whose
suspicions of antimonarchial plots bordered on the
manaical.3^

In an instrucei6n reservada of July 8, 1787,

Floridablanca wrote that the use of peninsulars was designed
to control sedition and rebellion on the part of the creoles.
In his estimation, the veteran forces in the colonies were
necessary to combat foreign invasions, but their primary
function was in "maintaining good internal order."
Peninsular Spaniards were to be shown preference at all
times as army officers and staff, and Spanish regulars should
always be stationed in the "principal locations" to assure
the loyalty of the army.
Positions of great military importance may have
W

M

M
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30Barros Arana, Historia general, VII, 341.
3^For a profile of Fioridablanca, see Richard Herr,
The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain (Princeton:
Princeton University Press', 1958) ."
3^Amunategui, Los precursores, III, 19. The contents
of instrucciOnes reservadas were of a classified nature and
were transmitted only among higher government officials.
33Ibid.
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generally been the exclusive domain of peninsulars, but it
is incorrect to assume that the crown systematically denied
creoles positions as officers in the army.

In the following

chart of the Chilean officer corps around 1800, officers
were classified according to the country of their birth (see
Table 2).

The results show that native-born Chileans were

substantially represented, and actually comprised a majority
of all officers.
In each of these major units, a common characteristic
throughout was the predominant peninsular composition of the
staff officers, or plana mayor.

Even more constant is an

almost geometrical decline of peninsulars as one descends
from the staff down to the rank of sergeant.

At the level

of sergeant, the ratios are almost reversed, with creoles
outnumbering those of European descent by a margin of ten to
one.
In scanning the general staff, one notices several
officers whose country of origin was Ireland, which was not
uncommon in the Chilean army.

Many Irish Catholics fled to

Spain in the 1640's after their country fell under English
domination and the subsequent imposition of the Puritan
r e g i m e.^

In Spain, they were hospitably received and

freely admitted to posts in the government and military.

•^Thomas L. Coonan, The Irish Catholic Confederacy
and the Puritan Revolution (Dublin: Clonmore and Reynolds,
Ltd., 1954), 90-91.
•^Barros Arana, Historia general, VII, 8.
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Table 2
Nationalities of Enlisted Officers and Men36

ASAMBLEA DE CABALLERIA (Santiago)
(December, 1800)
Sergeants
Chile
11
Spain
0
Portugal 1

Lieutenants
Chile 6
Spain 4

General Staff
Chile
0
Spain
4

DRAGOON SQUADRON OF THE FRONTIER (Los Angeles)
(December, 1800)
Captains
Chile 5
Spain 2

General Staff
Chile 3
Spain 2

Lieutenants
Chile
5
Spain
1
Minorca 1

2nd Lieutenants
Chile
5
Spain
2

Sergeants
Chile 8
Spain 0
INFANTRY BATTALION OF VALDIVIA
(December, 1800)
Lieutenants
Chile 5~
Spain 1

Captains
Chile 4
Spain 1

General Staff
Chile
Spain
Ireland
Peru
Portugal

Sergeants
Chile 5
Spain 1

2nd Lieutenants
Chile 5
Spain 1

INFANTRY BATTALION OF THE FRONTIER (Concepcibn)
(December, 1805)
General Staff
Chile
0
Spain
4
Ireland 1

Captains
_______
Lieutenants
Chile
5
Chile
8
Spain
4
Spain
1
Puerto Rico 1
France 1
2nd Lieutenants
Sergeants
Chile 8
Chile 6
Spain 1
Spain 1

3 6 " h o j a s

CLXXXIII.

d e

servicio,"

1 8 0 0

and

1 8 0 5 ,

ACM, CLXV and
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A number of Irish officers came to Chile in the 1700' s, the
most notable of whom was Ambrosio 0 'Higgins, who came to the
colony as an engineer1s assistant and later became one of
the most able and respected presidents of his time.

Irish

officers were discriminated against in Chile but excelled in
their professions, a number of them becoming governors or
other prominent officers.37
The rank and file veteran soldiers were nearly all
Chileans, much more so than the officers.

After the arrival

of the infantry battalion of Concepcibn in 1778, no more
major detachments of peninsular troops were sent by the
crown.

Iii 1796, one of the infantry companies of the

Valdivia battalion was made up of seven peninsulars and
seventy Chileans, a figure illustrative of the predominate
Chilean composition.38

In 1800, the frontier dragoons were

distributed in the following manner, according to their
country of origin:

Spain
Chile
Buenos Aires
Minorca

9
408
1
__1

Total

41939

37A few of the prominent Irish officers in the army
were Juan Mackenna, Alejandro Eagar, Juan Clarke and Tomas
O'Higgins.
38,1'Revista de..., 1796, " AC M . CX.
•^Review of the frontier dragoon squadron, December
31, 1800, ACM, CLXV, 1-3.
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As a by-product of the protracted Indian wars* the
army became a dominant force in the society of southern
Chile.

Presidents of the colony were frequently military

men of distinguished records in Europe, for whom the colony
was another testing ground.

Here, they sharpened their

administrative and military skills before ascending to
higher positions, frequently in Peru.

Several presidents

during the 1700 's later became Peruvian viceroys, among them
Jos6 Manso de Velasco, Ambrosio 0 'Higgins, Manuel de Amat
and Agustin de J&uregui.
Officers were proud of their profession and their
role in combating the Araucanians.

Whether of Chilean or

peninsular extraction, they shared a common fraternal bond
of long years of hard work (or persistence) to attain their
rank.

A study of the service records of the frontier

dragoon squadron in 1800 reveals that the median age of its
seven captains was 49.8 years.4<"* Most had originally
enlisted as young men (probably as cadets) and had served an
average of 33.4 years in the army.

The captains were 43.4

years old before being promoted to that rank, after having
served a full 27 years of active service.

Most of the other

units displayed a similar age pattern in their advancement.
The officers of the Valdivia infantry battalion were an
exception, for they seem to have been subject to slower
promotions than the other units.

4DIbid.

In the same year (1800),

20
the battalion lieutenants also averaged 49.8 years of age
and were 43.2 years old before attaining the rank of
lieutenant.4^

This means that the Valdivia lieutenants

required the same number of years to attain a full rank lower
than their fellow officers in Concepcibn.
The commeradarie within the officer corps was mani
fested in a number of ways, one of which was the perpetuation
of the military tradition through two or more generations in
a family.

The sons of many officers were enrolled as army

cadets at early ages, frequently as young as eight or nine
years old.42

Officer marriages often required prior approval

by the crown, but the officers themselves guarded their
social prestige by selecting brides from as high a social
strata as possible.43

These men were understandably

sensitive to civilian challenges to their authority in the
administrative posts which they sometimes held.

They

especially looked down on militia officers, whose rank and
titles were often honorary, unaccompanied by the years of
frontier duty which they were forced to undergo before
. .
.
44
attaining positions of command.

41Ibid.
42"Revista de..., December, 1795," ACM, CIII.
^Encina, Historia de Chile, V, 439, 532.
^ B e f o r e leaving Chile to become Viceroy of Peru in
1796, President 0 'Higgins appointed a militia colonel, Jos6
de Aldunate, as interim military governor of the port of
Valparaiso ("Informe del..., September 15, 1796," Doc. No.
5430, JMDI. CCXIII). Francisco Borja de Araus, a veteran

21
Personal pride in their profession was one of the
few things which veteran officers could attain, for there
were few tangible benefits from a career of soldering.
Infrequent promotions, displacement from home and family,
the backward living conditions of garrisons, and physical
dangers were factors which kept most of these men from
attaining social prominence in the aristocracy.

The pay was

lower than in comparable civilian professions, and one
officer noted that after forty or fifty years of service,
"...

the men go to eternity, leaving their families wrapped

in misery and mendicancy.
As an institution, the Chilean army seems to bear
little resemblance to its counterpart in Mexico.

Af%

In the

viceregal center of New Spain, the size and organizational
complexity of the army spawned an organization which was
more sophisticated, acutely aware of its social status, and

lieutenant colonel of artillery, angrily wrote to the king
that he should have been selected for the post by virtue of
a c6dula of August 2, 1789, which automatically gave pref
erence in such cases to the senior veteran officer present.
He was joined in his outcry by two other prominent officers
who similarly asserted the right of Borja de Araus ("Carta
de..., June 14, 1796," Doc. No. 5425, JMDI. CCXIII). The
author has been unable to detect any record of sustained
jurisdictional disputes between the regular army and militia;
when challenged by civilians, however, they were quick to
assert what they felt was their privilege in administering
strategic districts.
^Encina, Historia de Chile, V, 439.
46Lyle N. McAlister, The "Fuero Militar" in New
Spain. 1764-1800 (Gainesville; University of Florida Press,
1957) .

more apt to become embroiled in jurisdictional rivalries
with other groups, such as merchant guilds or the bureau
cracy.^7

Especially in the capital and in urban areas, the

army and militia may have been useful mechanisms for social
advancement or aristocratic pretensions.

As Lyle McAlister

points out, acrimonious disputes arose between the army and
civilians over the application of military privileges, or
48

fueros.

Although McAlister restricts his study princi

pally to militia, the character of urban veteran units
seems to follow the same pattern of development:

frequent

jurisdictional conflicts with competing civilian interest
groups. 49v
Chile was a more simple, unsophisticated colony.

As

the

army was largely stationed in inaccessible forts, there

was

little basis for institutional rivalry or a self

inflated image which could bring on jurisdictional conflicts.
Nor

did a praetorian tradition emerge.

Indian campaigns and

Eeing immersed in

purely military matters, officers had

little idle time to have their honor affronted by civilians.
Instead, the officer corps pursued a more undramatic but

47Ibid., Chapters 3 and 4.

4SIbid.

4% n Chris ton Archer's study of the Mexican coastal
garrison of Veracruz, there is further evidence of the
hypothesis that proximity to colonial centers of government
was conducive to the growth of military prestige and influ
ence. In the Veracruz area disease, terrible living
conditions, and poverty combined to deter individuals from
using the army as a means of social advancement (Christon I .
Archer, "To Serve the King: Military Recruitment in Late
Colonial Mexico," HAHR. LV [May, 1975], 226-60).
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noteworthy role— that of the protector of Spanish society
along the frontier.
This contrasted sharply with the case of Peru, where
the absence of internal threats cast the army in a relatively weak role in society. 50

Peruvian viceregal power was

traditionally based on the church and civil bureaucracy, and
the military reforms of the later Bourbon rulers failed to
51
professionalize the existing veteran forces.

The Chilean

army was a pervasive and influential factor in the pre
dominately rural south.

It was a functional institution,

and its importance in preserving Spanish civilization there
established it as a vibrant and essential force.

50Leon G. Campbell, "The Changing Racial and Adminis
trative Structure of the Peruvian Military Under the Later
Bourbons," The Americas. XXXII (July, 1975), 117-33.
Slperuvian military reforms during the second half
of the 1700 's centered not around the veteran forces, but
the civilian militia. The proliferation of new militia
units, financially supported by rich creoles, was envi
sioned by colonial leaders as a means of simultaneously
decreasing expenditures and bolstering military readiness.
However, neither the veteran army nor the militia proved
effective, as shown by their ineffectualness in quelling the
Ttipac Amaru revolt in the early 1780' s (Leon G. Campbell,
"The Army of Peru and the Ttipac Amaru Revolt, 1780-1783, "
HAHR [February. 1976], 31-57).

Chapter 2
COASTAL DEFENSES
The Indian struggle was an inherent part of the
colonial history of Chile* perhaps the single most influ
ential element in the formation of the colonial character.
Militarily, the threat of foreign interlopers in the Pacific
almost rivaled the frontier war in importance.

As a result,

nearly half of all veteran troops were stationed along the
coasts as a defense against possible invasion.

Chileans

were thus compromised in combating separate enemies on two
fronts— the restive Araucanians in the interior and European
intruders along the coasts.

Regardless of the manner in

which the army was deployed, its back was turned to one of
these threats at all times.
To all appearances, it would seem that Chile was
amply protected by its own peculiar geography; a number of
natural barriers isolated and separated the land even from
contiguous Spanish possessions.

Chile was thousands of

miles distant from Europe, a j o u m e y requiring eight to ten
months to complete.

On the southern flank was Cape Horn,

the most formidable obstacle to vessels entering the
Pacific.

To the east lay the Andes mountains, stretching
24
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almost the entire length of the colony.

And to the north

was the barren Atacama desert.
Despite these natural defenses,, geography was the
very undoing of the colony, the impediment which complicated
its defense.

The 2,300 mile coastline was largely unin

habited and filled with an infinite number of deserted bays
and inlets, offering ideal sanctuary to foreign enemies.
The extended length of the colony made the supplying of the
far-flung garrisons a matter of considerable difficulty, not
to mention coordinating army movements and the dispatching
of reinforcements.

In consideration of these limitations,

the Spanish had constructed a number of forts in the prin
cipal harbors to counteract the periodic sorties of pirates
and the possibility of European naval invasion.
Valparaiso was the principal port of the colony and
the focal point of commercial activity.

Through its ware

houses passed the bulk of Chilean commerce, most notably the
wheat shipments to Peru.

Its strategic importance was

enhanced by its proximity to Santiago, which made it the hub
of governmental comings and goings.

The bay was capable of

holding numerous ships, although it was exposed along the
north and northeast to strong winds which buffeted the
anchorage, leaving vessels in jeopardy during the fierce
winter gales.1

■^Vicente Carvallo y Goyeneche, DescripciOn histbricojeogrAfica del reino de Chile (Santiago: Libreria del
Mercurio, 1875), CHDC, X, 81.
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The first defenses of the bay dated from 1676 when
the castle of Concepcibn was constructed, containing eight
cannon.

In 1684, President Josb de Garro initiated the

construction of the castle of San Josb at the foot of the
high bluffs facing the bay entrance as a precaution against
3
the raids of the English pirate Bartholomew Sharpe.

Until

the middle of the 1700 's, the port was not Valparaiso proper
but the castle of San Josb, which with its ten cannon served
as the governor's residence, troop barracks and military
warehouse.
By the late 1700's, four forts overlooked the bay.
San Josb and Concepcibn were located on either side of the
bay mouth.

Both were hardly more than flimsy batteries,

poorly constructed.
of the port:

Two more forts protected the interior

Baron on the north side and San Antonio along

the southern shore, the latter constructed to frustrate a
possible landing of troops along the beach.^

In reality,

San Antonio was merely a battery situated at water's edge at
the base of a high rock bluff, leaving its defenders highly
vulnerable in the event of an attack.

Both of these forts

were incapable of defending the entire scope of the bay and

2Ibid.. 82.
^Benjamin Vicuna Mackenna, Historia de Valparaiso
(Valparaiso: Imprenta del Mercurio, 1872), II, 110.
^"Relacibn que dejb el senor marqubs de Avilbs,
presidente de Chile, a su sucesor el sehor Joaquin del Pino,
1796-1797," AUC, XLVII (1875), 452.
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could only protect Spanish ships lying at anchor beneath
their guns.

There were no pilotboats, cannon launches, or

other naval vessels which could be used for defense or
reconnaissance.
In 1790, the total of Valparaiso's cannon numbered
C
seventy, thirty-seven of which were of bronze.
The com
plement of veteran troops consisted of only one artillery
company

(40 m e n ) , dubiously reinforced by four urban militia

companies
cavalry
men.

6

(a total of 280 men) and a squadron of militia

(134 m e n ) , bringing the total force to around 450
Valparaiso was regarded as the strongest port of the

colony, after Valdivia, and was considered to be reasonably
well fortified.
In contrast to Valparaiso, the bay of Concepcibn was
immense, by far the largest in Chile and capable of safely
holding the largest naval squadrons.

Furthermore,

it was

the best port along the coast because of its sheltered
7

anchorage and facilities for refitting and r e v i c t u a l m g .

Concepcibn was not a commercial center and was thus visited
by only two or three merchant ships each year, which took on

^ "Expediente formado sobre...curenas, 1790," ACM,
XCIX.
Bronze cannon were stronger
than those of ironand
were preferred in coastal fortresses as they would not rust.
^Vicuna Mackenna,

Historia

de Valparaiso, II,114.

^Amadeo Francisco Frezier,
Relacibn del viaje por el
mar del sur a las costas de Chile i el Peru durante los anos
de 1712, 1713, i 1714 (Santiago:
Imprenta Mejia, 1902), 12.
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board modest quantities of wine and wheat for export.
Although an excellent port, the bay was so vast in
size that defense was rendered almost impossible.

One

governor noted that because of the bay's expanse and the
numerous anchorages,
impossible."®

". . „ total defense is morally

In view of this fact, the Spanish contented

themselves with constructing several batteries at key
positions overlooking the major anchorages.

Merchant

vessels could thus be protected against a lone corsair or
two, but not against an invasion taskforce.

9

The mouth of the bay was almost blocked by the
island of Quiriquina.

On its south side, the pass was only

deep enough to permit entry of shallow draft lighters.

The

northern pass was a full two miles wide but defended by only
a small battery on Quiriquina.

While most ship captains

preferred to enter the bay to the north by sailing close to
the shelter of the island, the middle of the channel was
also navigable.

This would allow an enemy to enter almost

out of cannon r a n g e . I n s i d e the bay was another coastal
battery near the site of the original settlement of Concep
cibn.

The new town was located inland to the south, just

off the harbor between the Bio Bio and Andalibn rivers.

8 "Sobre Reparo...,

1763, " ACG. DCCVII, 18.

% e I c h o r Martinez, Memoria histbrica sobre la
revolucibn de Chile, desde el cautiverio de Fernando V I I ,
hasta 1814 (Valparaiso*
Imprenta Europea, 1848), 266.
10,1'Sobre Reparo..., 1763, " ACG, DCCVII,

18.
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Another battery protected the wharf and main anchorage in
front of the village of Talcahuano, a small cluster of huts
and warehouses which became the principal port of Concep
cibn

This battery was of no practical use because enemy

ships could anchor at any number of points to the north,
facilitating the safe landing of troops out of gun range.
An isthmus of land separated Concepcibn bay from a much
smaller bay, overlooked from surrounding bluffs by the rude
settlement of San Vicente.

It too, was a good port and

defended by a battery, but this defense could not prevent
troops from landing on the far side of the bay.

12

Both

settlements had little more than a few dozen residents at
most, and could thus be regarded as only token defenses
against a determined foe.
The veteran forces of Concepcibn consisted of a
single company of artillerymen, augmented by several rustic
militia and artillery companies.

As in the case of V a l 

paraiso, these were considered to be grossly insufficient for
the needs of the port.

A positive factor was the proximity

of the bay to the frontier infantry headquarters in Los
Angeles and to troops stationed along the chain of frontier
forts.

With these troops and militia from the nearby

settlements,

it was judged possible to amass over 1,000 men

to the bay area m

Ibid.

less than twenty-four hours.

11

"Relacibn que dejb...," AUC, XLVII, 454.

•^Carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripcibn, X, 95.

Valdivia occupied a very special position in the
scheme of Chilean defense, and was often referred to in
military correspondence of the time as the "key to the
kingdom" and "stronghold of the Pacific."'1'4

Not only did it

comprise the strongest and most extensive fortification
works of the colony, but was comparable in strategic impor1 C

tance to such fortresses as Callao and Panama. J

Although

it could not rival the labrynthian fortifications of
Cartagena, Valdivia was the primary defense of the southern
Pacific and the guardian against foreign incursions around
Cape Horn.

A complex of seventeen castles and batteries

with over one hundred cannon ringed the entire bay.

The

Spanish had expended enormous sums of money to accomplish
these ends.

One source estimated that from its refounding

in 1645 until 1750, over 36 million pesos were consumed in
the construction of defenses and fortifications
The bay was broad, and according to one estimate was
capable of holding up to twenty large ships at one time,
along with numerous others of smaller sxze.

17

Around the

southern perimeter were high bluffs upon which rested the
most formidable works, well above the fire from enemy

1 4 "Plan de...,

1769," AVG, XI, 11.

•^Memorias de los vireyes que han gobernado el Peru,
durante el tiempo del coloniaje espahol (Lima: Libreria
Central de Felipe Bailly, 1859), VI, 305.
•^Martinez, Memoria hist6r.ica, 262-63.
17 "La verdad.. 1 7 8 2 , "

AFA, XXV,

1.

vessels.

To the north of the bay, eleven miles upstream

along the winding Valdivia and Tornagaleones rivers, was the
city of Valdivia, accessible to deep draft vessels.

While

the bay was spacious, the many sand bars, shifting currents
and prevailing winds dictated that ships must maneuver and
anchor only in specific areas.

With this in mind, the

Spanish had taken detailed soundings of the entire harbor
floor in order to ascertain where vessels could navigate and
consequently, where forts should be constructed

(see Map 4).

The positioning of each cannon and reduct was the result of
meticulous calculation, with the knowledge that a single
weak point could be crucial in the control of the entire bay.
There were three areas of defense:

the entrance to the bay,

the anchorage, and the city and its approaches.
The southern side of the bay entrance was guarded by
several fortifications, the first of which was the lookout
post of Morrogonzalo on the promontory at the very edge of
the sea.

As it was the most forward position,

a sentry was

continuously posted here to detect the approach of enemy
vessels.

13

Next in line toward the bay was Aguada del

Ingles, a small reduct initially consisting of three cannon.
It was situated on a rocky cliff to impede a troop disem
barkation along the beach.

It possessed a protective ditch,

parapet and a barracks capable of housing 80 men.

19

The

18Ibid., 7.
^Gabriel Guarda, La toma de Valdivia
Zig Zag, 1970), 37.

(Santiago:

Norrogontilo
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Map 4
The Bay and Fortress Complex of Valdivia*
*Atlas de don L£zaro de Rivera.
Nacional.

Sala Medina, Biblioteca

fort of San Carlos was constructed by the engineer Juan Birt
in 1762 on a tiny peninsula defended by up to twelve 24—
calibre cannon and a furnace for turning out red hot shot.

20

As it was a key to the bay entrance, the presence of a 100man garrison was considered imperative, although the actual
number never approached this figure.
To the side of San Carlos was the battery of El
Barro, constructed in 1687 and provided with two barracks
capable of housing 100 troops.

Its ten cannon were

positioned in such a manner as to flank the entire beach and
land approaches to Aguada del Ingl6s, preventing a force from
taking the forts from the rear.

9 1

At the narrowest point of

the bay entrance was the castle of Amargos, mounting twelve
24-calibre cannon.

Like San Carlos, Amargos possessed an

oven for red hot shot.

22

Built under the direction of the

Conde de Alba y Liste in 1677, the structure was imposing.
Its cannon pointed towards the pass to cross fire with those
of Niebla on the opposite side of the bay.

Completing the

defenses of the southern approach was Chorocamayo Bajo, a
light battery of six cannon designed to complement the fire
from Amargos.
It was between Morrogonzalo and Aguada del Inglds
that an enemy landing was deemed most likely.

2 0 "La verdad..., 1782," AFA, XXV, 19.
2 1 "Revista de la guerra," CHDI, V, 341.
22Ibid., 340.

In positioning

guns to cover the land flanks of this area, the Spanish were
aided by the rocky shore line, which afforded no smooth
beaches for disembarkation.

From Aguada all along this

portion of the coast was undergrowth so dense that the
garrison troops were accustomed to by-pass this route by
water.

Cannon fire from Aguada, El Barro and Chorocamayo

Bajo was designed to rake the shore line with shot and gain
valuable time until infantry reinforcements could be brought
to bear on the threatened area.

These reinforcements,

combined with the uneven terrain and undergrowth through
which the enemy must pass, could ideally stall a frontal
attack until the enemy's ammunition was exhausted.

23

The

guns from these batteries were also designed to defend the
flanks of Amargos, which jutting seaward with its cannon
facing the bay mouth was exposed to attack from the rear.
Initiating the line of defenses along the northern
shore of the bay entrance was the battery of El Molino,
analogous in location to Morrogonzalo on the southern shore.
Constructed in 1779 with four 24-calibre cannon,

its

function was to prevent an infantry landing along the narrow
beach at its front, from which Niebla could be stormed from
the rear.

24

El Molino overlooked the only beach along the

rocky shore line and was naturally defended by currents and
undertows which made troop disembarkation a dangerous under
taking.

The fort of Niebla was situated on the northern side

23ibid., 341.

24Ibid., 343.
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of the narrow strait leading to the harbor.

During the

1760's, it mounted approximately nineteen cannon, which were
positioned to present a deadly cross fire with Amargos,
directly across the strait.

25

An enemy assault by sea would be forced to actually
penetrate the harbor.

In order to accomplish this it would

be necessary to sail close to the shore line in the initial
approach to avoid the dangerous currents which swept up the
coast from the south, all the while exposed to fire from the
southern perimeter forts.

A precise channel existed by

which ships could enter the narrow strait, being forced to
pass between the rocky coast of Niebla and the large sand
bars in the center of the bay.26

It was inconceivable to

the Spanish that a ship could maneuver through the channel,
unfamiliar with its peculiar currents and winds, while
simultaneously enduring cannon barrages from Amargos and
Niebla.
Assuming an invading squadron passed the strait
intact, it faced the second area of defense— the bay.

The

anchorages were of special importance, for although the
harbor could hold a number of ships, these could safely
anchor at only certain points.

A roadstead existed in front

26Vicente Rodriguez Casado and Florentino Pdrez
Embid (eds.), Memoria de gobierno del virrey Amat (Sevilla:
Editorial Catdlica, 1947), 651-52.
26Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, Noticias secretas
de America (Madrid: Editorial Madrid, 1918), I, 66.
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of Niebla capable of holding two or three vessels but was
unused as it was exposed to strong winds which could drive
ships onto the rocky shore.

The only secure anchorage was

the inlet sheltered by high bluffs in front of the castle of
C o r r a l . ^7

This fort was originally composed of three

separate units:

Argolla, the northern portion; San

Sebasti&n, the southern reduct; and La Cortina, the great
wall that joined both into a single structure.

28

The walls

were defended by twenty to thirty 24-calibre cannon which
could be loaded with red hot shot, making this the most
OQ
formidable structure on the bay.
The walls of the
interior fort were over 110 feet wide and nearly 20 feet
high.

Inside were stone barracks spacious enough for 200

troops„30
To the immediate west of Corral was the battery of
Bolson, which mounted nine cannon and pointed towards the
O1
anchorage.
Atop the bluffs to the west of Bolson was
Chorocamayo Alto, the most strategically placed battery of
all with a minimum of six to a maximum of seventeen cannon.
Its elevated position rendered it immune to fire from ships,
while at the same time giving the gunners a clear field of

37Ibid., 66.
2®Guarda, La toma de Valdivia, 36.
2 9 "La verdad...,
30

1782," AFA, XXV,

• •
Guarda, La toma de Valdivia, 36.

31Ibid.

2.
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fire over all ships transiting the bay from the entrance to
the anchorage.3^

in addition to furnaces for red hot shot,

this battery was armed with chain cannon balls, used to
dismast enemy vessels.
The third area of defense was that of Valdivia and
the approaches to the city.

To the southeast of Corral was

the battery of Santa Rosa, defending the entrance to the
inlet of San Juan.

The island of Mancera was located midway

between the mouths of the Valdivia and Tornagaleones rivers,
with three forts to block upstream traffic.

San Pedro de

Alcantara, founded in 1645, became the principal fort but was
later abandoned in 1779.

In the extreme southwest of the

island was Baides, defending the entrance to the Tornaga
leones River, but likewise dismantled in 1748.

Another

battery of eight cannon rested upon a hill facing towards
Corral.33
Guarding the entrance to the Valdivia River on the
Niebla side was the battery of Piojo with two 24-calibre
cannon.

On the other side of the river lay Carboneros, with

three cannon.

These batteries were normally manned only in

times of impending attack.34

It was believed that without

possession of the city an invader would soon exhaust his
supplies and be forced to abandon the bay.

32jyiartlnez, Memoria histbrica, 262.
Guarda, La toma de Valdxvia, 32.
3 4 "La verdad..., 1782, " AFA. XXV, 4.
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To the infrequent merchant ships entering the bay,
the sight of over one hundred cannon must have certainly
presented a formidable, if not fearsome, appearance.
Valdivia possessed a certain contradictory quality.

Yet,
On the

one hand, it was Spain's bastion in the south Pacific, where
great sums of money had been spent in erecting fortifications.
On the other hand, the city and garrison were dependent for
survival on an annual supply ship, while the infantry
battalion was composed of rogues and convicts.

These were

only two of the flaws which undermined Valdivia's defense.
In terms of the deployment of defenses there were
visible shortcomings.

The island of Maneera, which ideally

should have been almost invulnerable, was considered acces
sible on nearly every side except that which faced the
anchorage.
cannon.

This was due to the faulty positioning of its

It was considered useless as a defensive position.

Actually, the batteries of Piojo and Carboneros were
originally constructed to protect Mancera, rather than
defend the Valdivia River against ships sailing upstream.

OC

Amargos similarly presented a weak field of fire because its
guns pointed away from the land, leaving open the possibility
of a flanking attack by foot soldiers.

And Niebla was

regarded by a number of tacticians as obsolete.

In their

opinion, its location so far forward on a point of land
subjected it to enfilades of fire down its entire length

35 "Sobre Reparo..., 1763," ACG, DCCVII,

12.
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from ships passing between it and Mancera.36

Finally, in

1765, an officer of the garrison, Pablo de la Cruz y
Contreras, noted ten points inside the bay where troops
could be landed without being menaced by cannon fire.

37

In view of the many batteries encircling the bay, it
was logical to assume that an enemy would not dare to venture
into the harbor to meet the onslaught of massed cannon but
would land on the shore behind them, taking the forts one
by one.

This was perhaps the most obvious weakness of the

entire complex.

The engineering officer Juan Mackenna

reflected in 1810 that the forts on the southern perimeter
were so isolated and helpless with their guns facing toward
the sea that an enemy force of 400 to 500 men could dis
embark behind San Carlos on the beach of Aguada del Ingl6s
with relative safety.

By then advancing along the heights

behind the forts, these troops could catch the Spanish com• 5 0

pletely exposed to their fire and force them to surrender.
Ten years later, the invading squadron of Lord Thomas
Cochrane took Valdivia by duplicating this strategy.
Cochrane landed 600 men from two ships in front of Aguada
del Ingl6s, who took the entire succession of forts in less
than two da y s .
A key to the protection of the bay was the cannon

3^Martinez, Memoria histdrica, 262.
07

Guarda, La toma de Valdivia, 50.

3®Martinez, Memoria histOrica,

262.
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cross fire from the various forts, which could saturate
approaching vessels from two sides.

In particular, the

Spanish regarded the cannon trajectories from Niebla,
Amargos and Mancera as a theoretically deadly triangle of
cross fire against any hostile warship.

Among the proponents

of this cross fire theory was the military engineer Olaguer
Feliti, who claimed the power of the guns was such that shots
from these forts could cross to the other side of the bay,
"...

their balls ricocheting or rebounding on the opposite

shores."

O Q

And yet, the distances within the bay were such

that one may seriously doubt whether the Spanish were secure
in their logic, if not flatly deceived by the judgment of
Olaguer.

Over one full mile of water separated Amargos and

Niebla, the narrowest point of the bay entrance.

In

addition, Niebla was separated from Corral by a distance of
a mile and a half.

In any attempt to force the bay entrance

by an enemy, gunners from either fort would be forced to
fire at moving targets over half a mile away with a high
degree of accuracy.

Considerable damage could be wrought in

this manner, but crippling the aggressor in his passage of
the straits is questionable. 40
The answers to these and similar questions went
largely unanswered, for the bay was not besieged during the

3 ^ " I n f o r m e sobre la defensa..., 1807," AMG, C.
40The maximum range of eighteenth-century cannon was
roughly one mile.
(Albert Manucy, Artillery through the
Ages [u. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C .,
Reprint, 1956]), 32.
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eighteenth century.

One element was certain, however.

The

weakest link in Valdivia's defense was not the ring of stone
fortifications but the troops who manned them.

The entire

concept of the bay's defense revolved around the coordination
of artillery fire and the mobility of troops in moving to
threatened landing points, maneuvers involving infinite
skill and precision.

These qualities were almost absent

because of the low quality of the average soldier and the
woefully insufficient number of troops.

At some point in

his administration, nearly every governor voiced the urgent
need for increased numbers of troops.

The garrison force

of four to five hundred infantry barely sufficed for pro
tection of the forts themselves, not counting the many
support troops which would be necessary to repel an invasion.
In February, 1796, a defense council in Spain concluded that a
minimum of 1,200 combat troops would be needed to thwart an
enemy landing.^
As heavy ordinance constituted the principal
weaponry of Valdivia, it was essential that enough qualified
artillerymen be kept on hand for any contingency.

The

artillery squadron of Valdivia consisted of only six master
gunners and seventeen artillerymen, a somewhat ludicrous
number when considering that they were charged with the
operation and firing of over one hundred cannon.

When

^"Oficio del..., February 18, 1796," Doc. No. 9096,
JMDI. CCLXLV, 118.
4 2 "Razdn de los Sueldos..., 1800," ACM, XLIX, No. 7.
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Captain Tamcis O'Higgins inspected the fortress in 1797, he
expressed the most severe reservations as to the garrison's
ability to repel an enemy.

He noted that the cannon were

loaded and ready but that should an attack occur,

. .

these could not be counted with more than one shot for each
cannon.In

this statement, he was referring to the

deficiencies of the artillerymen, not the capacity of the
cannon.

It was this substandard quality of the troops and

their insufficient numbers which comprised the real
vulnerability of Valdivia.
The province of Chilo6 was the southernmost strong
hold of the Spanish, the very first line of defense against
enemy ships rounding Cape Horn.

The arduous journey from

Europe was of such duration that even if a corsair stopped
in the Azores or along the Atlantic coast of South America,
the first objective after entering the Pacific was normally
that of putting in at a sheltered inlet to obtain fresh food
and water.

Not only would Chilofe serve as a temporary

shelter, it would also provide an excellent base of opera
tions against Valdivia or other ports along the coast.

The

Spanish realized that with so few vessels at their disposal,
this island fortress might be nearly impossible to retake if

4-1

"Viaje de .. .Tom&s de 0'Higgms,
XXXIII, 11.

1796-1797," AFA,

overrun by an enemy.
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.
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With the implementation of registry

shipping in the Pacific during the 1740's, the island came
to be regarded as an especially likely target for visit,: by
enemy vessels.
The archipelago of Chilo6 consisted of over one
thousand small islands, but the only one of importance was
Isla Grande, an elongated island paralleling the mainland
and separated from it by a broad channel of water.

The

western or seaward side contained no settlements, but along
the sheltered eastern shore were three fortified positions:
Castro, Chacao and San Carlos.
The fort of San Carlos was constructed in a wellsheltered inlet of the Bay of Lacuy, along the northern
shore of Isla Grande.

It consisted of stone walls with

parapets and positions for up to twenty-four cannon. 45
After 1767, it was the chief fortress of the island, housing
the provincial government, royal officials and governor.

As

the only port of Chilo£ directly exposed to the Pacific, it
was thought to be the most likely target for attack. 46
To the east of San Carlos lay the fort of Chacao on

4^In 1767, the president of Chile acknowledged the
receipt of communiques from Spain warning of possible
English attacks in the Pacific. According to Spanish intel
ligence sources, the English planned to establish a base not
on the mainland, but on the islands between Chilob and the
Strait of Magellan. ("El G o b e m a d o r .. ., February 23, 1767,"
Doc. No. 4566, JMDI, CLXLIV, 25) .
45 Carvallo y Goyeneche, DescripciOn, X, 317.
“^Martinez, Memoria histbrica, 261.
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the southern shore of the narrow chacao Channel, which
separated Chilofe from the mainland.

It was through this

strait that boats passed to reach settlements on the eastern
side of the island.

A small fort and a few cannon were

posted here, although the chief deterrant to attack was the
powerful current which rushed through the straits at great
A *7

velocity. 7

The town of Castro was located in the center of

the island's eastern side.

The fort there was likewise a

very minor structure with several cannon overlooking the
anchorage.48

In addition to these defenses, there was

another fort named Calbuco located on a small island to the
northeast of Isla Grande, just off the mainland.

It

defended the northern shore of the Chacao Channel and acted
as a communication outpost with the mainland.4^

Its only

population was the military garrison and families of the
troops.
During most of the 1700's, the veteran forces on
Chilo6 consisted of one dragoon company (53 men) defending
San Carlos and Chacao, an infantry company (53 men) stationed
in Calbuco, and an artillery company (33 men) in San Carlos.
Late in the 1700's, these forces were increased substantially
to battalion force, or around 400 troops.

47 Ibid. 317.

50

The militia

48Ibid., 316.

4 9 "Relaci6n que..., February 15, 1773," Doc. No.
7491, JMPI, CCLIX, 131-32.

50"Discurso que hace..., 1782," Doc. No. 7492, JMDI.
CCLIX, 254.
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comprised 23 companies, or a total of 680 cavalry and 1,145
51
infantry.

The island of Juan Fernandez served as a fortress
not from any intrinsic value of the land but because its
location on the same latitude as Valparaiso could make it
attractive as a base for enemy vessels preying upon Spanish
shipping.

Discovered in 1585 by the explorer Antonio Veci

and his pilot, Juan Fernandez, the island remained deserted
and forgotten until the 1740's when Lord Anson's English
squadron used it to repair their damaged

s

h

i
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s

.

Alarmed

that the island might be used as a base for foreign inter
vention in the Pacific, the Spanish crown instructed
President Ortiz y Rozas to colonize and fortify it with all
the resources at his disposal.

In March of 1750, a ship

departed from Valparaiso carrying the island's first
colonists— one infantry company, 171 settlers, and 22 convict
laborers .
The island was fortified along its eastern shore,
which was somewhat sheltered from strong winds and offered
several small bays in which ships could anchor.

By 1800,

5^-Carlos Olguin, InstituciQnes politicas y administrativas de Chilofe en el siglo XVIII (Santiago: Editorial
Juridica, 1970), 95, 97.
C O

-^Thaddaeus P. Haenke, DescripciOn del reino de
Chile (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, 1942), 67.
53Benjamin Vicuna Mackenna, Juan Fernandez, historia
verdadera de la isla de Robinson Crusoe (Santiago: Rafael
Jover, 1883), 269-70.
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some forty-one cannon protected the eastern side, arranged
in seven batteries from Puerto Franc6s to Puerto Ingl6s.54
There were two gunpowder storehouses, several clusters of
houses for the troops and settlers and the fort of Santa
Barbara,

Normally, one company of troops from the frontier

infantry battalion served there, being augmented in times of
danger by one or two additional companies.

Through neces

sity and custom, the convicts encarcerated there also served
as soldiers and were armed when the occasion demanded.
That the island should remain fortified was seldom
in question; it would offer a prime base of operations for
the infrequent incursions of corsairs.

However, there was

no consensus on the role of Juan Fernandez in the scheme of
Chilean defense;
sion.

that is, defense against foreign aggres-

For this reason, only a detachment of troops were

stationed there to maintain token sovereignty.

While the

Spanish presence did prevent the island from being utilized
as a European base, it could in no way safeguard other parts
of the colony.

It is ironic that the nearby island of Mas

Afuera became a well-known haunt of foreign seal hunters and
whalers.
These were the coastal defenses of the colony.

In

providing for the maintenance and security of these posi
tions, the Spanish faced a number of formidable obstacles.

54 Ibid.. 376.

55"Plan de..., 1769," AVG, XI, 9.
Letter of O'Higgins, Santiago, October 1, 1794, AMV,
XXI, 136.
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The most acute of these was the financing of fortifications,
a persistent preoccupation not only in Chile but in all of
Spanish America.

Defense was an ambiguous concept, contin

gent not so much upon actual need but upon the availability
of royal funds? the recommendations made by a procession of
visiting military engineers and technical experts were never
fulfilled intact, but normally served as a set of priorities
from which only the most pressing project might be
selected.

56

Their meticulous charts and prolific analyses

were largely ignored by governors who strove to balance
their slim budgets against royal exhortations to maintain an
ever-vigilant defense.

So insistent was the crown in

trimming military expenditures that Chilean troops were
normally forced to pay for their own uniforms, so that when
President Ambrosio Benavides broke precedent in the 1780's
by presenting each soldier with a complete, free uniform,
one officer observed that " . . .

this grace is not frequent

in that land."57
As long as the colony was preoccupied by an inter
mittent Indian war, virtually no amount of royal money could
secure the coast, because the simultaneous need to maintain
the frontier garrisons split and diffused the veteran troops.
During the frequent intervals when Spain was involved in

5^"Informe expedido..., March, 1793, " Doc. No. 5300,
JMDI. CCXI, 35.
57Carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripcidn, X, 424.
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continental wars, it was commonplace for the coastal forces
to be considerably reinforced against a possible invasion.
This could be done only by reducing the frontier forts to
mere skeleton garrisons.

One of the most calamitous pros

pects of a president was the possibility of a simultaneous
Indian uprising and the presence of foreign ships along the
coast.

This condition of splintered forces and a two-front

war prevented the army from containing either threat with
any degree of success.
It was also feared that European enemies might
capitalize on the Indian animosity by making an alliance
against the Spanish.

President 0 'Higgins was especially

mindful of this possibility, urging the Intendant of
Chilo6;
In all of your activities, particular care should
be lent to ascertaining if foreigners initiate com
munication with the Indians. You should continually
warn them of the cunning, deceit, and intentions they
have of establishing settlements along the coasts,
for the purpose of illicit trade or perhaps to invade
these
58
l
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One of the primary Spanish objectives in the parliaments
with the Indians was to obtain pledges of alliance or at
least their acquiescence in the eventuality of European
invasion.

At such times when war was declared in Europe, the

major Indian chiefs were sought out in order to obtain their

58

O'Higgins to the Intendant of Chilo6, Santiago,
November 5, 1791, ACG, DCCLXXXII, 490.
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verbal support against the enemies of the crown.

The

doubtful nature of Indian loyalties added another dimension
to the insecurity of the colony.

Because the Indians could

not be trusted, colonial leaders wavered uncertainly between
armed aggression and overtures of peace, depending on the
magnitude of foreign threat.
Leaders of the colony were all too aware of the
position of weakness from which they dealt.

In his dis

course concerning the defense of Chile in 1806, the
secretary of government Judas Tadeo Reyes was of the opinion
that:
It must be surmised that it is physically impos
sible to maintain the necessary defenses in the
extension of nearly six hundred leagues of open
coasts with innumerable ports, coves and inlets
that compose the colony. Even confining ourselves
to the most important fortified points of Valdivia,
Talcahuano, Valparaiso, city of La Serena and
islands of Juan FernSndez, we are totally exposed
for lack of proportionate g a r r i s o n s .60
Discounting the threat of individual corsairs, it was be
lieved that a coordinated invasion would consist of several
thousand well-armed troops with their accompanying baggage
and artillery, abundant munitions, and with the intent of
establishing a permanent foothold in the Pacific.

With

its forces dispersed along the frontier or in isolated

59"E1 Presidente..„, October 8, 1780," Doc. No. 4752,
JMDI, CLXLVII, 142-47.
"Informe sobre..., September 14, 1806, " AV,
CCXXXVII, 12.
61 Ibid., 14.
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pockets in the coast, the Chilean army would have been
obliged to meet the enemy from a definite position of weak
ness.
Cognizant of the many points of entry along the
coast and the limited number of troops on hand, colonial
military officers followed the principle of concentrating
the available forces among only the most vital ports.
Spanish strategists were of a like opinion.

During a meeting

of the royal junta de fortificacibnes in Madrid in 1805, one
of the topics submitted for consideration was the possibility
of fortifying Paposo, a deserted bay near Antofagasta.

The

junta resolved that it would be folly to fortify the bay,
not only because of the great costs involved, but also
because this would only present an enemy with another
enticement for sacking and pillage.

Besides spreading the

chain of defenses even thinner, it could only offer addi
tional incentive to corsairs who otherwise would have had no
reason to anchor along the empty coast.^2
The crux of the defense problem was the lack of
adequate Spanish sea power in the Pacific, which left
merchant shipping vulnerable to pirates and the coasts
unprotected against contrabandists.

This also rendered the

fortresses subject to extended enemy sieges, with little
fear of naval retaliation or re inforcement by sea.

A

6 2 "La Junta de..., February 17, 1805," Doc. No. 5584,
JMDI, CCXVIII.
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permanent naval squadron was the only means of changing the
defensive stance to an offensive capability.

Such a task-

force did not necessarily have to be large, as the most
frequent acts of belligerency were the raids of individual
pirate vessels.

However, the squadron had to be free of all

duties extraneous to those of patrolling the sea.
As with the system of fortifications, the scarcity
of funds was the overriding obstacle to the creation of a
Pacific squadron.

The Spanish navy possessed too few war

ships of its own for the European and Mediterranean theaters
of action, and could not relinquish ships to the relatively
peaceful Pacific Ocean.

Those royal warships which visited

Chilean and Peruvian ports from time to time came for a
specific purposes

to conduct situados, to deliver mail, or

to transport military supplies from Spain.

There were

shipyards along the coast, notably in Guayaquil where most
/* o

of the ships along the Pacific coast were built.

In

Chile, shipyards operated irregularly at Chilob, Valdivia
and Concepcibn.

One source found that between 1784 and 1811,

a total of seventeen ships were constructed in these p o r t s . ^
In view of the availability of timber resources, it seems
that the major factor inhibiting the creation of a squadron
was the cost of construction and maintenance.

According to

the computations of Viceroy Amat, a frigate of twenty-six

63Juan and Ulloa, Noticias secretas. I, 78.
64vicuna Mackenna, Historia de Valparaiso, II,
136-37.
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cannon and a crew of 267 men consumed 5,886 pesos each month,
an amount which the Peruvian treasury could not afford.

65

During the 1750 's, the naval force was composed of
two vessels, the Esperanza. of fifty cannon, and the San
Perm in, of forty cannon.

Their armament came from two other

ships and several galleys in the Guayaquil shipyard, which
were found inserviceable and stripped of all useful materials.
These ships proved grossly inadequate for their intended use.
Thus, when English warships were at one point rumored to be
in the Pacific, both vessels were promptly anchored in
Callao harbor to augment the cannon fire from the forts, and
were of no use in patrolling the coasts.^
The general tenor of naval defense remained roughly
similar to this throughout the following decades.

Possess

ing no war vessels of their own, Chileans were forced to
accept the decisions of the viceroy regarding the movements
of warships and their patrol routes.

This proved to be a

source of irritation to the presidents.

In 1780, President

Tomas Alvarez de Acevedo complained to Minister of the
Indies Jos6 de Galvez, concerning the naval squadron then in
Valparaiso.

He protested that the squadron commander com

municated his actions in Chilean waters either to the
viceroy or to the crown; thus, he felt there was no

(1C

Rodriguez and P6rez (eds.), Memoria del virrey
Amat, 795.
^ Memorias de los vireyes, IV, 262, 265.
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coordination in the use of these forces or in protecting
those areas considered important by Chileans.^7

It was not

that authorities in Lima viewed the coasts of southern Chile
with anything but the highest esteem.

However, with the

limited naval forces on hand, it naturally seemed more
important to assure the security of the Peruvian coasts in
the event of military crisis.
In the 1790's. Viceroy Gil de Taboada y Lemus
envisioned the formation of a true squadron of warships
capable of dealing with any threat on the part of foreign
powers.

The plan centered around two existing war frigates,

the Limeno and the Peruano (each with eighteen cannon) , two
additional vessels whose construction had been approved by
the king, and an additional frigate or two from the royal
navy.

These would be reinforced by several armed merchant

vessels, bringing the total force to fifteen.^®

Obstructed

by high costs and a scarcity of men and material, the pro
ject never reached fruition.

Several years later, the sea

force was again found to be reduced to two bergantines.6 9^
These sufficed in times of peace and for routine police duty
but were completely insufficient to deal with the influx

67"El Presidente..., September 7, 1780," Doc. No.
4755, CLXLVII, 154-55.
68Memorias de los vireyes, VI, 306-307.
6 ^Ricardo Donoso, El marqufes de Osorno, don Ambrosio
0 ‘Higgins, 1721-1801 (Santiago; Imprenta Universitaria,
1941), 467-68.
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of foreign whalers and contrabandists, which by that time
had proliferated throughout the Pacific.
The saving grace of the colony was the fact that an
invasion never came during the eighteenth century.

The

English and other enemies of Spain were enmeshed in European
conflicts and were either disinterested or too preoccupied
with other matters to undertake a Pacific venture of any
magnitude.

As the colonial era neared its conclusion, the

major concern became not the possibility of invasion, but
aggressive foreign entrepreneurs and smugglers intent on
breaking down trade restrictions of the empire.

Chile's

principal defenses remained its geographic inaccessibility,
its isolation, and general European apathy towards this
remote colony.

Chapter 3
FOREIGN THREATS IN THE PACIFIC
On entering the eighteenth century, Spain left
behind the guilded age of its European grandeur and the
zenith of its world power.

It had taken only a century

from the union of Castile and Aragon until the annexation of
Portugal (1479-1580) to achieve European supremacy and like
wise, only another century (1598-1700) to descend to the
status of a second-rate monarchy.1

The accession of the

French Bourbons to the Spanish throne in 1700 heralded a new
era of renewed political strength and a revitalized economic
life, culminating in the enlightened reign of Charles III.
However, the recovery was a slow and painful process.

The

first decades of the century were characterized by rebuilding,
renovation, and the patient eradication of Hapsburg tradi
tionalism.
Concurrent with the plight of the peninsula, Spanish
America was also in the throes of severe crisis.

The

colonies found themselves challenged in their long-standing
monopoly of Indies wealth by the English and other European

ljos6 Maria Jover, et al., Historia de Espana (2nd
ed.; New York: Las Americas Publishing Company, 1965), 290.
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adversaries.

This challenge was manifested not only through

military aggression but by subtle trading and smuggling,
which drained the colonies of their coveted wealth and
weakened the ties of royalism.

The cracks in the super

structure of Spanish colonial power were not so much
attributable to inherent weaknesses within the Indies, but
to the diminishing power of the mother country and the con
cessions which it was forced to make to its victorious
enemies.

The implications of these political and territorial

concessions were profound and destined to give Chile a new
character in the scheme of colonial enterprise.
The War of Spanish Succession (1702-1713) was the
initial testing of Spain's declining international prestige
and set a precedent for repeated colonial concessions which
it would be required to make to the victors of European
struggles.

As victors over the combined French and Spanish

forces, the English were able to extract from the latter an
invaluable agreement concerning trade and commercial priv
ileges in America.

This was the asiento, or the right of

the English to be the sole suppliers of Negro slaves to
Spanish America for a period of thirty years.^

The asiento

trade was assigned to the South Sea Company, which through a
network of agents in colonial ports became a front for

2Arthur S. Aiton, "The Asiento Treaty as Reflected
in the Papers of Lord Shelburne," HAHR, VIII, No. 2 (Mav.
1928), 167-68.
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widespread contrabanding.3
With the outbreak of war between Britain and Spain
in 1739, the company was ejected from the colonies.

How

ever, the firm foothold which it had established opened the
door to a proliferation of smuggling in less conspicuous
American ports.

During the ensuing decades, the popularity

of these new commercial areas rose to the point where
Spanish anxieties over the monopoly of the South American
and Pacific trades equaled those felt earlier in the century
for their possessions in the Caribbean and Central America.^
Another cause of the increasing importance of the
Pacific colonies was the decline of the commercial fleet
system originated by the Hapsburgs and its replacement with
a more vigorous, competitive system known as registry
shipping. Moribund by 1700, the fleet system was briefly
revived in 1720, but soon fell afoul of the largely illegal
competition of the English and the maritime confrontations
which resulted.

s

The War of J e n k m ' s Ear, beginning in 1739,

because of one such confrontation, brought an end to all
efforts to revive the old system.

6

3Vera Lee Brown, "Contraband Trade: A Factor in the
Decline of Spain1s Empire in America," HAHR, VIII, No. 2
(May, 1928), 179-80.
4 Ibid.. 189.
3For a description of the fleet system routes see
C. H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1947), 325-26.
^Valentin V&squez de Prada, "Las rutas comerciales
entre Espana y America en el siglo XVIII," AEA, XXV (1968),
208.
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In 1740, all fleet traffic was suspended and replaced
by a system of registered ships sailing from Cadiz to
specific ports in America.

7

While merchant monopolists were

later successful in reinstituting the Veracruz fleet (which
sailed intermittently from 1757 until its demise in 1789),
in only a few short years, the dominance of registry
shipping over its aging counterpart was an acknowledged
fact. 8

As the range of privileges was gradually extended to

more Spanish American ports and as intercolonial trade
became sanctioned, heretofore marginal regions of the
Venezuelan coast, the Windward Islands and Buenos Aires
experienced unprecedented commercial expansion.
One of the most preferential locale for registry
shipping in South America was the La Plata area, but a con
siderable number of ships risked crossing Cape Horn to
Q
reach Chilean and Peruvian ports
From a military stand
.

J

point, the increased levels of commercial traffic in the
Pacific intensified the threat of corsairs and enemy war
ships .

Considering the traditional absence of a Spanish

Pacific squadron, there was very little that could be done

7
Haring, op. cit., 336-37.
ohn Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, 17821810; The Intendant System in the Viceroyalty of the Rio de
la Plata (London: Athlone Press, 1958), 10.
9According to Benj amin Vicuna Mackenna, between 1743
and 1748 no less than eighteen chartered vessels arrived at
Callao, alone (Vicuna Mackenna, Historia de Valparaiso, II,
34) .
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to counteract the entry of Europeans in these waters.

In

the following decades, the Pacific was to experience a
tremendous upsurge of foreign traffic among not only
smugglers and traders but enemy vessels in search of registry
ships and bases for raiding.

This increased traffic changed

Chile's military status within the empire.
Within the scope of Spain's New World possessions,
Chile was traditionally not one of the more critical areas
of defense, nor was it an important territorial pawn which
changed hands frequently during the course of the colonial
period.

Isolated as it was from both the mother country and

its foes, Chile occupied a modest niche in the overall scheme
of colonial domain— that of a link in preserving the Pacific
coast as Spanish territory.
The fundamental strategic role of the colony in the
Spanish orb was its relationship with the viceroyalty; Chile
served as the southern defense perimeter of Peru and the
Ip

first line defense against enemies rounding Cape Horn.
analyzing the defense of

In

his vast jurisdiction in 1796,

Viceroy Gil de Taboada y Lemus isolated three potential
threats.

The first and most genuine threat came from

foreign invasion and piratical incursions along the coast.
The second came from insurrection on the part of the
Peruvian Indians inhabiting the sierra, many of whom still
harbored vengeance towards the Spanish for the subjugation

•^OMemorias de los vireyes, V, 161.

of their race.

(It is noteworthy that the viceroy held the

foreign threat uppermost in his mind over that of Indian
revolt, despite the recent Tupac Amaru rebellion.)

The

third area of concern was the weak Spanish grasp over the
borderlands and the volatile nature of the Indian tribes
living there.

While he considered this as the least

hazardous of the three, he treated it with equal precaution
in the knowledge that Spain's enemies were ever-vigilent in
exploiting Indian resentment to further their territorial
acquisitions.

He pointed out that the Portuguese had

capitalized on this animosity in the Sacramento area (which
he feared might eventually lead to a confrontation with
Spain)
Gi l 's analysis reflected the general consensus among
a succession of Peruvian viceroys that foreign incursions
did indeed constitute the chief danger to their domains.
Accordingly, coastal defense became the overriding military
concern during their administrations.

Chile occupied a
I O

position of prime importance in this overall strategy. ^
Viceroy Gil enumerated six critical points of coastal
defense through the viceroyalty:

Valdivia; Chilo6; Juan

Fem&ndez; Valparaiso; Panama; and Guayaquil *1*3

It is

11 Ibid., VI, 304.
•^Rodriguez

and P6rez

(eds.), Memoria del virrey

Amat, 650.
-^Memorias de los vireyes, VI, 305.

61
significant that four of these six areas were in Chile.
Despite the financial drain occasioned by these fortresses,
the cost was considered well spent if it prevented their
being used as bases for foreign enemies.
Chile was a focal point of Peruvian interest in
another manner;

the rich valleys of central Chile provided

Lima with the bulk of the wheat which it consumed.

In this

particular commercial relationship, the traditional role of
dependency was reversed as Chile assumed a degree of
economic hegemony over the Peruvian viceroys.
The volume of this trade was impressive--at least
100,000 fanegas were imported annually through the port of

Callao.^

Despite this quantity, importation never reached

the level of internal demand due to opposition from Peruvian
economic interests, especially the desires of domestic
agrarianists for a government protectionist policy against
imported wheat.

As a result of crown rulings in 1775 and

1785, Chilean grains were freed from maritime duties.
Importation increased to between 150,000 and 200,000 fanegas
a n n u a l l y . F o r example, from September, 1788, until
September, 1789, 199,337 fanegas of Chilean wheat entered
Callao, carried by fifteen ships making a total of twenty■}
four trips. °
CL

1 4o scar Febres Villaroel, "La crisis agricola del
Pertl en el ultimo tercio del siglo XVIII," RH, XXVII (1964),
174.
15 Ibid.. 179.

^vi c u n a Mackenna, Historia de Valparaiso, II, 161.
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Peru's grain dependency also had military ramifica
tions.

As long as Peruvians were dependent on imported

grains, the severing of the trade routes by corsairs could
have serious consequences.

In the eventuality that a naval

squadron besieged Callao, the city of Lima could be strangled
by the capture of ships transporting the local food supply.
For this reason, Viceroy Croix was vitally concerned with
the security of Valdivia, not in a military sense per se but
in terms of its value in securing the routes of Chilean
1n

wheat shipments.

'

The emerging importance of Chile's defense was first
revealed by events during the War of Jenkin1s Ear, a struggle
which as shown, accelerated that situation by changing the
commercial pattern.

The English promptly dispatched two

naval expeditions to America.

The first was the expedition

of Admiral Edward Vernon, which sailed for the Caribbean and
laid siege to the port of Cartagena in 1741.

The second was

led by Commander George Anson and was destined to be the
first coordinated threat to the Pacific during the century.
Anson1s orders were to enter the Pacific, disrupt trade and
communication lines, incite Indian rebellion, and to gen
erally distract and damage the Spanish forces along the
coast.

A more specific aim was the capture of Valdivia,

which would deprive the Spanish of their primary defense in

Memorias de los vireyes, V, 161.
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those latitudes and serve as a base of operations against
lft
shipping.
On September 18, 1740, Anson’s squadron departed
from England.

It was composed of six warships carrying a

total of 236 cannon, two supply vessels, and a complement of
1,980 sailors and landing troops.'*'9

News of the expedition

made its way to Spain, where a similar squadron of five
warships was prepared to pursue the English, led by General
de Marina Jos6 Alfonso Pizarro.
In a race to the Pacific, both fleets arrived almost
simultaneously at Cape Horn where one of Anson's ships was
actually pursued for a short time by the Spanish.

The

English vessels were badly mauled and dispersed by storms in
their late autumn passage of the Cape.

Nearly one-half of
on
the crews died due to disease and scurvy.
After enduring
terrible adversities, the flagship Centurion and three other
vessels arrived safely in Pacific waters.

The Spanish

squadron suffered an equally disastrous fate.

The Hermione

sank with 500 men aboard, and the Guiptizcoa was abandoned
along the coast after over half of its crew died.

21

Judging

•*"®Vicuna Mackenna, Historia de Valparaiso, II, 5.
■*■^Barros Arana, Historia general, VI, 122.
20l . A. Wilcox, Anson1s Voyage (London:
Sons, 1969), 35-40.

G. Bell and

^^Richard Walter and Benjamin Robins, A Voyage round
the World in the Years MDCCXL,
II, III, IV by George
Anson, Edited by Glyndwr Williams (London: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1974), 38-40.
X ,
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that to continue around the Cape would risk the loss of his
entire squadron, Pizarro returned to Buenos Aires with the
remaining ships and communicated his losses to the Peruvian
viceroy.
With his remaining crews so shorthanded and weakened
by the ordeal, Anson was forced to put in at Juan FernAndez
for an extended period of refitting.

22

During this period,

the English had few charts of the Chilean

coast and only a

rudimentary idea of the location of major landmarks, but the
island of Juan Fernandez was well known among mariners as a
safe location for regrouping and making repairs:
. . . it is the only commodious place in those seas,
where British cruisers can refresh and recover their
men after their passage round
Cape Horn, and where
they may remain for some time without alarming the
Spanish coast.23
After assessing the strength of his reduced squadron, Anson
concluded that an attack on Valdivia would be foolhardy,
resolving instead to concentrate on the capture of Spanish

shipping.
The marques de Villa Garcia, Viceroy of Peru,
received word from Pizarro that while there was a slim
possibility of several of the English ships having passed
into the Pacific, they must now be in such a weak condition
O
as to be incapable of offensive action.
The viceroy
A

immediately outfitted four warships and instructed their

22 Ibid., 109-10.
2^wilcox, op. cit., 64.

23Ibid., 115.
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captains to patrol off Juan Femdndez and the Chilean coast.
After none of Anson's squadron appeared, it was assumed that
they had met the same or worse fate as that of Pizarro.
Accordingly, the Spanish warships left Juan Fernandez on
June 6, missing the arrival of the Centurion by only three
days.25
Ignorant of Anson's entry into the Pacific, Spanish
shipping resumed its normal flow.

Undetected, the small

English taskforce was able to station itself along the trade
routes near Valparaiso to intercept shipping from Lima.
Among the vessels captured were the Nuestra Senora del Monte
Carmelo, the Santa Teresa de Jestis, the Nuestra Senora de
Carmln and the Arranzazu, a huge merchantman of 600 tons
26
quite uncommon in those waters.

From the crews of these

vessels, it was learned that the authorities were still
blissfully unaware of their presence, and as the chaplain of
the Centurion wrotes
And thus we were certain of, from the information
of our prisoners, that whatever our success might
be as to the prizes we might light on, we had
nothing to fear, weak as we were, from the Spanish
force in this part of the world.27
As prizes became increasingly scarce over a period
of months the English realized that their presence must by
that time be known to the authorities.

Concerned over the

possibility of facing a Spanish taskforce, the English

25Ibid., 64.

26Ibid., 63-71.

27Walter and Robins, op. cit., 158-59.
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abandoned Chilean waters.

They sailed for the Peruvian

coast where they sacked and burned the small port of Paita,
escaping with over 30,000 pounds sterling in bullion and
destroying many times that amount in property.

O O

All this time the English had met no resistance of
any kind.

With his eyes now set on the possibility of

capturing the Philippines treasure galleon which sailed each
year between Manila and Acapulco, Anson abandoned all but
his flagship and sailed into Pacific waters, arriving there
in 1743.

Later that year, Anson achieved the pinnacle of

the expedition's success by capturing the Manila galleon
intact after an hour and a half battle.

The cargo was

valued at 1,313,843 pesos, in addition to 35,700 ounces of
bullion.29

The lone Centurion reached England on June 15,

1744, after circumnavigating the globe in a voyage of four
years.
The voyage of Anson was a classic adventure at sea

and a re-creation of the privateering type of warfare so
popular in the Elizabethan tradition of Drake and Hawkins.
Besides the Spanish losses in shipping and the booty of
Paita, the fear generated by the raid paralyzed sea commerce
between Chile and Peru for months.

Indeed, the psychological

effects were even more profound than the material losses.
This raid revealed with patent clarity the vulnerability of

2®Wilcox, op. cit., 82.

29Ibid., 150.

67
the Pacific coast and the inability of the Spanish to do
more than sit idly by until an enemy tired of those waters
and moved on to more profitable ones.
A n s o n 1s exploit was a strong argument for the
expansion of British commerce and influence in the remote
areas of Spanish rule in the Pacific.

This influence was to

take on renewed importance in the following decades as
England expanded its grasp through the capture of Manila in
1762, articulation of trade with China, and the opening of
the Pacific by Captain Cook and others who sought strategic
bases and new commercial m a r k e t s . ^

The voyage of Anson was

the precursor of these events and dramatically reawakened
British interest in this part of the world.

Events in

Europe were now destined to play a major role in the future
of the Pacific.
The pact between France and Spain which was to form
a bulwark of their reciprocal military and political alliance
during the eighteenth century was known as the Family Com
pact.

First signed in 1733 and ratified again in 1743 and

1761, it was visualized by the Spanish as a way to improve
their position of strength against European enemies and the
ultimate weapon in their struggles with archrival Britain„J
Since the Treaty of Utrecht

(1713), the Spanish had been

forced to make debilitating trade concessions in America to

inWalter and Robins, op. c i t ., x, Introduction.
31

Rhea M. Smith, Spain, A Modern History (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1965), 241, 243, 247.
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the London court.

Now diplomatically intertwined with

France, the Spanish actively pursued an aggressive military
stance against the English in the hope£ of extricating them
selves from these treaties and once again recapturing their
colonial trade.^2

culmination of this protracted

struggle was the Seven Years War

(1756-1763), in which

Charles III rashly overestimated his own strength and joined
France against England only two years after his accession to
power.
Defeat, not victory, marked the efforts of Charles,
as a result of which the Spanish lost Florida, were forced
to recognize English logwood cutters in Honduras, and relin
quished their pretensions to fishing rights on the Newfoundland Banks.

More significantly, as a result of this war,

the French withdrew from North America, leaving Spain as
sole rival on the continent to a victorious Britain.

Far

from enhancing Spain's political status, the Family Compact
became an entangling alliance by which new avenues of foreign
expansion were opened in America.

Lynch, op. c i t ., 11.
^Smith,

op. c i t ., 248.

34on their withdrawal from America, the French ceded
Louisiana to the Spanish, which meant that there was no
longer a friendly buffer territory to protect the northern
provinces of Mexico.
In addition, Spain now shared naviga
tional rights of the Mississippi River with England and
faced the presence of English troops in the gulf coast ports
of Pensacola and Mobile (Vera Lee Brown, "Anglo-Spanish
Relations in America in the closing Years of the Colonial
Era, 11 HAHR, V, No. 3 (August, 1922), 337.
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With the outbreak of the American Revolution, Spain
and France intervened on the side of the thirteen colonies
in the hopes of avenging their 1763 territorial losses to
Britain.

In 1779, the two nations formally allied them

selves against the English, and after this, Spain sent large
quantities of money and arms to the American colonies. 35
In the Indies, there was fighting at Campeche, the Gulf of
Honduras and along the Mosquito Coast.

Mobile and Pensacola

surrendered to Spanish forces under Bernardo GAlvez in 1780
and 1781.

Spain experienced a relatively successful out

come of the war, and by the Treaty of Paris (1783) acquired
Minorca and East and West Florida.

Despite these gains,

the mother country afterwards grew increasingly incapable of
defending its American possessions.

Additional wars during

the succeeding two decades forced the Indies to subsist
militarily on their own resources.

And the United States

now became a maritime menace to Spanish colonial interests,
especially in the Pacific.
The friction between the Americans and Spaniards
became noticeable after the Revolutionary War, centering
around whaling and commercial markets.

In the second half

of the eighteenth century, the demand for whale oil reached
tremendous proportions, stimulating a world-wide search for
this precious commodity so essential to keeping the lamps of

33Smith, op. cit., 251-52.
36Ibid., 252.
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Europe burning.

A rivalry quickly developed between the

American whaling industry centered in Boston, Nantucket, and
New Bedford, and the British whaling fleets of London and
Dunkirk. 37

Manned by staunch New Englanders, the American

whalers pursued their quarry into most of the oceans of the
world and especially the Pacific.
Many of these whaling captains carried small quanti
ties of merchandise to sell clandestinely in Pacific ports,
often with the intent of only covering the cost of their
voyages.

Others continued their fishing or commercial

sojourns to Hawaii, the far Northwest, and even China, some
times circumnavigating the globe in voyages of several years 1
duration .38

Other Americans came to hunt for seals on

barren islands such as Juan FernAndez and Mas Afuera, conOQ
tinuing on to Asiatic markets to sell the hides.
Throughout the course of Spain's enterprise in
America, a constant unrest pervaded the spirits of royal
officials in seeing the Caribbean and Pacific frequented
by ships not flying the flag of Castile.

Territorial

3^Pereira Salas, Los primeros contactos entre Chile
y los Estados Unidos, 1778-1809 (Santiago
Editorial Andr6 s
Bello, 1971), Appendix, 315-46.
t

3®Vicuna Mackenna, Juan Fernandez, 343-44.
•^In 1792, the Eliza, out of New York and captained
by W. R. Steward, obtained 38,000 seal skins from Mas Afuera,
which were sold in Canton, China, for $16,000. The Eliza
was the first North American boat to procure hides on the
Chilean islands and sell them in Asiatic markets (Pereira
Salas, Los primeros contactos, p. 317).
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sovereignty was the overriding principle of Spanish coloni
zation, and this principle was applied with equal fervor to
the seas which bathed the coasts of America.

Just as the

juridical concept espoused in the Treaty of Tordesillas in
1494 served as legal justification for the New World terri
torial claims, it was likewise extended to include the
waters adjoining them .4 0

Viceroy Teodoro de Croix epitomized

the Spanish mistrust of foreigners by alluding to the fact
that while Spain might be at peace with a particular foreign
power, there was always a potential for corsairs or inde
pendent adventurers of that nation to violate these treaties.
Foreigners, no matter what their mission, were to be treated
with caution and suspicion.4^

This closed sea doctrine

became insupportable as foreign traders began to put in at
1 ikely-1 ooking

coastal towns, even moreso as the colonials

showed no hesitancy in entering in these activities.

4-2

The first American vessel to actually touch Chilean
soil was the Columbia, which appeared off Juan Fernandez on
May 24, 1788.

Out of the port of Boston and captained by

John Kendrick, the ship was reportedly bound for the Russian
settlements of the far Northwest when it had been damaged by

^Opaul E. Hoffman, "Diplomacy and the Papal Donation,
1493-1585," The Americas. XXX, No. 2 (October, 1973), 153-54.
41Memorias de los vireyes, V, 247.
42Juan and Ulloa, Noticias secretas. I, 222, 224 ,
231.
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storms and separated from its sister ship, the Lady
Washington

. ^

Kendrick asked for permission to be admitted

to port to take on badly needed provisions and repair
damaged rigging.

Governor Bias Gonzales possessed no

specific instructions concerning the treatment to be afforded
neutral vessels, but the ship's navigational papers were in
order, including a recommendation from the French consul in
America.

There did not appear to be contraband on board.

He therefore allowed the crew to carry out repairs and
provisioning while anchored below the guns of the fort and
allowed the ship's officers to come on shore .4 4

After

several days, Captain Kendrick departed, thanking the
Spanish governor for his hospitality.
The Columbia incident sent shock waves through the
upper echelon of Spanish authorities both in America and in
Spain.

The Peruvian viceroy and president of Chile were

stunned by such an audacious arrival of an American vessel
in a Spanish port and even more appalled at Governor Bias
45
Gonzales for allowing the Americans to set foot on shore.
The issue merited close scrutiny as a precedent regarding
the treatment accorded neutral vessels and the Spanish claim
to sovereignty of the sea.

Based upon the general tenor of

previous cddulas, Viceroy Croix ruled that any foreign

4^pereira Salas, Los primeros contactos, 27.
44Memorias de los vireyes, V, 255.
4 5 Ibid.,

254.
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vessel "in these seas" without specific permission should be
treated as an enemy, even though that nation were an ally of
Spain .46

The fiscal of the Chilean audiencia remembered a

c 6 dula of 1777 which similarly prohibited foreign ships from
the ports of Spanish A m e r i c a . G o v e r n o r Bias Gonzales was
summarily relieved of command for his actions, and coastal
authorities were warned to detain any foreign vessels which
might enter their jurisdictions.
T^ e Columbia incident gave way to a rash of real and
imaginary sightings as foreign traffic intensified and as
Spanish authorities became increasingly wary of the inten
tions of these strangers.

This included not only American

vessels but those of England, Holland, and even France, the
ally of Spain.

Several months after this event, fishermen

near Valparaiso reported sighting over a dozen English ships
sailing near the coast.

The local militia was mobilized

before the story was discounted as a rumor.

4-8

In March of

the following year, 1790, a ship presumed to be English was
seen entering the northern bay of Caldera, where the crew
made depth s o u n d i n g s A concerned President 0'Higgins
advised each provincial authority along the coast to post

4 6 Ibid.,
4 ^Donoso,

255-56.
El marauds de Osorno, 255.

"Carta de..., January 24, 1789," Doc. No. 5134,
JMDI, CCVI, 3-5.
49"Expediente de noticias..., 1790," ACG, DCXCV, 5.
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sentinels, exercise extreme vigilance in noting the construc
tion and function of these ships and their activities, and to
prohibit their crews from landing.

Should they do so they

cn
were to be imprisoned. w
Juan Fem&ndez was also visited by a number of
vessels, among them the Penelope, an American whaler which
dropped anchor in the bay in April, 1791.

51

Mindful of the

mistakes of his predecessor, Governor Calvo de la Cantera
imprisoned the pilot and part of the crew as they came
ashore to ask for fruits to combat scurvy.

Captain John

Worth was baffled by this action and could not comprehend
why his simple requests for fruits could be interpreted as
such a monumental threat to the Spanish crown.

He was a

personal friend of the captain of the Columbia and was aware
of the cordial welcome which he had received from Governor
Bias Gonzales.^2

In a letter which he floated to shore on a

buoy, Worth penned a resolute if somewhat inarticulate
letter referring to his pride in being a citizen of the
great "You Nitted Stats of North Amarick" and demanding the
CO
release of his crew.
The captain was subsequently
deceived into coming ashore, where he was also captured.

The

entire crew was later sent to Valparaiso for a period of
detention.

This sequence of events was repeated many times

50Ibid., 12.

^"Expediente formado..., 1791," ACG, DCXCV, 1-7.
5^Ibid.# 5 ,

^"^Ibid.
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in the ensuing years.

It epitomized the nonchalance of

foreign mariners in approaching the Pacific coast and the
exaggerated reaction of the Spanish.
Not all foreign ships came for the purpose of contra
band? many were innocent whalers or merchantmen which had
floundered on uncharted coast lines or had anchored in bays
to take on water and provisions.

The crews of other ships

had contracted scurvy in the long passage around Cape Horn
and were forced to stop in order to obtain fruits or fresh
foods.

Nevertheless, the suspicion pervaded everywhere;

there was an attempt to define every foreign landing as some
kind of subversive plot.

The xenophobia of the Spanish was

not illogical, for the soundings, map-making and knowledge
of the coast which these mariners obtained provided them
with a steadily growing reservoir of information which could
be of great strategic value in a future war with these
nations.

In the words of President O'Higgins;

Until now no more injury has been incurred than
the shame and vexation of seeing foreign ships con
tinually along our coasts. Under the pretext of
fishing they advance their nautical knowledge of our
condition, which will only encourage their hostile
activities when we are enemies in the future.54
In 1789, England and Spain came into conflict once
again, this time over a remote and seemingly unlikely loca
tion for confrontation.

The dispute did not escalate to an

outbreak of war, but the effects were to have notable

^ 0 'Higgins to Valdez, Santiago, September 19, 1792,
ACG, DCCLXLIII, 217.
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consequences on the Spanish colonies in the Pacific.

In the

late 1700's, the English began to push into the far North
west and Alaska to take advantage of the booming fur trade,
an expansion which led to conflict with Spain, whose Pacific
domain extended at least in theory as far north as Alaska.
One of the Spanish-claimed areas which they occupied was
Nootka Sound on the island of Vancouver.
and renamed Friendly Cove by the British.

It was occupied
This violation

of Spanish jurisdiction, no matter how distant, disturbed
the viceroy of New Spain, who sent a small taskforce to
Nootka Bay under the command of Esteban Jos 6 Martinez.

He

found two English vessels in the bay, captured their crews
S6

and took them to the Mexican port of San Bias. u
This precipitate act almost brought the two nations
to war.

The Spanish naval fleet was actually readied for

action and an alliance was sought with the United States and
France.

After sober consideration, however, the decidedly

inferior military status of the Spanish and an empty
treasury persuaded the crown to discretely opt for a nego
tiated settlement concerning fishing and navigational rights
in the Pacific.

Signed in San Lorenzo on October 28, 1790,

the Nootka Sound Convention was a de facto recognition of
Spain's rapidly deteriorating European prestige and a

b a r r e n L. Cook, Flood Tide of Empire. Spain and
the Pacific Northwest, 1543-1819 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1973), 136-39.
5 6 Ibid.,

193-96.
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gesture of appeasement to the stronger English nation.

57

Under the terms of this treaty, British subjects
were granted the right to colonize and establish trading out
posts on the northwest coast to the north of Spanish-occupied
territory in North America.

In terms of significance to

Chile, Britain was granted free navigation and fishing rights
in the Pacific, including both North and South America.

In

return, the English agreed not to use this privilege as a
pretext for smuggling; to insure this, no British subject
could approach within ten nautical leagues of those regions
settled by the Spanish.

58

This last provision was sub3 ect

to varying interpretation, for the English were free to land
on the deserted offshore islands and unpopulated stretches
of coast line.

In the following years, Chileans became

alarmed as the English began to land on deserted Chilean
coasts, areas claimed by the Spanish.
The Nootka Sound Convention presented the English
with a legal foothold in the Pacific and an ideal subterfuge
for trade with the forbidden coasts.

Despite the regulation

prohibiting English from setting foot on Spanish-occupied
areas, there was no arbitration commission nor military
force at the disposal of the Spanish to enforce such a
ruling.

By virtue of their inability to guard the entire

coast line, the Spanish gave tacit assent to what was
already a fact— British fishermen landing on offshore

57Ibid., 247-48.

58Ibid., 544-45.
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islands or deserted stretches to build temporary warehouses
and huts.
On receiving news of the treaty, Chilean authorities
reacted with consternation at being obligated to assist a
rival who was so intent upon the destruction of their com
mercial system.

There was also confusion as to the specific

treatment to be afforded English crews which touched their
shores.

By this time foreign vessels were arriving with

frightening regularity, either to ask for supplies or to
trade.

The pertinent question was not how to prevent their

arrival but the manner of receiving them.

Should English

crews be preferentially treated and permitted to come
ashore, while at the same time denying this right to the
French allies?

Or should another diplomatic crisis be

risked by detaining or quarantining
asked for assistance?

English crews when they

As the subdelegado of La Serena wrote

to the president:
I await your instructing me how I should comport
myself, if they [the English] must enjoy the right
of hospitality and within what bounds, with respect
of the fact that in the treaty between our crown
and that of Britain nothing is elucidated concerning
these details .59
President 0 'Higgins himself was confused over the
manner in which these intruders should be greeted.

He was

an openminded, enlightened servant of the crown who
undoubtedly comprehended the commercial importance the

59"Expediente formado..., 1790," ACG, DCCVII, 15.
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Pacific seemed destined to attain.

At the same time, he was

a high colonial functionary and faithful executor of the
royal will.

While he was willing to grant a certain amount

of leeway to foreigners who were innocent of breaking Spanish
laws, he strictly upheld royal prohibitions against com
mercial transactions with foreigners.

On January 2, 1792,

he issued a ruling that any Spaniard apprehended in trade
negotiations with foreigners would be liable to receive the
death penalty, a measure which received full sanction by the
court in Madrid.

60

The most disturbing consequence of the treaty was
that the ships of other nations now arrived in unprecedented
numbers, all pretending to enjoy the same rights as those
granted to the English.^

In just a few short years, the

Pacific became crowded with the vessels of many nations,
each professing a right to sail unmolested and to drop
anchor along those deserted coast lines which even the
Spanish had not colonized.
The concessions of San Lorenzo were followed by
disastrous European wars.

From 1793 to 1795, there was war

with revolutionary France, and in 1796, another war with
England, which was to continue with only a brief interval

^Donoso, El marquds de Osorno, 259.
61"Expediente formado..., 1790," ACG, DCCVII, 28.
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for the next twelve y e a r s . ^

During this tumultuous period,

the colonies were forced to exist largely independent of the
mother country due to the disruption of communication routes
and preoccupation with internal affairs.

No longer able to

maintain the normal level of shipping with Spanish American
ports, the crown enacted provisions permitting the colonies
to trade not only among themselves, but directly with allies
and neutral nations.
Outbreak of war with England in 1796 forced the
crown to throw open its colonial ports to neutral traffic
with the unprecedented royal order of November 18, 1 7 9 7 . ^
It was an act of desperation.

Despite subsequent revocation

and restrictions of this right in 1799, 1801 and 1804, an
irreparable damage had been done.

By 1800, colonials were

accustomed to regulate many of their own trade transactions
while foreign merchants were equally used to hawking their
wares in American ports.
As the leading neutral maritime power, the United
States was able to capitalize on Spanish misfortune by
winning valuable trade concessions in Spanish America.

In

contrast to Anglo-American relations of the same period,

a . Humphreys, "Isolation from Spain," in John
Lynch and R. A. Humphreys (eds.), The Origins of the Latin
American Revolutions, 1808-1826, 143.

63a. P. Whitaker, "Early Commercial Relations
Between the United States and Spanish America," in Lynch and
Humphreys (eds.), The Origins of the Latin American Revolu
tions, 1808-1826, 8 8 .
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commercial privileges were not the ultimate goal of American
diplomacy with Spain, although the merchants of the eastern
seaboard looked longingly at the closed ports in the Carib
bean and in South America.

The boundary dispute over the

Louisiana territory and free navigation of the Mississippi
River were the keystones of American diplomatic wranglings.
These issues were settled conclusively by the Treaty of San
Lorenzo on October 27, 1795
Under the terms of the treaty, the Spanish acceded
to the territorial demarcation line in Louisiana and Florida
claimed by the Americans and also granted them free naviga
tion of the Mississippi River.

There were also broad

dispositions concerning navigational rights in the Pacific
Ocean.

Article VIII stipulated that should the vessels of

either nation be forced by pirates, storms or similar
emergencies to seek temporary shelter in ports of the other,
the crews would be received kindly, and be permitted to
t iC

repair damages or refresh themselves without molestation.
This provision had a much broader application than the
conventional rules for protection of vessels within the
territorial waters of another nation.

The presence of so

many Americans in the Pacific inevitably led to smuggling
and other activities forbidden by the Spanish, all under

^^Samuel Flagg Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty; America's
Advantage from European Distress, 1783-1800 (revised
edition; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), 343-62.
6 5 Ibid.,

349-50.
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the cover of this provision.
Effects of this treaty were quickly felt, the first
test coming in August, 1796, when the whaler Rose out of
Nantucket was detained and later taken to Callao for dis
position by higher authorities.

On being notified of the

matter, the Madrid court dispatched the news of the recent
treaty and ordered that the boat be released.^

In another

incident, the Boston merchantman Belle Savage and her crew
were released in 1800 in consideration of the San Lorenzo
treaty after being detained for contraband activity.

Its

captain confidently resumed his clandestine trade and at the
end of two years sailed for Canton with $81,000 in specie
obtained from contrabanding along the Chilean coast.

The

risks which these vessels incurred could at times be severe,
ending in detention of the crew and confiscation of the
vessel and its cargo.

Those who dealt in this trade trusted

to luck, their own resourcefulness and the gullibility or
venality of Spanish officials, but their efforts were aided
by the breakdown of the Spanish administrative system under
the stress of war.

(ZQ

The Chilean coast became the cornerstone of clan
destine American trade in the Pacific, and deserted offshore
islands were lucrative hunting grounds for seal and wolf

^ Pereira Salas, Los primeros contactos, 75.
^Whitaker, op. cit., 90-91.
6 8 Ibid.,

90.
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skins.

Lying 65 miles to the west of Juan Fernandez, the

uninhabited island of Mas Afuera became a center for the
seal industry and the object of concern to Spanish officials
who suspected the hunters of "suspicious designs and nego
tiations.

During the sealing season, droves of sailors

came ashore with clubs to slaughter the docile herds of
seals, whose skins were then taken to China where the
hunters reaped handsome profits.

One source estimated that

between 1797 and 1804, over three million seal skins were
taken from the island in this manner.

70

It is not known how many foreign ships sailed in
Chilean waters or touched the coast during the late 1700's.
Most did not advertise their presence because of the secret
nature of their undertakings.

The historian Eugenio Pereira

Salas has compiled a documentation of only the American
ships in the area between 1788 and 1809.

In this twenty-two

year period he found that there were at least 291 such
vessels, or an average of over a dozen per year. 7 1

This is

a significant figure when one takes into consideration the
much smaller scale of overall commercial activity of that
time.

69"E i president e ..., November 11, 1802," Doc. No.
5518, JMDI. CCXV, 225-26.
^ R a l p h Lee Woodward, Robinson Crusoe's Island: A
History of Juan Fernandez (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1969), 118.
^Pereira Salas, Los primeros contactos. Appendix,
315-46.
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During the 1700's, then, it can be seen that the
southern Pacific acquired a growing prominence within the
realm of Spanish defense in America, with significant con
sequences for Chile.

The shifting pattern of colonial trade

from the Caribbean to the Pacific and other previously
neglected areas, the proliferation of foreign smugglers,
traders, and fishermen in those profitable waters aggravated
Chilean defense and added a new dimension to the role of the
military.

The Chilean army was forced to deploy nearly half

of its troops in coastal garrisons in order to defend
against possible invasion or the foreign colonization of
uninhabited lands in the far south.

As a result of the

combined threats of the Araucanians and foreigners, neither
could be combated successfully.

The deployment of troops on

two fronts accentuated the instability of the south and the
close relationship between the military and society.

Chapter 4
THE SITUADO— LIFELINE OF THE FRONTIER ARMY
During the colonial era, the constant preoccupation
of Chilean officials was in striving for military superiority
over the indigenous tribes? however, there was an equal
concern with the staggering costs of continually supporting
a standing army and the tremendous expenditures which this
entailed.

This fiscal burden was intensified because of

Chile's economic impoverishment; the colony possessed no
vast deposits of exploitable wealth, nor was it located at a
geographic crossroads which would enable it to become a
master cog in the colonial merchantile system.

The Indian

struggle seriously impaired the development of colonization
and stable agricultural production.

Because of these

factors, military financing became a continual strain on the
capabilities of Chilean fiscal administration.
The weighing influence of the military in society is
illustrated by the fact that during the last quarter of the
eighteenth century, the military accounted for approximately
forty percent of the total annual expenditures of the
Chilean treasury."*'

A special inquiry into the state of the

■*"Barros Arana, Historia general, VII, 338.
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colony's finances revealed that of the 654,278 pesos spent
by the real hacienda in 1788, 277,938 pesos were expended
for the military and related defense costs.

2

Even with

these huge sums of money, Chilean presidents were never
fully capable of adequately maintaining the military forces
in a strong defense posture.

During a three-year period

from 1786 through 1788, the royal treasury of the Intendancy
of Concepcibn incurred aggregate military expenses of 500,906
pesos, but was only able to pay out 395,725 pesos.

As was

customary, the deficit was partially covered by crediting
the debit against other royal revenues, or through obtaining
periodic emergency funds from Santiago.

Despite such

measures, Chile entered the nineteenth century still a
virtual liability to the crown, and its remissions of money
to the mother country were so diminished as to be only a
symbolic gesture of fealty.
Within Spain's colonial possessions were a number of
military outposts such as Chile, which were vital to the
defense of the kingdom but were too poor to internally fund
their extensive fortifications and troop garrisons.

It was

common practice for such garrisons to be provided with large
sums of money called situados, or subsidies, from the vice
regal centers of New Spain or Peru.

2 Ibid.,

In America, the

336.

3 "Expediente formado..., 1790," ACG, CCCLXXXIX, 131.

situado originated in the 1560's and 1570's.

4

Chile was aided in its treasury dilemmas by Peruvian
subsidization of its army, an annual assistance which became
practically an institutionalized part of military life.

The

situado which Peru remitted to Chile was a crucially influ
ential mechanism, for it constituted the major portion of
Chilean defense expenditures and virtually sustained the
strategic coastal fortresses.

It established both an

economic and a political dependency upon Peru, the effects
of which became manifest during the gestation of the indepen
dence movement.

Indeed, the subsidy existed for over two

hundred years, representing a sort of umbilical cord by
which Peru nurtured and fed the frontier forts with all of
the vital elements of military sustenance.
The history of the Chilean subsidy was as old as
that of the regular army.

By the end of the sixteenth

century, the diminutive colonial army was composed of no
more than six hundred ill-equipped and ill-paid troops, who
received some 60,000 pesos of silver annually from Peru for
C
their sustenance.
During the period from 1603 to 1607, a
series of royal dispositions led to the creation of a full-

^Paul E. Hoffman, "Financing the Defense of the
Indies, 1535-1585," M.S. of a paper read at a meeting of the
Southern Historical Association, Washington, D. C. (November
13, 1975), 4-5.
-*Roberto Onat and Carlos Roa, Regimen legal del
ej 6 rcito en el reino de Chile (Santiago: Universidad
Catblica de Chile, 1952), 66-67.
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time professional army of 2 , 0 0 0 soldiers, regularly paid by
the Peruvian treasury and fully governed by Spanish military
ordinances.

This not only lent stability and permanence to

the army but was greeted by the colonials as the beginning
of a new era of tranquility and prosperity.

Although they

were mistaken in the assumption that the Indian wars would
promptly be terminated, civilians were at least free from
the onerous duty of military service.
The mainstay of this new army was the situado from
Peru, for it was recognized as impossible for Chile to
subsist militarily on its own resources.

By royal order of

December 6 , 1606, the king fixed the level of this subsidy
at 292,000 pesos, 3 reales, which was to be annually
remitted by ship from Lima to Concepcibn.
The normal procedure for distributing the subsidy
each year on its arrival in Concepci6 n was for the important
treasury officials, veedor general of the army, an oidor of
the royal audiencia and the Bishop of Concepcibn to meet
together in order to oversee the equitable distribution of
the royal monies.

Once the pay lists were drawn up for each

soldier and the amount due him was ascertained, represen
tatives from each of the frontier forts were sent to the
city to collect their respective allotments.

6 Ibid.,

Meticulous

67-72.

7"Carta de..., 1723," Doc. No. 3989, JMDI. CLXXXICLXXXII, 177.
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provisions were made concerning troop payment— such as
designating the specific hours of the day in which salaries
could be distributed, the presence of cex'tified witnesses
and the designation of proxies for those soldiers unable to
receive their wages in person.

After Valdivia was

refounded in 1645, it became the recipient of another
situado, separate from that of Concepcibn, initially conQ
sisting of 1 1 0 , 2 2 1 pesos, 2 reales.
During the course of the 1600's, the subsidy remis
sions underwent gradual improvement such as in 1690, when
Chilean presidents were instructed to prepare annual lists
of all active military personnel to be sent to Lima, so
that the following year's subsidy might be more accurately
gaugedThe

route of the situado vessel came to form a

regular pattern of travel from Peru to the various Pacific
fortresses, carrying not only the troop salaries but also
reinforcements, convict laborers, and all manner of military
supplies.
The system of situado remission almost immediately
became rife with administrative corruption and malfeasance.
Complaints were soon heard of shoddy, overpriced clothing
sent from Lima and of the pilfering of the soldiers' pay by

8 0nat

and Roa, Regimen legal, 83-85.

9 "Expediente sobre.. 1 7 8 0 , " ACG, XLVI, 138.
•*-8 0nat and Roa, Regimen legal, 8 6 .

90
avaricious governors and treasury officials.^

The many

opportunities for graft stemmed from the long, tortuous
route of the shipment and the numerous middlemen involved in
handling and transshipping.

The mountainous paperwork in

this operation and the creation of superfluous administrative
posts certainly made the falsification of shipping records
and bills of lading as profitable a means of stealing as
outright theft of the merchandise.

In addition, an attitude

of bureaucratic detachment among Lima administrators left
them rather unconcerned over the eventual fate of each ship
ment, so long as it was dispatched by their office with the
due perfunctory routine.
Equally threatening the safe delivery of the subsidy
were navigational hazards, storms and pirates, all of which
took a mounting toll of vessels.

So uncertain was the

shipment by sea that as a result of the loss of the 1685
subsidy vessel, the Peruvian viceroy ruled that henceforth
the subsidy should be transported overland from the treasury
of Potosi, in Upper Peru.

I O

This new method was inaugurated

in 1689, but the results were no more favorable than the
original system.

During the next twenty-nine years, only

seven shipments were actually made from Potosi, so that in
1718, the crown again decided to revert to the previous

ll"Carta de..., October 7, 1617, " Doc. No. 7874,
JMDI, CCLXXII, 48.
■^•^Carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripcidn, IX, 186.
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method of shipment by sea from Lima.

13

For the Lima viceroys, the weighty responsibilities
of administration encompassed the substantial military
subsidies remitted to Panama and Chile.

As Table 3 indicates,

during the five-year period from 1790 to 1794, the Peruvian
viceroyalty spent a total of 19,446,524 pesos in all adminis
trative areas.

Of this amount, 2,151,467 pesos were

remitted as situados, or about 9.1 percent of the total
treasury expenditures.

Table 3
Expenses of the Peruvian Royal Treasury,
1790-179414
Branch of
Government

Ordinary
Expenses
(pesos)

Royal Treasury
War
Political
Ecclesiastical
TOTAL

6,580,384
7,203,839
3,313,343
1,198,990
18,296,556

ExtraOrdinary
Expenses
802,806
227,663
119,496
—

1,149,965

Total
7,383,191
7,431,502
3,432,839
1,198,990
19,446,524

Per
cent
Total
37.96
38.21
17.65
6.16
99.98

Another colonial estimate differing slightly from the first
calculated the subsidies during a six-year period as the
following amounts:

1 3 "Carta de..., 1723," Doc. No. 3989, JMDI,
CLXXXI—CLXXXII, 178-79.
•^•^Memorias de los vireyes, VI, Appendix, 30. Totals
rounded o f T T o nearest 'whole’'"peso.
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Table 4
Peruvian Subsidy Remissions, 1790-1795
Chilo6
Subsidy

Year

Valdivia
Subsidy

1790

87,161

88,656

1791

77,009

54,069

1792

87,481

1793

15

Remitted
to Chile

Panama
Subsidy

Totals

—

175,817

585,818

—

716,897

65,407

269,279

—

423,168

95,065

71,914

521,609

—

1794

105,992

49,640

17,739

1795

101,186

87,790

Totals

553,897

418,480

—

688,590

.

227,289

53,916

—

188,977

—

1,394,446

53,916

2,420,740

In her study, Maria Encamacidn Rodriguez has con
cluded that contrary to the widespread belief that Spain
lived off the royal monies remitted from the New World, the
greater part of at least the Peruvian revenues were con
verted into paying for the large military expenditures of
the viceroyalty, including the situados.

Between 1651 and

1739, 49.4 percent of Peruvian revenues was consumed by
normal operating costs of government.

Only 20.6 percent

found its way into the coffers of Spain, while a full 30.1
percent was funneled into military-related costs.

17

It can

Ibid., Appendix, 36. Totals rounded off to nearest
whole peso.
l^Maifa EncamaciOn Rodriguez Vicente, "Los caudales
remitidos desde el Peru a Espana por cuenta de la real
hacienda: series estadisticas, 1651-1739," AEA, XXI (1964),
1-24.
17Ibid., 16.
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be seen from this brief analysis that military expenses
consumed an excessive proportion of the viceregal budget,
which aggravated deficit spending and was partially respon
sible for the dwindling amounts of money remitted to the
Spanish treasury*

The situados constituted a very consider

able portion of these outlays.
Although a study of the economic effects of the
subsidy is beyond the scope of this study, it is known that
the decline of the flota commerce around mid-century
prompted a great deal of concern among Lima administrators.
A principal source of subsidy revenues

was

derived from

the almojarifazgo (import tax) and the alcabala (sales tax),
which were levied on goods entering Peru by way of the
Caribbean and Panama.

Viceroy Jos 6 Manso de Velasco wrote

in the 1750's that the virtual cessation of fleet commerce
from Spain to the Indies had brought about a general slump
in Peruvian tax receipts.

Although the registry commerce

of individually-chartered ships sailing around Cape Horn
might be expected to take up some of the slack, the viceroy
was obviously pessimistic concerning the sources of future
revenues:
. . . if they [the registry ships] do not satisfy
the established revenue sources, there will be a
notable decline in the subsidies of Panama, Chile
and Valdivia, and . . . it will not be possible to
maintain the fortresses.
This crucial phase reflects not only the increasingly rough

■^Memorias de los vireyes, IV, 233.

financial straits through which Peru was passing, but also
the fact that the Chilean defenses would be the first to
suffer from any economic belt-tightening.
The 1753 Chilean military ordinances, conceived by
Viceroy Manso, were the most influential and far-reaching
army reforms to that time, and were predicated upon the need
for a sizeable reduction of forces in order to ease the
financial burden on the crown.

19

These reforms also

reflected the thinking of Peruvian officials that the
captaincy-general should assume more of an active financial
role in its own defense.

The original situado of 292,000

pesos had been gradually reduced over the years, and under
these ordinances it was set at 90,764 pesos, distributed in
the following manner:

72, 212 pesos for Concepcibn and the

frontier; 11,784 pesos for Chilob; and 6,768 pesos for Juan
Fernandez.

In addition, Valdivia retained its separate

subsidy of 50,692 pesos.

20

With the exception of the amount

destined for Juan Fernandez, the entire quantity was to be
paid by the Peruvian treasury.

However, it was not

-^Reglamento para la q u a m i c i 6 n de las Plazas y
Fuertes de la frontera de la Concepcibn, Valparaiso y Chilob
del Reyno de Chile, y de las Islas de Juan Fernbndez (Lima:
Francisco Sobrino, 1753), cited hereafter as Reglamento para
Concepcibn, Valparaiso, y Chilob, 1753. Copy in Sala Medina
^ Reglamento para la guarnicibn de la Plaza de
Valdivia (Lima: Francisco Sobrino, 1753),
"Resumen general
Cited hereafter as Reglamento para Valdivia, 1753. Copy in
Sala Medina.
Including transportation expenses, the total cost of
the Valdivia subsidy averaged between 60,000 and 70,000
pesos during this period.
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stipulated that the Santiago treasury should assume future
responsibility for the provisioning of Valdivia and Juan
Fernandez, and for this purpose should allot 10,000 pesos
annually for the purchase and transportation (by sea) of
pi
foodstuffs to the garrison.
In 1753, the crown monopoly on the sale of tobacco
(estanco de tabaco) was established in Chile, a monopoly
which rapidly became one of the most lucrative and stable
revenues of the captaincy-general.

One study computes its

income for the colonial treasury in the late 1700's as almost
equaling the other major revenue sources combined.

Chile's

tobacco bureaucracy fell under the larger estanco adminis
tration in Lima, which supplied it with all of the tobacco
sold in the colony, without cost.

The tobacco monopoly

impinges on this study in that it became a means of paying
for the military subsidies.

During the next four decades,

it was also a device by which Peruvian viceroys hoped to

^ Reglamento para Valdivia, 1753, Ord. 1.
The food subsidy for Valdivia and Juan Fernandez was
known as the situado de viveres, and was remitted each year
from the port of Valparaiso.
It consisted mainly of three
staple items— flour, jerked beef and lard— -and was comple
mented by lesser quantities of beans, peppers, tallow and
salt. As with the Lima subsidy, the situado de viveres
involved a network of powerful commercial interests, located
in the vicinity of the capital. Subsidization from Val
paraiso continued until the first years of the 18001s, when
the Valdivia area became largely self-sufficient in agri
cultural production.
22

Agnes Stapff, "La renta del tabaco en el Chile de
la epoca virreinal. Un ejemplo de la politica econdmica
mereantilista," AEA, XVIII (1961), 26.
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shift the burden of these subsidies to the Chileans.
The first military subsidy to suffer from the aus
terity measures of Viceroy Manso was the situado of Concepci 6 n and the frontier.

As a result of viceregal decrees of

October 22, 1754, and September 16, 1755, it was ruled that
the two provincial estancos of Santiago and Concepci 6 n must
thereafter pay the prestamo of the frontier army; that is,
the monthly advances given to each soldier in lieu of his
full salary.
pesos .22

This constituted an annual cost of 41,952

The remaining wages (37,478 pesos) continued to be

remitted from Lima at the end of each year.

In 1759, the

remaining frontier subsidy from Peru was terminated, the
corresponding amount of money to be provided by the tobacco
revenues of C o n c e p c i b n . H o w e v e r , the provincial adminis
trators found this an intolerable burden on their already
strained treasury, especially in the light of escalating
military costs.

Beginning in the 1770's the Santiago

bursars were forced to send 100,000 pesos a year to Con
cepcibn in order to pay two-thirds of the wages of the
frontier army. 25

Despite this assistance, m

the three-year

period from 1786 through 1788, the treasury of Concepcibn

23pernando Silva Vargas, "Peru y Chile. Notas sobre
sus vinculacibnes administrativas y fiscales, 1785-1800,"
Historia, VII (1968), 163.
24"E1 presidente..., February 4, 1790, " Doc. No.
5158, JMDI, CCVI, 267.
25,1 Expediente

formado..., 1790," ACG, CCCLXXXIX, 132.
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fell some 105,180 pesos in arrears in paying the troops .26
After 1755, Chilean tobacco revenues and treasury
fxands supported two food subsidies (Juan Fern&ndez and
Valdivia), the salaries of the frontier army, and those of
the small detachments in Valparaiso and Juan Fernandez.

It

was a responsibility which placed a severe strain on the
colony's resources, for in spite of the tobacco revenues,
Chile's treasury was in a state of permanent insolvency.
Nonetheless, Peruvian officials continued to try to push an
even greater part of the defense burden

onto

the Chilean

treasury.
The logical mechanism for achieving this was through
the estanco.

Peruvian tobacco revenues were as profitable

as those of Chile, but since 1754 the viceroys had sent all
tobacco to Chile free of charge, assuming the costs them
selves .

It was the desire of Viceroy Francisco Gil de

Taboada and others that the cost of the situado be offset
by Chilean reimbursement for the tobacco which it pur97
chased. 7

This act carried with it the stipulation that

Chile pay for all of the tobacco which it consumed.

28

By

royal c 6 dulas of June 20, 1787, and July 22, 1788, the
viceroy received orders to remit to Spain the revenues from
tobacco and playing cards, which led him to demand the

2 5 Ibid.,

131.

2^Silva Vargas,
28stapff,

"Peru y. Chile," 173.

"La renta del tabaco," 42.
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immediate liquidation of the Chilean estanco debts.

?Q

These

severe demands on the colonial treasury were protested by
President 0 'Higgins, but to no avail.
In spite of these fiscal skirmishes, Peru was still
encumbered with the Valdivia subsidy.

While it was realized

that this responsibility could not be evaded. Viceroy Gil de
Taboada sought to at least ameliorate the consequences to
his own treasury.

On July 7, 1790, President O'Higgins

received correspondence from the viceroy advising him that
henceforth the cost of the situado (which by this time had
risen to 80,444 pesos) must be borne by Chileans from their
tobacco revenues.

As compensation for this, an equal amount

of money would be sent to Spain from the Peruvian treasury
to cancel part of the mountainous debt which Chile owed to
the crown.

Technically, Peru would still carry the hidden

cost of the subsidy, but would be able to charge this amount
•an
against its own extended payments to Spain.
The settlement was hardly satisfactory for the
Chileans, for they would now be forced to pay from their
reserves on hand, as opposed to the relative ease with which
they could negotiate their long-term debt with Spain.

In

all of its subtle ramifications, the plan spelled another
financial obligation for Chile.

President 0 'Higgins

promptly petitioned to Spain for the abrogation of this

^^Memorias de los vireyes, V, 267.
"El presidente..., July 7, 1790," Doc. No. 5118,
JMDI, CCV, 168.
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ruling, or at least a temporary suspension until the
colony's case could be presented.

This delaying action

permitted Chile to receive the subsidy as always for a
number of years more.

On November 22, 1804, the Spanish

monarch finally granted the viceroy authority to decide the
matter for himself.32

Two years later, in 1806, the Peruvian

viceroy definitively ruled that Chilean revenues must pay
for the entire cost of the Valdivia subsidy.
This ruling ended the longstanding contention
between Lima and Santiago over the military subsidy.

Now,

the Chilean treasury was faced with additional military
funding of major proportions, which coupled with other
urgent expenses led to predictions of dire consequences in
financial circles.

Only one year later, in 1807, President

Munoz de Guzman was forced to lower the salaries of all
government and military personnel by ten to twenty-five
percent.34

There were also pleas for voluntary donations

and stringent efforts to raise new tax revenues.
The apprehension of Chileans over the subsidy1s
termination were perhaps justified, for it came at a moment

31silva Vargas,

"Peru y Chile," 186.

32"Real orden..., November 22, 1804," ACM, XLIX, 1.
33cabriel Guarda, La economia de Chile austral antes
de la colonizacidn alemana, 1645-1850 (Valdivia: Universidad Austral de Chile, 1973), 94.
34"Decreto del..., March 11, 1807, " Doc. No. 5610,
JMDI, CCXVIII, 215-17.
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when invasion by European powers was an imminent possibility;
1806 was the year in which a British military force captured
Buenos Aires and was rumored to be readying another expedi
tion to enter Pacific wate r s . ^

The colony1s increased

costs in constructing fortifications to meet this threat, as
well as the mobilization of militia to guard coastal areas,
became doubly burdensome with the almost simultaneous
assumption of the Valdivia situado by Santiago.
An incident exemplifying this difficult situation
took place on the eve of the independence movement in 1810.
Governor Alejandro Eagar of Valdivia wrote to President
Garcia Carrasco in July of that year that the garrison was
in desperate straits because no money had been forthcoming
from Santiago on the situado v e s s e l . T h e

situation was so

critical that of the 13,000 pesos consumed by the treasury
each month, only 3,760 pesos remained in July of that year—
barely enough to pay the infantry battalion its current
salaries .37

It was customary in times such as these for

Valdivian treasury officials to utilize the practical but
undependable recourse of borrowing funds from local
merchants.

During this particular year, however, no citizen

had volunteered any assistance.

The treasurers in Santiago

protested to the governor that the capital was entering an

33Barros Arana, Historia general, VII, 295-97.
35"Expediente. . 1 8 1 0 , " ACG, CCCLXLV, 225.
3 7 Ibid.,

226.
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equally bleak fiscal crisis and finally persuaded Concepcibn
officials to dispatch 12,000 pesos to Valdivia as an emer
gency relief.

As the winter was too far progressed to send

the money by ship, the mail courier for the two cities was
contracted to carry the money overland, aided by his amiable
relations with the Indians.

Op

Stopgap remedies such as this one were the typical
responses of the financially strained Santiago treasury to
the military needs of the south, depicting an almost com
plete incapability in shouldering the responsibilities of
situado remission.

Long-range solutions to the provisioning

of Valdivia were not only beyond the range of the colony's
resources, but were looked upon with relative disinterest by
the Santiago decision-makers.

They were at this time more

preoccupied with defense of central Chile and the capital
area, especially due to the possibilities of independence
and the subsequent need to protect this vital core of the
patriot movement.
*

*

*

*

*

*

Because of its unique historical development and
local circumstances, Valdivia offers an exemplary model of
the actual implementat ion of the situado system, not only
from the complexities of its operation, but also because the
corrupting influence of garrison life presented the greatest

38Ibid.. 229.
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impediment to its intended use.
The Valdivia situado was used for the salaries of
military personnel, fortifications, public works and the
maintenance of convict laborers.

The amount of the subsidy

varied from year to year, but roughly 80,000 pesos annually
was sent from Lima— -about 30,000 pesos worth of which
arrived in the form of clothing or other commodities for the
t r o o p s . 3^

it constituted the economic base of existence for

the city and forts and became a kind of oil that lubricated
the entire economic machinery of government.
The importance of the subsidy is illustrated by the
fact that the most critical matters of deliberation between
the governor and his staff were undertaken in a junta de
hacienda, or finance council, rather than in a council of
war, for on the maintenance of the tenuous supply and
communication routes hinged the very survival of the colony.
This finance council, composed of the governor, sergeant
major, company captains and treasury officials, met each
year to elect a situadista, or an agent charged with
traveling to Lima to personally supervise the delivery of
the subsidy .^0

Until the 1750's, the selection of this

important official had defaulted to the individual
governors, who frequently chose a relative or crony in
conspiracies to defraud the royal treasury.

While a 1753

^Guarda, La economia, 89.
^Reglamento para Valdivia, 1753, Ord. 4.
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ordinance provided that the junta de hacienda should elect
the situadista from the ranks of the battalion captains,
categorically excluding any relatives of the governor, it
was not until late in the colonial period that these irregu
larities were somewhat diminished.

This was due to the use

of wealthy bondsmen who put up considerable sums of money to
guarantee full delivery of the subsidy.4^
There were other officials commissioned by the
governor to coordinate the delivery of the situado.

The

apoderado (attorney) representing Valdivia maintained
permanent residence in Lima and was charged with managing
legal technicalities and insuring the financial solvency of
individuals bonding the subsidy.

Unlike many of the

situadistas, these lawyers were evidently responsible
officials.

They were usually of great social prominence in
40

Lima and enjoyed an annual salary of 1,200 pesos. ^

After

1707, another position of legal agent was established in
Santiago in order to manage the financial accounts of
Valdivia and the food subsidy, which was sent each year from
A O

Valparaiso.

These positions were of singular importance

as the security of the situado against embezzlement was best
insured by the use of bondsmen, whom the officials directly
supervised.

4 ^Ibid.,

42

Ord. 33.

Guarda, Historia de Valdivia, 164.

4 3 "Indice alfabetico...," [c 1792], AV, CCLXXXIII,
Item 1, "Apoderado."
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The Valdivia situado included not only troop salaries
but also clothing, hardware, woolen cloth, gunpowder, arms,
and particularly those specialties and luxury items such as
sugar, hams and wines .^4

Immediately prior to his departure

for Lima, the situadista received from the junta de hacienda
an inventory of the company pay lists, miscellaneous mer
chandise to be purchased (such as medicines and clothing) for
the convicts, and the amount of pay which each soldier
desired to receive in merchandise.

On his arrival in Lima,

this inventory list was presented to the treasury officials,
who disbursed the stipulated amount while the situadista
purchased the other necessary items.

In order to place a

check on the infamous collusion between situadistas and
Peruvian merchants, it was stipulated that the buying of
merchandise should conform to current price guidelines
issued periodically by the Lima tribunal of commerce, the
consulado.4^

In actuality, both parties were sufficiently

skilled at avoiding such regulations, often dealing in
transactions far below the price guidelines with the dif
ference going into their own pockets.
On returning to Valdivia with the cargo, the
situadista was presented with another itemized list of the
alterations in the pay scales of the troops which had
occurred during his absence, due to desertion, discharge or

4 4 "Expediente sobre..., 1802," ACG, CCCCXIV, 206.
4 5 Ibid.,

213.
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additional recruitment.

He must rearrange the accounts

accordingly and then distribute the particular merchandise
to each company captain.

Once this was concluded, a carta

cuenta was drawn up relating the amounts given to each
soldier and the resulting deductions from his pay.^

The

position of the situadista could be precarious, for if he
misjudged the amount of money due the troops or spent too
much for merchandise in Lima, he was personally held liable
for repaying the difference to the treasury.

This was a

circumstance which was not infrequent .^7
The root cause of graft in the subsidy lay not merely
with the situadista but also with a multitude of royal
officials, who realized that there were enormous gains to
be made from this very large flow of money.

Governors of

Valdivia were frequently the most ardent practitioners of
these illegalities.

The seldom-practiced method of electing

the situadista usually resulted in two competing groups of
officials coalescing within the town, each attempting to
gain the favor of the governor with promises of lucrative
payments if their candidate was chosen.

48

It appears that

the situadista at times had to suffer the consequences of
his prestigious cohorts.

46"Indice alfabetico.. "
Item 1, "Situadista."

[c 1792], AV, CCLXXXIII,

47"Expediente sobre..., 1802," ACG, CCCCXIV, 206.
AQ

^°Guarda, Historia de Valdivia, 165.
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One particular agent. Captain Pedro Usauro Martinez,
was exposed in 1762 for having defrauded the treasury of
10,013 pesos in his supervision of the s u b s i d y I t

is not

known whether or not he had accomplices, but in this case
Martinez was imprisoned, his personal property auctioned by
the treasury, and his normal yearly salary deducted from the
debt outstanding.

This in itself is not unusual, but it is

interesting to note that Martinez served for many years in
prison, all the while on the active military roster and
forfeiting his salary to repay the debt.

In 1783, it was

ruled that he should be granted one-third of his salary to
provide for his family, but when he died in 1789, he still
owed 2,169 pesos to the royal treasury.

sn

The urgent need for the troops to receive the
situado promptly each year, and intact, was aggravated by
the practice of paying them their full salary once yearly,
rather than on a monthly or trimester basis as was customary
in the forts along the frontier.

Soldiers were given a

small monthly advance from the Valdivia treasury for
subsistence and for purchasing a few necessities, then paid
the remainder of their salary on arrival of the Lima boat.
This monthly stipend was far from sufficient, as evidenced

4 9 "Testimonio de..., 1764," ACG. DXXXV, 379.
5 0 Ibid.,

400.

■^Letter of Oyarzdbal, Santiago, May 9, 1808, ACG,
DCXXXVI.
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by the widespread usury which developed.

The governor him

self lent out large sums of his own money to the soldiers at
exorbitant rates of interest.

In addition to this loan

sharking by prominent officials, the scarcity of clothing
and food obliged the soldiers and their families to fall
into debt peonage by purchasing necessities from the
governor's own warehouse.

Although this practice was for

bidden by royal law, the need of the soldiers was so great
that the Ordenanzas politicas y econbmicas de Valdivia
(1741)

not only relented to its use, but laid down specific

instructions as to how such lending should be transacted and
the maximum rates of interest which might be charged. 52
If the subsidy proved a lucrative source of income
for Lima merchants and high-ranking officers of Valdivia,
the same did not necessarily hold true for shipowners who
transported it.

While the Peruvian treasurers paid 6 ,000

pesos for expenses to each shipowner making the journey,
these men were hesitant to risk the tempestuous weather of
the southern latitudes or to voluntarily exclude themselves
53
from more profitable voyages.

As there were seldom royal

warships available to undertake this loathsome task,

3^The conditions of such loans were that they be
voluntary on the part of the troops, that the amount of the
loan should not exceed one-third of the soldier1s salary,
and that the interest rate must not be exhorbitant ("Orden
anzas politicas y econOmicas de la Plaza de Valdivia,"
Concepci6 n, November 17, 1741, Ords. 29 and 30. Hereafter
cited as "Ordenanzas de Valdivia," 1741. Copy in Sala
Medina.
53"Autos seguidos..., 1766, " ACM, XXII, 30.
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officials were constantly preoccupied with either persuading
or intimidating a private owner to fit out his vessel on
short notice and then making certain that he did not wriggle
out of his obligation before completing the voyage.

This

system of private contracting left the subsidy vulnerable to
costly delays, spoilage of perishables, and a fluctuating
delivery schedule.

The short sailing season made it

imperative that the ship leave on time, or else an entire
year's effort would be wasted.

Coordination and planning

were often an impossibility considering that reluctant ship
owners could bottleneck the entire yearly operation by
refusing to sail on the scheduled date, sometimes under the
pretext of their vessel being unseaworthy.
Finally, in 1766, the viceroy decreed that all large
ships of the Pacific coastal trade were obliged to take
cA
turns carrying the situado each year.
This decision was
predicated on the theory that such strategic shipments were
not regarded as normal commerce presided over by the Lima
tribunal del consulado, but fell under jurisdiction of the
royal treasury.^

Under this turn system known as the

sorteo, shipowners agreed to rotate the delivery, the first
period extending from 1769 through 1779.

If a particular

owner could not fulfill his appointed turn, he might trade
positions with another owner by mutual consent, but refusal
to comply with o n e 's obligation entailed a fine of 4,000

54ibid., 1.

55Ibid., 18-19.
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pesos.

This improved system was a first step in choosing

a willing shipper, and was later renewed after the first
ten-year period expired.
Apart from the flaws of the sorteo, the subsidy was
continually threatened by either loss at sea or piratical
incursions in the Pacific.

The mere rumor of the latter was

sometimes sufficient cause for the delay or suspension of
the ship's departure.

Once loaded in Callao, it was normal

for the vessel to proceed directly to Valparaiso, where it
also took on board the food situado before continuing to
Valdivia, in this manner cutting transportation costs by a
considerable margin.

Governor Joaquin de Espinosa bitterly

denounced this practice in 1766 on the grounds that a
single large vessel lacked the capacity to carry both
situados combined, which resulted in the garrison not having
enough supplies to last an entire year.

57

In 1782, a more uniform delivery method was devised,
which utilized a separate vessel for each subsidy and a
rotation system as agreed upon under the s o r t e o .

The

first ship must be a large, heavy vessel which transported
the provisions to Valdivia, departing from Valparaiso
punctually each February 15.

The second vessel should be

smaller in size, leaving Callao during October, with the
regular Peruvian subsidy.

5 6 Ibid.,
5 8 "E1

14-15.

33.

After unloading in Valdivia, this

5 7 Ibid..

24.

tribunal de Cuentas..., 1782," AV, CCLXXXIII,
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vessel was to return to Valparaiso to take on the supplies
and relief troops destined for Juan Fernandez, which had to
arrive at the island by March at the very latest.

Under this

system, a total of 1 1 , 0 0 0 pesos was allotted for transporta
tion costs:

6,000 for the larger ship and 5,000 for the

smaller one ,59
The situado was more than a means of supplying the
soldiers of the Chilean army.

In a broader context it

represented the policy of Lima and Valparaiso commercial
interests to preserve their own trade monopolies by pre
venting the growth of would-be competitors.

As Father

Gabriel Guarda points out, there was a conscious effort on
the part of many governmental officials, both in Chile and
Peru, to deny Valdivians trade licenses or access to out
side commerce .^9

The situado constituted a basic component

of this monopolistic system because the bulk of its worth
was remitted in merchandise rather than the currency which
was needed to develop the local economy.

A royal investi

gator lent credence to this with his statement that:
. . . there is no doubt that the method of carrying
the subsidy in merchandise results that no one
[speaking of merchants] thinks of sailing to Valdivia,
as there is no purpose, its commerce being thus closed
and restricted to a few established individuals that
never v a r y . 6 1

5 9 Ibid.,
6 °Guarda.

14.
La economia, 66-67.

61-Escobedo to Jhuregui, Lima, October 1, 1782, ACM,
XLIX, 4.

Ill
Governor Juan Clarke remarked in 1795 that one of his over
riding desires was that Valdivia should develop a class of
merchants, but an even more important aspiration was that
these merchants be residents of the city, for the region
would never prosper as long as it depended on outside
assistance for survival .®2
*

*

*

*

*

*

To the island colony of Chilo 6 , the situado repre
sented even a more necessary component of life than in
Valdivia, for the primitive agricultural existence and the
absence of local commerce forced even the civilian populace
to hang upon the arrival of the ship from Callao.

The

amount of the situado averaged around 70,000 pesos a year
during the term of Peruvian Viceroy Gil de Taboada (1790's),
much of this consisting of merchandise.®^

The poverty of

the island was heightened by its isolation, for the belicose
Indians impeded terrestial contact between Chilob and
Valdivia, while the long eight-month winter closed off all
sea traffic.

The subsidy was thus justified in that it

provided the essentials for the colony's survival.

But

through the years Peruvian policy-makers had continued to
hold the island in economic servitude and had steadfastly
refused to allow the inhabitants to gradually decrease their

62,,Sobre mejorar..., 1795, " ACM, CX, 14.
® 2Olguin, Institucibnes, 85.
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dependence by the stimulation of local commerce.

The subsidy

arrived so infrequently at times that it caused extreme hard
ship among the inhabitants of the island.

For example, the

subsidy was not sent from 1733 through 1735.

During that

time, the soldiers contracted such large debts borrowing
money on which to subsist that when the shipments finally
resumed and their creditors demanded immediate payment of
the loans, the troops were left as pennyless as

b

e

f o

r e

.

64

Practically all of Chilo 6 1s ties were with Peru.
Island residents traveling to Valparaiso or other Chilean
ports had to take the roundabout itinerary of first
joumeying to Lima, then traveling southward to Chile on
another ship.

Commerce was restrictive because the

islanders possessed no vessels capable of transport ing their
goods to Peru.

Consequently, they were at the mercy of a

handful of Peruvian shipowners who agreed to transport their
commodities only at outrageous prices, at times up to one
£C
hundred percent of the product's worth. J The engineer
L&zaro Rivera wrote that the total value of Chilo6 's exports
to Peru in 1782 reached 95,700 pesos, while the worth of
imports from Peru was only 13,326

p

e

s

o

s

.
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Such an unfavor

able balance of trade was compounded by the discrepancy in

6 4 " C a r t a del Presidente..., March 15, 1739," Doc.
No. 4125, JMDI. CLXXXIV, 320-21.
6 6 "Discurso que hace..., 1782," D o c . No. 7492, JMDI,
CCLIX, 216.
6 6 ibid..

233-38.
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price between identical products in Lima and in Chilo6 ,
which resulted in the islanders paying prices several times
higher than elsewhere.

Table 5
Price Discrepancies Between Products
in Lima and C h i l o £ 6 7

Item

Jug of liquor
Sugar (one arroba)
Soap (one arroba)
Rock salt

Price
in
Chilo 6

Price in
Lima
11

25 pesos

pesos

4 pesos, 4 reales
10
1

pesos

10

pesos

35 pesos
4 pesos

peso

Rivera realized that the island's barter economy and
poverty could only be transformed by the availability of
capital, through which local business initiative could off
set Peruvian monopolism.

The situado, composing one of the

two or three ships which annually visited the colony,
actually impeded economic progress.

As a royal inspector

reported s
. . . the scarcity of money comes from the traditional
practice of the island's agent [the situadista] being
a merchant from Lima? he receives the subsidy in

/ ■ •*7

Ibid., 213-14.
twenty-five pounds.

An arroba equals approximately
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currency and sends it converted into merchandise.
This results in money being so rare that two
reales have been called and are still called a
provincial p e s o . 68
The Peruvian situado, then, was the heart of a master
plan for the maintenance of the strategic fortress complexes
throughout the viceroyalty, and a notable example of Spanish
administrative genius.

Considering the immense planning

which went into its functioning, the coordination of
shipping, and the dispatching of currency and merchandise,
it served admirably well.

It was the only means of sustain

ing these important areas, without which such vital positions
as Panama and Valdivia might have become possessions of
foreign powers.

It also promoted the cohesiveness and

loyalty to the crown of the residents of these areas, as the
annual situado ship was sometimes their only communicative
tie with the outside world.

Not only did it provide them

with essential elements of survival, but this direct link
with the viceregal bureaucracy and a constant flow of royal
military officers was a subtle but powerful means of culti
vating loyalty to the crown.

In an era when frontier

arsenals represented the epitomy of isolation, Spain's
centralism was reinforced to a remarkable degree.

"Fragmento de...," [c 1780], Doc. No. 4844, JMDI,
CXCVIII, 320-21.
peso consisted of eight reales.
A

Chapter 5
THE DESTERRADOS
One of the worst maladies of eighteenth century
Chilean society was the prevalence of crime, banditry,
vagrancy and other forms of social degeneracy, especially
among the mestizo-Indian castes and the semi-barbaric rural
inhabitants.

This heritage of lawlessness and violence was

more than a persistent vestige of the period of conquest, to
be gradually eradicated by the inroads of Spanish civiliza
tion; rather, it constituted part of the very fabric of
society itself, and was a way of life for thousands of rural
inhabitants.^

The disrespect for authority was a definite

factor in weakening the Spanish grip over the southern lands
and in their pushing back the frontier.
The expanses of underpopulated lands between the
Maule and Bio Bio rivers served as principal sanctuaries for
countless half-breeds and Spanish who had fled there either
to escape from crimes which they had committed or because
they had simply grown weary of the social conformity imposed
by urban life.

There, they reverted to an existence

i
G 6 ngora, Vagabundaie, 29.
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centering around cattle thievery, contrabanding, or highway
robbery.

2

They lived on the margins of Spanish society, and

the most draconic rulings by presidents had no apparent
effect on their actions.

While he was an army officer along

the frontier, Ambrosio 0 'Higgins wrote that the Spanish and
mestizo criminals who preyed on the civilian population were
almost as great a problem as the Indians, for the militia
was so occupied in apprehend ing these derelicts that they
were of little use in reinforcing the veteran troops.3
Municipalities and cabildos were entirely inadequate in con
tending with the rampant crime, for local jails were either
non-existent or so rudimentary that criminals could escape
almost at will.

The fiscal burden of maintaining prisoners

was an equally acute problem.

In 1762, the entire prison

population of Santiago was at the point of starvation because
there were no available revenues to procure food for the
inmates, save for the scant alms of a concerned priest. 4
It was customary in Chile, as in other areas of the
Spanish empire, for civil authorities to remand convicted
criminals to military fortresses where they would be far
removed from endangering or burdening the civilian populace.
This was mutually beneficial, for the military was able to

2 Ibid.,

5-7.

^ 0 'Higgins to J&uregui, April 21, 1776, ACM, LIV, 3.
4jos6 T. Medina, Cosas de la colonial apuntes para
la cr6 nica del siglo XVIII en Chile (Santiago: Imprenta
Universitaria, 1952), 297.
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utilize convict labor to construct the extensive fortifica
tions throughout the south®
somewhat of a dual role:

Thus, the Chilean army served

not only did it provide for the

defense of the colony, but it was also responsible for the
detention and upkeep of criminals.

While this diminished

the pressure on the overburdened, civilian penal facilities,
it left a rather profound stamp on the character of the
military.
Convicts serving their sentences within the military
outposts of Chile were known as desterrados, or exiles,

and

they were shipped there from such distant centers as Peru,
New Granada, and even Spain.

The policy of these adminis

trative centers was almost uniform in the desire to rid
their colonies of as many undesirable elements as possible.
In Spain, both the civil and military tribunals were charged
with dispatching military delinquents to America in order to
serve out their sentences.

In spite of this deliberate

policy, until very late in the colonial period it was cus
tomary to send most convicts either to peninsular fortresses
7

or to Africa.

Because Chile fell under the direct juris

diction of Lima, the colony was obliged to serve as a

^At times, convicts were also referred to as
presidarios.
6 "Indice alfabetico..., July 4, 1777," ACG,
DCCLXXIII.
7
Pedro Toledo SSnchez, Esquema del derecho penal
militar indiano y su jurisprudencia chilena (Valparaiso:
Editorial Juridica de Chile, 1961), 130.
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dumping ground for some of the viceroyalty's most incor
rigible offenders, especially military deserters from the
Peruvian army.

A Peruvian military ordinance of 1753

specifically provided that apprehended deserters should be
forced to serve for six years in Valdivia, with a reinci
dence of desertion punishable by "perpetual exile" in either
Q
Valdivia or Juan Fernandez.
The majority of convicts came from the captaincygeneral, itself.

The wheels of justice turned with

agonizing slowness in Chile, due to the almost epidemic
proportions of criminality and the cumbersome nature of
colonial jurisprudence.

Magistrates found it impossible to

process the accused quickly enough to avoid massive backlogs
of pending cases, so that sheer practicality came to dictate
that criminal cases frequently be expedited with penalties
of forced labor.

This was standard practice not only for

common thieves and footpads, but also for capital offenders,
for the hanging of murderers was an expensive and lengthy
process .9
There was a similar urgency within administrative
circles to remit enough convicts in order to fill the quotas
of construction laborers, for the defense of the colony was

^Reglamento para la G u a m i c i 6 n de la Plaza del Real
Phelipe del Callao (Lima: Francisco Sobrino, 1753), Ord.
18.
^Vicuna Mackenna, Juan Fernandez, 301. The customary
sentence for vagrants was two years fortress labor and up to
ten years* confinement for robbery.
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felt to pivot upon a strong network of fixed fortifications.
In order to comply with orders for new fortifications,
President O'Higgins solicited the audiencia in 1788 to
expedite criminal cases more quickly and to pass out more
sentences of forced labor.

When the royal court was unco

operative with his plea, the president issued a decree
ordering the subdelegados to immediately ferret out up to
four hundred vagrants and known criminals throughout their
districts.

If at least two witnesses could testify to the

guilt or bad character of each accused, he was to be remitted
to Valparaiso for shipment to Valdivia on the earliest
possible boat.

As the foregoing example depicts, expedi

ence was the key to the remission of desterrados, either
from the overburdened dockets of the audiencia or from the
needs of military labor camps.

There was little concern for

the lack of prison facilities within these forts, nor the
manpower limitations in providing for convict maintenance.
Valdivia, Juan Fernandez, Talcahuano (the port of
Concepci6 n) and Valparaiso were the four Chilean fortresses
used for the detention of criminals.

A handful of convicts

were occasionally sent to forts along the frontier, but the
bulk of them were housed in the coastal fortresses because
of the ease with which they could be transported there by
sea.

The collection and remission of the convicts were

normally undertaken in conjunction with the situado, and

b o r d e r of February 14, 1786, ACG, DCCLXXIII.

120
each year convicts from Peru were loaded aboard the military
supply ship in Callao for the trip south.

Upon their

arrival at Valparaiso, additional convicts were put aboard
from the Santiago jails and outlying areas of the
11

intendancy.

Before leaving port, those men destined to

serve in Valdivia or Juan Fernandez were given thorough
medical examinations to ascertain their fitness for enduring
the cold, southern latitudes and the arduous physical
labor .12
Separated from the mainland by 400 miles, Juan
Fernandez became Chile's maximum security prison.

To the

island were consigned the hard-core incorrigibles and
1^
especially those men with habitual escape records. J

Although the island was not far off the Lima-Valparaiso
trade route, the extremely treacherous seas and craggy coast
line enhanced its almost total isolation and discouraged all
but one or two ships landing there each year.

Ironically,

the governor and troops stationed there considered them
selves as much prisoners as any convict, for they were
rotated only once a year from the despised g a r r i s o n . 1^

The

11"Expediente formado..., 1800-1806," Doc. No. 1338,
ARA. DCII, 8 .
1Certification of prisoner's health bound for
Valdivia and Juan Fern&ndez, Santiago, April 11, 1799, ARA,
CCCLXXXV, 3-5.
12"Correspondencia del Tribunal..., May 22, 1762,"
ACG, DCXLV, 126.
1Carvallo y Goyeneche, DescripciOn, X, 202.

121
island was completely poverty-stricken, and the letters of
its governors attested to the wretched state of the inhabi
tants, the undiscipline of the troops, and the absence of
productive enterprises.

Dependency was the overriding con

cept in its existence, for the very survival of the
islanders hinged upon the prompt arrival of the annual
situado from Valparaiso.

This subsidy of food and supplies

sustained not only the regular crown dependents

(soldiers

and convicts) but their families and the colonists, as
well .15
Anywhere from several dozen to as many as one hundred
prisoners a year were brought to the island, and they served
as laborers and as auxiliary troops in time of war.

In

April, 1802, there were 165 convicts on the island, 44 of
whom had come from Lima.1** Notwithstanding the island's
reputation as a maximum security prison, prisoners did
escape.

This necessitated vigilance on the part of the

troops there.

One of the ordinances for Juan Fernandez

promulgated under President Jduregui ordered that a corporal
and two soldiers guard each ship arriving at port in order
to prevent convicts from stowxng away on board. 17

2

.

^"Relacidn que expresa..., July, 1795," ACM, CIII,

1 5 "Relaci6 n que manifiesta..., January 2, 1799," ARA,
CCCLXXXV, 1.

1^ "Ordenanzas del presidente J&uregui, " Santiago,
April 25, 1776, hereinafter cited as "Ordenanzas de
Jciuregui, " 1776. Copy in Sala Medina.
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In 1787, a bizarre episode occurred which involved
the Peruvian viceroy's signature being forged in order to
secure the release of three convicts.

The archival source

does not mention who might have perpetrated the forgery but
does relate that three men left the island on ships with
supposedly valid documents confirming their release.

One

convict even managed to sign aboard the visiting situado
ship as a sailor.

The authorities in Santiago advised the

Intendant of Concepcibn to search all incoming vessels for
the escapees.

TO

This and similar occurrences convinced

Chilean officials that prisoners could escape from an island,
even one as far away as Juan Fernandez.
In an effort to stimulate the growth of the island
population, incentives for colonization were offered (such
as land, tools and housing materials), and the families of
soldiers stationed there were encouraged to settle on the
island.

These benefits were also extended to the convicts

with the realization that they composed an integral portion
of the p o p u l a t i o n H o w e v e r ,

the inhospitable environment

of the island doomed these attempts to failure, and the
proportion of independent colonists to crown dependents
remained consistently low.

In his visit to the island in

1793, the naturalist Thaddaeus Haenke estimated the total

IS"Expediente...sobre aprencibn de unos Reos, 1787,"
ACG, DCCGLXV, 1-4.
19"Ordenanzas de J&uregui," 1776, Ord. 61.
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population as around 300 souls „

A commissary review dated

two years later revealed that there were almost 200 crown
dependents present, including 93 convicts.

7 1

If we are to

accept Haenke's census figure as a reasonable approximation,
then it is evident that at least two-thirds of the population
was reliant on government support in order to live and that
one-third of the total were convicts.

This attests to the

island's poverty and the impossibility of creating a selfsufficient, industrious colony.

The island never lost its

reputation as a squalid army outpost and penal colony, and
the association between soldiers and convicts constituted
the dominant theme in its existence.
In 1645, the city of Valdivia was rebuilt with the
status of plaza-fuerte, or town-fort, and under direct
supervision and jurisdiction of Peru.

From its refounding

until the end of the colonial period, the authorities of
Lima and Santiago made regular practice of sending shiploads
of convicts to Valdivia in order to construct the formidable
fortress complex which eventually encircled the entire bay.
During its colonial prime, Valdivia possessed over two
thousand residents, several hundreds of whom were convicts

^^Haenke, Descripci 6 n , 75.
21"Relaci6n que expresa..., July, 1795," ACM, CIII,
1.
22

.

•

.

Guarda, Historia de Valdivia. 166.

?o
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living within the confines of the forts and the city .22

An

untold number of others had become residents of the town
after completing their sentences.

With a penal population

of at least ten to fifteen percent of the entire city, it

was

inevitable that these convicts would dramatically influence
the character of Valdivia.

This influence was even more

pronounced considering that convicts did not remain segre
gated from the citizenry but actually lived and worked among
them, employing their skills as artisans, laborers, and
soldiers .24
Spanish authorities were intensely concerned with
providing for the maintenance and upkeep of large numbers of
convicts and the security problems inherent in their
proximity to military garrisons.

At the same time, it was

realized that convict labor was indispensable in the construc
tion of the crucial defensive works.

These two objectives

were not always compatible, for convicts were usually
remitted on the basis of construction timetables and not
with regard for the capabilities of military prison facili
ties.

Governors of Valdivia were usually hard-pressed

simply to provide food and clothing for their own troops,

22"Viaje de...Tom&s de O'Higgins, 1796-1797," AFA,
XXXIII, 8.
The monthly reviews of the Valdivia prison popula
tion in 1796 show a fairly constant level of over 200 con
victs: February, 248 prisoners; March, 236 prisoners;
April, 242 prisoners ("Relacidn..., 1796, " ACM, CX, 1-4).
24
"Expediente formado..., 1792," ACG, DCCCLXVIII, 6 .
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especially since survival was so dependent on the prompt
arrival of a single shipload of supplies.

Because of the

absence of prison facilities and shortages of military per
sonnel, there was a pronounced laxness in the vigilance and
care of prisoners.

As late as 1757 there was not a single

jail within the entire Valdivia complex.

25

As time pro

gressed, the prisoners within the log palisade walls of the
town were locked up each night in a long barracks , but in
the forts they could be found laboring among the fortifica
tions unguarded, without cells, even living among the
soldiers .^6

to an officer newly-arrived at Valdivia, the

sight of such a motley garrison of soldiers and its apparent
inability to control the movements of the prisoners must
have been very disconcerting.

One officer of longstanding

frontier service lamented the fact that,
. . . the positions of employment in which the prisoners
are engaged, as well as the cells where they are kept,
are of no security and frankly facilitate their
escape .27
The capabilities of the Valdivia garrison were
undeniably strained with the encumbrance of maintaining a
large prison population.

Simply from an administrative point

of view there was frequent uncertainty as to just how long
prisoners were to be confined.

This was due in part to the

^Medina, Cosas de la colonia, 453.
^"V i a j e de...TomAs de 0 'Higgins, 1796-1797," AFA,
XXXIII, 8 .
27,lExpediente formado..., 1792, " ACG, DCCCLXVIII, 7.
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variety of jurisdictions from which they were sent and the
practice of remanding convicts to the fortresses without
stipulating the length of their sentences. 28

But it was

more likely that the infrequent communication with the out
side world, the continual need of laborers, and the wide
prerogatives of the governors were most instrumental factors
in determining the length of a prisoner's stay.

It was not

uncommon for men to complete their original sentences but be
faced with additional years of hard labor for crimes
committed while they were prisoners.

The neglect of convicts

and their welfare lent an air of permanence to the sentences
of pena de presidio, for many of these men served for years
. .
. ■
29
past the time limit of their original sentences.
The great preoccupation of military governors was in
stemming the criminality within Valdivia and preventing the
escape of the convicts.

It was impossible to maintain close

supervision over the prison population without compromising
the military preparedness of the garrison.

Escape was a

common occurrence which seemed to generate a great deal of
fear among the townspeople and also in neighboring parts of
the intendancy.

The danger of these convicts lay not so

much in their actual numbers, but in their criminal person
alities and their propensity towards crime.
28

Many were

According to Governor Espinosa, there were numerous
convicts who had no definite time limit for their encarceration, only the general penalty of "presidio labor" (Espinosa
to 0 'Higgins, April 8 , 1774, ACG, DCCCLXVIII, 8 ).
29Ibid.
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repeated offenders from Peru or other areas who, having once
escaped, found themselves in an unfamiliar, hostile terri
tory where continued crime was the only alternative for their
survival.
The high incidence of escape caused concern as far
away as Santiago.

In 1792, President 0 'Higgins chastised

the governor of Valdivia for not giving him an account of
escaped convicts which were known to be running loose in the
vicinity.30

He let the governor know in no uncertain terms

that he expected the apprehension of these men and an end to
the crimes which they were committing.

He ordered that in

the future the intendants of both Santiago and Concepcibn be
Ol

immediately notified of escapes.

Lawlessness and insta

bility were abiding features of Valdivian society, not so
much from the hostile environment of the region as from
factors within the town.
Townspeople also feared the criminal because one of
the most common tactics of escape and certainly the most
unique, was that of setting fires to the town dwellings in
the hope of creating enough distraction to flee unnoticed.
Fire was always a danger where wooden structures predominated,
but in Valdivia it occurred so frequently as to become one
of the worst threats to local residents.

Three major fires

ravaged the city during the first half of the eighteenth

3^o'Higgins to the governor of Valdivia, Santiago,
May 15, 1792, ACG. DCCLXXXII, 511.
31ibid.
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century (1734, 1742 and 1748), as a result of which few of
the original colonial buildings were left intact .33
Arson was prevalent not only in the town but also
among the forts, evidently to such a degree that a local
attorney called it the major danger faced by the garrison of
soldiers. J

It appears that the most common time of day for

these fires was during the early afternoon when the inhabi
tants were resting and vigilance was relaxed.

Prisoners

threw torches onto the thatched roofs of the wooden houses
and then escaped in the ensuing confusion.

During much of

the term of Governor Pedro Gregorio de Echenique, arson was
so prevalent that it was necessary for special watchmen to be
posted around the clock to detect the spread of fire.

34

Special ordinances provided that administrative offices,
powder magazines, and even the individual houses be roofed
with tile.

But the use of flammable building materials

must have continued to predominate, for as late as 1794 the
residents of Valdivia petitioned to the governor to con
struct a small factory for producing roofing tile.

They

pointed out that within the past December, alone, a total of
eleven houses had been destroyed in two separate fires, and
another house had been partially burned in January.

3 3 Guarda,

Historia de Valdivia, 96.

33"Causa criminal..., 1777, " ACG, CCCX, 29.
3 ^Guarda,

Historia de Valdivia, 167.

35Reqlamento para Valdivia, 1753, Ord. 43.

They
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were quite specific in placing the responsibility for these
fires on the "perverse mentality" of the prisoners.3^
The shortage of soldiers and the presence of large
numbers of convicts resulted in the enlistment of many
criminals in the army.

It was the logical expedient to

alleviate overcrowded penal facilities and to satisfy the
manpower shortage in the army.

This was perhaps the most

pervasive and far-reaching effect of the desterrados, for
the composition of the military was radically altered by
their presence.

Military archives of the period reflect the

concern of governors in filling out the ranks of their
commands rather than documenting the background of the
recruits.

However, it is known that a very large ratio of

soldiers were former convicted criminals.

In his visit to

Valdivia in the early 1700 *s, the French engineer Amadeo
Frezier estimated that the majority of the local troops were
0 7

convicted men.

Several decades later, President Amat

similarly remarked that the greater part of the Valdivian
troops were criminals, many of whom were serving their
second prison term as soldiers.

Op

Convict soldiers were not uncommon in the Chilean
army but were especially prevalent in the infantry battalion
of Valdivia.

The military ordinances of Valdivia (1753)

35"Los vecinos..., 1794," ACG, CMLXXVII, 1.
37

Frezier, RelaciOn del viaje, 3.

3®"Carta de..., March 28, 1756, " Doc. No. 4305,
JMDI. CLXXXVIII, 165.
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sanctioned the enlistment of desterrados as soldiers, and
they were admitted according to their racial status in
either the regular companies of Spanish or the caste company
(compahla de pardos).

Enlistment entailed an obligation of

serving for the length of the sentence, plus an additional
three years in the town militia after one's discharge

.

^

In

spite of the strict racial guidelines, castes were frequently
placed into the regular companies of Spanish, an infraction
which for the class-conscious Spanish mind was worse than
the unsavory character of these recruits.4®

Only those

prisoners who had committed the most grave offenses were
barred from military service.
Convict soldiers were prohibited by law from
receiving any salary or other remuneration for their services,
and were furnished with only a daily ration and the neces
sary clothing.4-*- Likewise, they were forbidden from
ascending to the rank of officer.

If they were dismissed

as unfit at some point during their duty, their accumulated
length of service was deducted from their original prison
sentences.4^

After successful completion of their military

service the criminal records of these soldiers were

^®Req1amento para Valdivia, 1753, Ord. 15.
4 0 Ibid..

Ord. 35.

41ibid., Ord. 14.

4 2 "Ordenanzas de Valdivia," 1741. Ord. 20.
43o'Higgins to the King, Santiago, October 11, 1794,
AGG. DCCXCIII, 275.
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considered clean.

Those men who agreed to settle permanently

in Valdivia were given status as regular citizens and fur
nished with homes for their families
With such lucrative incentives offered them, it was
only natural that a great many convicts would turn to the
career of soldier, rather than face grueling labor as con
victs .

During an Indian revolt in 1792, the Valdivia

garrison was so understrength that the convict population
was picked over to find volunteers with a knowledge of
firearms.

Some forty-seven of them were chosen to take part

in a punitive expedition against the Indians, with the
promise of having their sentences reduced.

They were also

assigned a salary of four pesos monthly, about half that of
<45
the regular veteran troops. J

Enlistment was known to have

been extended even to Indian half-breeds, who once discharged
from the service made war against the very troops with whom
they had s e r v e d . A l l manner of dregs of colonial society
were either enlisted or impressed into the army1s ranks,
where the most severe penalties failed to deter their deser
tion and undiscipline.^

Although a critical manpower

^Reglamento para Valdivia, 1753, Ord. 19.
45;LUcas Molina to 0 'Higgins, Valdivia, October 15,
1792, AMV. XXI, 318.
^Medina, cosas de la colonia. 269.
^ I n 1763, fifteen soldiers deserted en masse from
the fort of Niebla, accompanied by several prisoners. All
were apprehended and the instigator of the movement, Vicente
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shortage was satisfied by such measures the calibre of the
army was immeasurably lowered, for the very nature of these
convicts was anathema to discipline and regimentation.
Considering the strategic importance of Valdivia and
the other Chilean forts as a first line of defense against
European incursions in the Pacific, it is indeed ironic that
the Spanish chose to send there some of the worst human
elements imaginable.

The Bourbon committment to building

a strong defensive posture in America and the outlays of men
and material which this entailed, was in a sense hobbled
because of the presence of so many criminals alongside and
in the regular army.

There was a very real concern in some

circles that should the colony be invaded by foreign powers,
the unruly convict population would defect to the enemy,
providing invaluable assistance and information.

As

Governor Clarke of Valdivia remarked:
The situation of Valdivia is unique; it is
located one hundred leagues from Concepcibn (the
most immediate fort); it shelters convicts and
wicked people that would ally themselves with the
enemy at their first arrival.48
Not only were the prisoners feared, but those convicts who
had become soldiers were so devoid of fighting ability that

Acuna, was remanded to the fort at Yumbel. In a statement
to the president concerning the incident, the governor
recounted that Acuna was a notorious vagabond and robber of
the frontier and had originally entered the army as a
prisoner on Juan Femfindez ("Sobre indulto concedido...,
1763," ACG, DCCXI, 1-3).
4®clarke to Guzman, Valdivia, April 29, 1805, ACG,
DCCCXXIV, 6 .
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officials virtually discounted their ability to repel an
invasion.

The foreign threat was perhaps more imagined than

real, but security was definitely at stake; there could be
no real safety for the inhabitants of the south as long as
the military fortresses perpetuated instability and the
criminal influence.
Although convicts were admittedly a security problem,
a financial burden and contributed to the shoddy character
of the army, they did fulfill the all-important function of
constructing fortifications.

Convict labor built practically

all of Chile's coastal fortresses and was as vital an element
of construction as quarry stone or mortar .4 9

Ordinary wage

laborers and artisans were not only scarce, but their
employment constituted the single most expensive item in
construction costs.

50

For this reason, convict labor was

utilized almost exclusively, saving the royal treasury no
small sums of money.

This reliance on convict labor created

a certain dependency and an incapability of completing con
struction without it.
In 1798, the Spanish king ruled that Chile must
function independently of Peruvian military and financial
assistance, an action which suddenly placed the heavy defense
c: *1

costs squarely on the shoulders of the Chilean treasury.

49,lLa verdad..., 1782, " AFA, XXV, 2-3.
5 0 Ibid..

5.

C *1

Augusto Orrego Luco, La patria vieja (Santiago:
Prensas de la Universidad de Chile, 1933), I, 12.
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As an offshoot of this, in 1804, it was prohibited that any
further convicts be sent to Valdivia and Juan Fernandez
unless the Peruvian viceroyalty agreed to assume costs of
their transportation and upkeep in these garrisons .52

As

Chile and Peru had always been jointly liable for these
expenses in the past, the Lima administrators naturally felt
it in their best interest to cease these convict remissions
and avoid unnecessary costs.
Interestingly enough, the ministers of the royal
treasury in Santiago did not view this development as an
opportunity to rid the colony of burdensome criminals, but
actually opposed the plan as it would prove detrimental to
the completion of Chilean defenses .53

A statement of

similar import by the influential tribunal de cuentas
(fiscal auditing agency) in Santiago urged continuation of
the traditional system of convict remissions, for even if
Chile were forced to bear the costs of transportation and
maintenance the total expenses would still be substantially
less than the hiring of free laborers .54

After delibera

tion, the viceroy agreed in 1807 to reinstate the previous
system; but for all practical purposes, the colony derived
no further benefits from this.

Shortly afterwards, the

52,,Real Orden..., November 22, 1804, " ACM. XLIX, 1.
5 3 Ibid., 6 . While the treasury ministers admitted
that Valdivia's dependency on convict labor was high, they
noted that Juan Fernandez could well manage with smaller
numbers of convicts.

54Ibid., 7.
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system of military supply (situado) was terminated, which
finally ended convict remissions to Chile.
The intimate relationship between desterrados and
the army was one of the most unique and interesting facets
of the Chilean military.

In one sense convicts were bene

ficial, for without their labor the coastal fortifications
of the colony would have never reached fruition.

In another

sense they were an encumbrance, absorbing manpower and
resources by the crimes they committed and the continual
escapes which they perpetrated.

Their most profound influ

ence was that of their recruitment as soldiers, which
substantially affected the calibre and morale of the army.
For good or bad, the desterrados were an intrinsic and
accepted feature of military life.

Chapter 6
RECRUITMENT AND ITS EFFECTS ON
THE MILITARY
For the residents of the peripheral, borderland
areas of Spanish America, the presidio and its complement of
soldiers often represented the only secure bulwark against
the instability of rural life.

The military was frequently

the crown's principal agent in the extension of territorial
sovereignty and colonization, but it was not necessarily a
civilizing factor.

On the contrary, the Chilean military

seems to have displayed a marked predilection towards
criminality and was intimately linked with the violence and
lawlessness of frontier society.

A great many of the rank

and file soldiers were miscreants and rogues of the worst
order, which often made the army appear as much a threat to
society as the elements it sought to contain.
The military did possess many brilliant and accom
plished soldiers.

Among them were the royal engineers, who

not only constructed some of the colony's grandest public
buildings but contributed to the cartographic knowledge of
Chile by their extensive mapping of the coasts and natural
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ports .1

And a host of governors and presidents exercised

prudent judgment in balancing both the needs of civil
administration and the exigencies of military preparedness.
But two centuries of internecine Indian warfare and the
poverty and isolation of the colony had combined to breed an
army low in morale and woefully deficient in professionalism,
rife with desertion and crime and stubbornly resistant to
reform.

As a commandant of the San Pedro fort wrote of the

fourteen veteran troops under his command, only four knew
how to fire a musket and the rest were incompetent, due to
sickness or advanced age .2

Another commander was even less

camplimentary, referring to his troops as a ludicrous pro
cession of delinquents,

"all of them idiots in the art of

warfare ."3
Deficiencies in the army were perpetuated not so
much by an absence of professionalism and training as they
were by recruitment practices, for the unpopu 1 arity of
military service left little recourse but the drafting of
convicts and vagrants.

The Spanish army, which was the

fountainhead of soldiers for Chile during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, had virtually curtailed large-scale

•^Foremost among these army engineers was the archi
tect Joaquin Toesca, who supervised many of the great public
works projects of the late colonial period. Other military
engineers of note were: Juan Garland, Jos 6 Antonio Birt,
Pedro Rico, and Leandro Badar&n (Encina, Historia de Chile.
V, 202-206).
2 "Expediente sobre..., 1770, " ACG, DCCCLXI, 2.
^Medina, Cosas de la colonia, 452.
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remissions of troops by the beginning of the eighteenth
century.

As the colony became increasingly self-sufficient

and as the Indian struggle showed a marked decline, Spanish
monarchs reduced the flow of foot soldiers to very modest
proportions.

Chileans were forced to rely on a steady

trickle of peninsular officers to provide the leadership
backbone of the colonial army.
The burden of raising an army thus fell mainly upon
the captaincy-general, a task which was intensified by the
continual state of alert in which the army was kept, either
from the threat of Indians or from foreign invasion.

It was

of critical importance to maintain troop levels at full
strength and to keep on hand enough qualified specialists
in certain fields, such as experienced artillerymen .4

The

task of recruitment was infinitely compounded by the
reluctance of the colonials.

The normal six-year enlistment

offered little compensation and little glory or adventure
for the common soldier.

It did offer a lonely tour of duty

in some frontier outpost where boredom, impoverishment, and
an oppressive isolation naturally created an atmosphere of
mediocrity and slack discipline.
Enlistment bonuses were offered as an enticement to
potential recruits, but the numbers of volunteers were
seldom sufficient, leaving impressment as the ultimate means

4 "Carta de..., 1762," AFA, LII, 1.
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of filling out the ranks.

5

While desterrados and other

unsavory persons were usually allowed to join the army of
their own volition, impressment was quite another matter.
The Ordenanza general del ej6 reito (1768) strictly specified
that all recruitment, no matter under what circumstances,
should be completely voluntary and without c o e r c i o n Y e t ,
the custom in Chile, as well as in other colonial juris
dictions, was to use whatever means necessary to obtain the
required soldiers, which frequently meant scouring the jails
7

and city streets.

Although impressment was an admittedly

necessary and accepted means of recruitment, it had the
effect of continually placing the dregs of society in the
ranks of the army.
The inevitable outgrowth of the impressment of
soldiers and the repugnant character of military service was
widespread desertion.

Indeed, it was probably the most

5 "Revista de..., 1793," ACM, CX, 13.
The Peruvian military faced similar adversities in
filling the ranks of the numerous soldiers who had either
died, deserted or been discharged. Viceroy Croix noted that
the European soldiers who were sent to Peru soon left the
army in search of more rewarding and more gentile profes
sions (Memorias de los vireyes, V, 257).
^Toledo Sanchez, Esquema del derecho, 144.
^Upon creation of the Royal Regiment of Lima in 1787,
it was ruled that in case there were not enough voluntary
recruits, that a rigorous impressment be carried out in Lima
and other Peruvian cities of all idlers, vagrants and
sailors who had deserted off ships arriving from Spain.
Some of these men eventually deserted, were captured and
tried, and were sent to Chilean fortresses (Memorias de los
vireyes, V, 250-51).
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frequent crime within the ranks.

8

Deserters created a

plethora of security problems, not only for the military but
for the civilian populace as well, for these men were often
of a vile temperament and accustomed to live by illegal
means.

They roamed the countryside in bands, taking what

ever they could find, and preyed upon residents of isolated
settlements.

When supply ships arrived each summer at the

island of Chilo 6 , the local inhabitants were put on alert
against the sudden influx of criminals and deserters who
9
fled the ships, many posing as soldiers.
in Valdivia,
desertion was nearly as great a problem as the escape of
convicts.

Soldiers were not only offered bounty for the

apprehension of deserters, but also a reduction in their own
enlistments .10
High rates of desertion were also attributable to
inadequacies of supply and communication within the army.
The infrequency with which soldiers were supplied and paid
their wages left many of them with no alternative but to
pursue farming, mining or other vocations in order to pro
vide for their families.

This was not due to any distaste

^Toledo S&nchez, Esquema del derecho, 149. Accord
ing to this author, desertion accounted for eighteen percent
of all military crimes.
^ "Bando de buen govierno, June 20, 1797," AFA,

XXXIII, 78.
1 0 ,,0rden de..., February 6 , 1787, " ACG. DCCLXXIII,
Vol. 26, No. 12.
"Real orden..., January 6 , 1786," ACG, DCCXXXVI,
Item 10637.
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for the profession of soldiering, but from simple economic
n e c e s s i t y D u r i n g the early eighteenth century, the
situado was subject to delays of several years duration.

It

was then that the distinction between soldier and civilian
took on a vague, undefined meaning.

Soldiers left the ranks

seasonally to tend their crops or drifted about the country
side in search of employment, eventually returning to their
units.

On visiting Concepcidn in 1713, the engineer Amadeo

Frezier found that the troops had not been paid by the crown
in fourteen years.

Most of them had left their companies to

find employment elsewhere.

Only a few aged guards remained
IP
to defend the Indian frontier.
One of the military
ordinances passed by President J&uregui (1776) forbade
troops from engaging in any other livelihood except the army,
a noble but illusory principle considering the sad lot of
the common foot soldier. 13
Spanish military law conceived of two basic types of
desertion, which were applicable in the mother country and
the colonies, as well.

The first of these, desercidn

calificada. or qualified desertion, pertained to flight in
time of war and bore penalties ranging from death for treason
to ten years of hard labor for desertion in actual battle or

•^Carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripcidn, IX, 223.
^Frezier, Relacidn del viaje, 15.
13"0rdenanzas de J&uregui," 1776, Ord. 21.
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from strategic military fortresses.^ The second, desercibn
simple, or ordinary desertion, was that which was committed
in peacetime without mitigating circumstances.

For first

offenders, four months of imprisonment were prescribed,
followed by eight more years of obligatory military service.
Recurrences merited similarly lengthy sentences of forced
labor in military arsenals or public works.

15

In actual

practice, the implementation of these penalties varied
widely throughout the empire, due to amplification and
amendment among the many colonial jurisdictions; but a
common denominator throughout was that juridical policy was
not at all adverse to returning deserters to active military
service, especially in the Indies.^
The dispensation of military justice in Chile fol
lowed neither the exacting procedural regimen as practiced
in the peninsular tribunals, nor were the penalties applied
with the severity implicit m

17

the military ordinances.

Within the realm of the judicial heirarchy there were lower
tribunals (tribunales inferiores) in America, which were of
sole, first and second instance, while in Spain resided the
superior tribunals (tribunales superiores), of second
instance and appellate nature.

Although the peninsular

^ To l e d o S&nchez, Esquema del derecho, 140.
1 5 Ibid.

16"Orden de..., March 2, 1787," ACG. DCCLXXIII,
Vol. 26, No. 18.
17 Carvallo y Goyeneche, DescripciOn. IX, 172.
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tribunals were by law designated as appellate courts for
resolving difficult colonial legal matters, they were rarely
used for this purpose because of the great distances
involved, as well as the time and expense. 18

As a result,

the ultimate dispensation of military cases normally fell
upon the viceroy or president, or in isolated areas, a
military governor.

Their decisions were usually tempered

more by the reality of frontier life rather than the
rigidity and severity of peninsular legal doctrine.
There was a pronounced tendency to moderate the
penalties for crimes committed in America, with the possible
exception of peninsular soldiers who were sent to reinforce
the colonial armies.

These penalties were especially

diminished in Chile due to the shortage of able-bodied
fighting men and the realization that there were few replace
ments for soldiers who were imprisoned or drummed out of the
service.

A royal order of 1794 stipulated that deserters

from the Valdivia garrison who were apprehended should
simply be reassigned to serve in the infantry battalion of
Concepci6 n.

20

Another royal order of similar vein offered

full pardon to deserters if they would voluntarily surrender
themselves within a four-month period, agreeing to serve for

^ To l e d o S&nchez, Esquema del derecho, 120.
1 9 Ibid.,

127.

20"Orden de..., May 24, 1794," ACG, DCCLXXIII,
Vol. 33, No. 65.
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more years in the army.

91

The tenor of these rulings

suggests a kind of dry rot among the rank and file troops,
but one which was necessarily tolerated by the general staff.
The trial proceedings of one particular deserter,
one Jos£ Ccircamo, is indicative of the laxity with which
this crime was often punished.

22

The first page of the

relatively brief proceeding, taking place in Concepcidn in
1725, was signed by President Gabriel Cano.

It stated that

the soldier Jos 6 carcamo, of the company of Captain Ambrosio
Lovillo, over a period of time had repeatedly deserted from
the ranks.

After his initial desertion, he was apprehended

in the partido of Maule and remitted to the fort of Puren,
where he again deserted.

This time he was sent to the fort

of San Pedro, where he deserted for a third time and was
taken to Concepcidn for trial.

The opening statement was

closed with the recommendation that proceedings be initiated
against the soldier as an example to others .23
Diego Orellana, also a member of Lovillo’s company,
testified that it had been almost a year since carcamo
deserted and that he knew the accused had also fled after
this from Puren and San Pedro.

The next witness, a soldier

named Jos 6 Fernandez, verified the authenticity of the pre
ceding

testimony, adding that the defendant was now

21"Orden de..., August 23, 1776," ACG. DCCLXXIII,
Vol. 17, No. 81.
22"Auto contra Jos 6 carcamo..., 1724," ACG. CCLXXXIII,
Item 14.
23Ibid., 1.
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confined in the guardhouse .24

The fiscal then ordered that

the accused present his testimony before the asesor general
de qobierno and the auditor de querra.

On March 2, Carcamo

declared under oath that it had been almost one year since
he was given one month's leave to go to the partido of
Maule, but that he exceeded his leave and was subsequently
apprehended .25

He added that he had also deserted from

Puren and San Pedro.

When asked if he knew it was a grave

offense to desert, even more so at a time when the Indians
were in full revolt, C&rcamo answered that he was fully
aware of the consequences of his actions.
Although a maximum of six days was declared for
deliberation of a verdict, a decision was reached almost at
once.

C&rcamo was found guilty of deserting three times,

compounded by having done so during time of war.

The

accused was sentenced to be taken to the city square to
receive a public flogging.

The sentence was dated March 3,

1724, and was signed by the president, the licenciado
Rosales, and authorized by the escribiano Tomds de Vald 6 z ?
duration of the entire proceeding was five days.2^
The trial of C&rcamo terminated with this sentence.
Although the severity of the flogging is not known, it would
appear to be only a token penalty for a crime of such
gravity.

However, the most disturbing factor is that there

24Ibid., 2
26Ibid., 5.

25Ibid.. 3.
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was no mention of his being prohibited from further military
service, nor in being forced to serve for several years of
hard labor in prison.

Instead, the sole penalty of a public

flogging leads one to assume that Cdrcamo was reinstated in
good standing with his company.

The Ordenanza general del

ei 6 rcito bluntly prescribed that all those soldiers who
deserted during military engagements should be executed.

27

Even when considering the prudent practice of
ameliorating the sometimes extreme penalties recommended by
military law, justice was too often applied with excessive
leniency and a propensity to reemploy these offenders as
soldiers.

Rather than ejecting hardened criminals and

repeated offenders, officers recycled them into the military
service, with the result that these troops gave the army a
bad reputation.

2^The military ordinances of President J&uregui
stipulated that soldiers in the frontier forts not be allowed
to leave their posts unless by permission of the commandant,
and only then in urgent cases for a maximum of eight days
(Ord. 23). Extended leaves of absence of up to one month
could be obtained only by solicitude to the maestre de campo.
For longer periods of time than this, it was necessary to
obtain approval of the president (Ord. 24).

Chapter 7
OFFICER CORRUPTION— CHARACTERISTICS OF
A PREDATORY ARMY
As an institution, the military possessed a great
deal of power and influence, both from its enormous budgetary
demands and from the sheer proliferation of forts and troops
throughout the colony.

In the remote southern outposts this

power was personified by the military commandant or governor.
These officers not only commanded the troops at their dis
posal , but frequently exercised political and administrative
powers over the civilian populace, as in the case of Vald
ivia.

The potential for abuse of this power was great and

especially tempting, considering the infrequency of being
paid and the deprivations of army life.
It was a relatively easy matter for the more unprin
cipled officers to deal in contraband or stolen cattle, to
pilfer royal monies through improper auditing, and to sell
exorbitantly priced merchandise to their own troops.^

Other

officers headed extensive smuggling networks or retailed
stolen goods, utilizing enlisted men and Indians as
underlings.

The Indians, whose loyalties were easily

1 "Carta del..., November 28, 1721," Doc. No. 3963,
JMDI, CLXXIX, 189.
^Gbngora, Vagabundaje, 23-24.
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swayed with liquor and gifts, were susceptible to the offers
of military men.

The chronicler Carvallo y Goyeneche com

mented on this predatory aspect of militarism which seemed
to permeate frontier life:
. . . it is said that in America there is no enemy so
powerful as a military man with money, and once
unleashed there is no form of deceit they will not use
in their dealings with the Indians, as well as their
commercial negotiations on the frontier and other
branches of political and military government.3
Valdivia was a natural breeding ground for corrupt
officials and unscrupulous governors because of the unusually
low discipline of its troops and the lucrative opportunities
for self-gain.

The situado, as the economic mainstay of the

town, was especially vulnerable to the capriciousness of
crown representatives.

As was discussed in Chapter 4, there

were an infinite number of ways in which the valuable cargo
could be stolen or hoarded to be sold at a later date,
usually with such finesse that detection was a minor risk.
The Ordenanzas econOmicas y politicas de la Plaza de
Valdivia (1741) were implemented not only to clarify adminis
trative and economic matters relating to the normal operation
of the garrison, but in large part were an effort to dis
courage the rampant graft and pilfering by royal officials.^
For example, one ordinance permitted the local residents to
engage in a supervised barter with the Indians but absolutely

•^Carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripcibn, IX, 434.
^"Ordenanzas de Valdivia," 1741, Ord. 13.
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forbade governors from any trade outside the few fresh meats
and fruits necessary for the consumption of their own house
holds .5

Another ordinance several years later ruled against

the governor and other high functionaries drawing their full
salaries in advance each year from the treasury, rather than
waiting for the situado to arrive.

Officials were guilty

of monopolizing local commerce by refusing to license
private businesses and instead, establishing their own
7
bakeries and general merchandise stores.

A small but

flourishing importation of lumber was also handed down from
successive governors involving the exchange of merchandise
to the islanders of Chilo 6 in return for timber.

To facili

tate this, governors made use of the crown reconnaissance
launch and manned it with crews of convicts, afterward
reselling the lumber to the citizens.

Not only were all of

these activities prohibited by military ordinances, but
colonial treasurers no doubt realized that the traffic in
lumber and other commodities defrauded the crown of its just
revenues under the system of commercial monopolies.
To a pragmatic and resourceful governor, the dangers
of eventually facing a court trial for his actions were not
so frightening when weighed against the profits to be made.

5Ibid., Ord. 15.
^Reglamento para Valdivia. 1753, Ord. 34.
7 Ibid..

Ord. 13.

®"Ordenanzas de Valdivia," 1741, Ord. 25.
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One observer noted that with only a thousand peso annual
salary and the additional strain of financing their own
j o u m e y from Spain to Valdivia, governors were able to retire
after only one five-year tour of duty with accumulations of
up to seventy and eighty thousand pesos.

if these officials

did run the risk of exposure, it was unlikely to come from
below; the troops and desterrados were many times forced to
work as laborers for the governors, as well as furnishing
personal services.

At times, the day to day activities with

in the forts more closely resembled the relationship between
lord and serf, than that between officer and soldier. Presi
dent Manso angrily denounced these practices with a similar
analogy in a letter to the king:

"The soldiers that normally

serve in that fortress are those who are remitted for commit
ting crimes; they serve the governor more than Your Magesty
with their s a l a r i e s . T h e n there were instances of gover
nors destroying the letters of complaining soldiers before
dispatching mail pouches to Concepcidn.

A particular ruling

forbade these actions and ordered that notices be posted
11

publicly prior to the sending of mail.

Valdivia was not a perpetual den of iniquity, but
the power of its military leaders was not always conducive

^"Carta del..., August 16, 1741," Doc. No. 8705,
JMDI„ CCXCI, 207.
10"Carta de..., February 28, 1739, " Doc. No. 4123,
JMDI. GLXXXIV, 307.
^"Ordenanzas de Valdivia," 1741, Ord. 28.
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to the growth and prosperity of the city.

Their monopoly of

local industry inhibited economic development and discouraged
the relocation of a merchant class to the city.

President

Manso made the rather pithy observation that within the
Valdivia area the military-civilian elite had a considerable
influence in determining the degree of "civilization," for
their restriction of economic progress discouraged potential
1?
colonists and kept the area m stagnation.
The incidence of corruption within the officer corps
must have been fairly commonplace,,

Records of malfeasance

are a useful tool in piecing together a picture of army life,
but of equal interest is the functioning of military justice
and the intricate relationships within the chain of command.
The prescribed penalties for infractions of the military
penal code did not always function in their pure form.

As

in the civil government, bribery or influential associates
could be of great value to the accused in winning a light
sentence or acquittal.
bonds among officers.

Likewise, there were close fraternal
There were numerous ways for these

men to supplement their income by illegal means, which
necessitated the cooperation of other officers, either as
direct business associates or through their acquiescence in
not exposing their fellow officers.

It is the feeling of

this writer that the course of military justice in Chile was

12"carta d e ..., February 28, 1739," Doc. No. 4123,
JMDI, GLXXXIV, 306.
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heavily swayed by informal bonds of rank and prestige and
frequently, mutual commercial interests.
The archival transcripts of criminal proceedings
against an officer for situado fraud, let us say, would not
necessarily reveal whether he acted as an individual or in
league with accomplices.

The accused might have been

brought to trial because his actions had been exposed or
because his superiors preferred charges when he did not pay
them off for maintaining silence in the matter.

Or, the

unlucky officer might have been sacrificed in order to
prevent a scandal from spreading to other officials.

There

was probably a tendency to condone a certain amount of
corruption

at the local level, provided that the excesses

were not too conspicuous and as long as higher ranking
officers were not implicated.

Should the officer's actions

become too noticeable, it would naturally become necessary
to hold a trial? but for those who had personal influence or
prestige a quick, perfunctory trial might result with a
light sentence such as obligatory retirement.

One can only

surmise the extent to which money or prestige determined
military justice, for gentlemen's agreements and the per
suasive power of rank were not the kind of data which would
be disclosed in court proceedings.
There are ample cases of military corruption but
very few sources that do more than hint at the collusion
among officers or allude to their close-knit cliques.
Several Chilean chroniclers departed from the narrow

153
historical style of that period to give candid accounts of
colonial leaders, their personalities and behind-the-scenes
struggles for power.

Still, their factual data was not

always accurate, and they were often heavily biased.

13

Documentary sources are of use but require careful reading
between the lines.

One archival source is analyzed here

concerning an officer accused of a variety of crimes and the
course of his hearing.

It is presented as a case study of

military power and its effects on colonial society.
In 1769, Lieutenant Laureano Bueno, commandant of
the fort of Santa Barbara, was accused of moral improprie
ties with a local woman of the town and of maintaining
extensive and unlawful commercial dealings with the neigh
boring Indians .'*'4

As the civil and military governor of the

fort and the nearby town of Santa Barbara, Bueno possessed
the full measure of power, and his authority was intensified
by the isolation of the town.

His amorous escapades and

sinister business dealings became so obvious after a time
that public complaints were voiced, leading to an investiga
tion by military officials and the Bishop of Concepcibn.

A

Doctor Domingo Villegas of Santa Barbara was commissioned by
the government to initiate a hearing in the town and call

^Guillermo Felih Cruz, Historiografla colonial de
Chile, 1796-1886 (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, 1958),
3-43.
■*'4 "Criminales seguidos contra...Laureano Bueno,
1769," ACG, CCC, 124-64.
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forth witnesses to testify concerning the allegations„

We

do not know if Bueno played a role in the appointment of
Villegas, although by a strange coincidence the doctor
happened to be a close friend of the commandant.

He intimi

dated a number of the witnesses in order to obtain declara
tions of Bueno's innocence.

Consequently, the hearing and

the procession of witnesses were moved to Concepcidn in
January, 1769, where a second set of testimony by the same
witnesses revealed the contradictions of their earlier
statements.

It is this second set of testimony, or sumario,

which is abstracted here.

This legal brief did not consti

tute a formal trial but was only a hearing to determine the
validity of the charges brought against Bueno.
Throughout the hearings in Concepcidn, a steady
stream of witnesses unanimously testified to the guilt of
the commandant.

Fructuoso L 6 pez, a resident of Santa

Barbara, testified that for some time Laureano Bueno had
engaged in an open and illicit love affair with his mistress,
dona Feliziana Zapata, and that the lady had given birth to
twins by Bueno even before her infirm husband had died.
After her husband's death, dona Feliziana moved into a house
owned by the witness L 6 pez, but the embarrassment from the
affair led him to ask her to move to another house in the
town.

When dona Feliziana refused, the commandant brought

her to live inside the fort itself, and for this purpose
prepared living quarters for her in what had been a barracks
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for soldiers.

K

Despite the public indignation which this

aroused, Bueno made repairs to the barracks, placed an iron
grillwork around it, and even installed a kitchen for her
convenience.

Pursuant to Bueno‘s commercial dealings, Ldpez

testified that the commandant frequently traded with the
Indians, but that he always avoided direct involvement by
hiring intermediaries for the actual transactions.

Only a

short while before, he stated, over one hundred mares were
seen near the town church belonging to Basilio Fernandez and
the commandant, which were in turn sold to the Indians by
Antonio Catalan, Xavier Fernandez and two other peasants.
Ldpez also knew that these were stolen animals which Bueno
frequently purchased from known criminals and thieves.
Cristobal del Castillo, the notary public of the
town of Santa Barbara, related under oath the widespread
knowledge of Bueno's love affair.

The twins which were born

of this illicit union had died, and Castillo stated that he
had found the dead children on the doorstep of the church
where they had been left by the couple.

Castillo revealed

that he had been commissioned to privately investigate the
allegations against Bueno by the Bishop of Concepcidn.

In

this capacity, Castillo recalled that little more than a
month before he had seen over one hundred fifty mares
passing through the town.

He was told by various persons

that they were the property of Bueno and Basilio Fernaridez,

15Ibid., 136.
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and were being taken to the Indian lands.

The notary further

stated that he had questioned one Justo Lagos, retailer of
Bueno's stolen horses to the Indians, who confirmed the
*|

CL

involvement of Bueno.
Bueno knew of Castillo's commission, and at this
stage was evidently fearful of exposure to authorities out
side Santa Barbara.

He not only denied the notary the

assistance for which he had asked, but also made plans to
blackmail him.

Castillo was told by a close friend that

Bueno had arranged for a town prostitute to seduce him in a
predetermined location, at which point Bueno and several
troops would burst out of concealment and arrest him.
Angered by the knowledge of this plot, Castillo went to com
plain in person to the commandant.

Bueno denied having

masterminded such a scheme but admitted that he had suggested
it to several other citizens who were also being investigated
by Castillo, as a means of freeing themselves from his
"persecutions. 1,17
When called to testify, Francisco Catalan stated
that the commandant had more than one mistress, for it was
also well known that he was involved with a certain Narziza
Zalassar.

Catalan also knew that Bueno traded extensively

with the Indians, selling them cattle, mares, wheat and wine
in exchange for salt, ponchos, and Indian slaves.

16Ibid., 139.
18Ibid., 143.

17Ibid., 140.

18

On one
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occasion Bueno bought four Indian women for wine from a
Peguenche Indian named Millau.

One of the women became

drunk and killed another Indian in the town.

The commandant

imprisoned the murderess for only two days before letting
her go free.
Not until the testimony of Jacinto Molina does a
contradiction in earlier testimony become apparent.

Molina,

an alf6 rez in the local garrison, said that in his original
statement in Santa Barbara he had testified falsely as to
the innocence of Laureano Bueno.

This statement had been

forced from him by Doctor Domingo Villegas, who had origi
nally been commissioned in the town to preside over the
hearing.

Molina was intimidated by Villegas, not only

because he was indebted to him for twenty-one pesos but
because the doctor was an intimate friend of Laureano
Bueno.

10

Now free to testify without fear of reprisal,

Molina recounted that on the day in which Villegas first
initiated the proceedings the doctor dispatched a message to
Bueno in Puren, requesting his presence.

The commandant

traveled all night and arrived in Santa Barbara at four
o 'clock the next morning, whereupon he immediately went to
confer with Villegas in his house and remained there for the
rest of the morning.

Around noon the witnesses were

assembled and called before Villegas.

All of them were

fearful of giving detrimental testimony lest they be punished

19Ibid., 145.
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by the commandant and the doctor.
Molina continued by stating that the commandant not
only had as a mistress the said dona Feliziana, but also
Manuela Bilchez, Phelipa Romero and Antonia Uzeda.^®

The

witness had been told by one Bernardo Rebollan that Antonia
Uzeda became pregnant by the commandant and that Bueno found
a young man whom she could conveniently marry, although the
father

of the young man was vehemently opposed to such a

match.

Molina said that he was the confidant who had warned

the notary Castillo of Bueno's plot to blackmail him with a
prostitute.

Molina's knowledge of the commandant1s business

interests were particularly interesting, for he revealed
that Bueno monopolized the local commerce in certain com
modities, making certain that no one could buy them except
through him.

He provided the Indians with mares, cattle,

wine and wheat in exchange for such items as ponchos and
salt.

He also posted guards along the entrances to the

Indian lands to prevent the townspeople from dealing
directly with them.

He then sold these badly-needed com

modities to the residents at exorbitant prices..
The last witness, Juan de Agunto, stated that the
previous testimony which he gave before Villegas was false,
but that he and other witnesses had acted thusly because of
the well-known friendship between Bueno and the doctor and a

20

On closing his testimony, Molina acknowledged that
he was a nephew of Feliziana Zapata. Ibid.
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fear of reprisals by them.

He knew for a fact that before

initiating the hearing, Villegas had first summoned Bueno
from Puren, and on arriving in Santa Barbara the commandant
went to Villegas' house.

There, the two conferred privately

until eleven that morning.

Immediately afterwards, the

witnesses were called upon to come make public statements
and were intimidated and threatened by the two men.

Agunto

knew that Bueno's trade with the Indians was of large propor
tions, and that in addition to the previously-ment ioned
articles he sold them spurs, bridles, bits and axes.

This

occurred so frequently that Bueno kept a blacksmith in his
employ at all times, solely for the manufacture of these
articles. 21 Before closing his testimony, Agunto also
admitted knowledge of the commandant1s posting guards in the
passes to monopolize trade with the Indians.

On February 24,

1769, the testimony closed.
The process was turned over to a new comisionado,
Sergeant Major Pablo de la Cruz y Contreras, who was
instructed by President Balmaceda to return to Santa Barbara
with the witnesses and to solicit additional testimony and
evidence.

22

Cruz y Contreras was also ordered to take

21-Trade was sanctioned between the Indians and the
Spanish, but only under close supervision. Certain articles
such as spurs, bridles, knives, or other iron implements were
strictly forbidden as they could be forged into weapons.
"Ordenanzas de Valdivia," 1741, Ords. 14 and 17.
2 2 jn military trials for criminal offenses, the
sergeant major or adjutant of each regiment was designated
to oversee court proceedings„ Onat and Roa, Regimen legal,
216-19.

160
charge of the property and personal effects of Laureano
Bueno, pending the outcome of the hearing.

Bueno did not

return to Santa Barbara as he had been ordered, but remained
in Concepcibn with the excuse of serious illness.

In a

letter to Cruz y Contreras dated May 16, 1769, he stated
that his physical deterioration was so extreme that he was
unable to even mount a horse.

Being under the care of

both the army surgeon general and the surgeon of the frigate
La Liebre, Bueno said that he had been advised by these
doctors not to leave from their care.

Not wanting to appear

impertinent, he closed the letter with a humble supplication
for further instructions in view of his being incapacitated.
From this point on, the process of events in the
hearing, as well as Bueno's actions, appear somewhat vague
and elusive.

For some unexplained reason, President

Balmaceda suddenly replaced Cruz y Contreras with two other
officers, charging them with ascertaining the validity of
the allegations and remitting their findings to him as
quickly as possible for evaluation.
Less than one month after his letter to Cruz y
Contreras, Bueno wrote to President Balmaceda asking permis
sion to return to Santa Barbara as the peste de viruelas, or
smallpox, was so epidemic throughout Concepcibn that he
feared for his l i f e . ^

Not only was his continued presence

23"criminales seguidos contra...Laureano Bueno,
1769," ACG, CCC, 148.
2 4 Ibid.,

162.
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in the city dangerous to his life, but he also argued that
an officer of his standing should not be forced to undergo
the indignation of being temporarily deprived of the rightful
exercise of his duties as commandant.

He absolved himself

from any guilt and vowed to prove his innocence.

He also

asked to be allowed to prepare his own defense by using as
witnesses not the residents of the town, but his superior
officers, whom were best qualified to ascertain the guilt or
innocence of their subalterns.

On June 19, the president

issued a disposition relative to Bueno's letter.

In it he

granted Bueno permission to return to Santa Barbara to pre
pare his defense and ruled that the written testimony of his
superiors be admitted as evidence.

Balmaceda ordered the

new comisionados to complete the evidence as quickly as
possible and remit the sealed summary to him.

25

With this final statement, the hearing was closed.
There was no mention in the expediente documents of a reason
for its abrupt termination, nor was there a definite time set
for its future resumption; the president simply decided that
the particulars be assembled and sent to him for review.
There is no evidence in other archives that Bueno was ever
formally tried for the charges against him or that he was
officially exonerated for

his alleged misdeeds.

We do know

that he was relieved of his post as commandant of Santa

25Ibid., 163.
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Barbara.

o^

Yet, there should have been no justification for

this action if there was no formal trial which proved his
guilt.

Bueno was evidently not suspended from military

service, for the following year (1770) he took an active
part in the campaign to quell the major Indian revolt
the frontier.27

along

The inconclusiveness of the proceedings

(especially in view of the unanimously damaging testimony)
and other evidence leads one to assume that the case may
have been purposely shelved in order to prevent an indict
ment of the commandant.

It is quite possible that Bueno

possessed enough powerful connections to evade prosecution,
or again, the process may have been indefinitely postponed
due to procrastination or red tape.
It is known that Bueno not only had influence in
Santa Barbara, but he also had influence with the maestre de
campo, or army field commander.

28

The first comisionado,

Doctor Villegas, was a friend of Bueno and was involved in
the intimidation of witnesses to obtain his vindication; it
is not so absurd to speculate that higher ranking officers
exercised a more discreet influence to obtain his acquittal.
Less than one month passed between Bueno's first letter to
the comisionado Cruz y Contreras, in which he professed him
self unable even to mount a horse, and his letter to

^Carvallo

y

Goyeneche, Descripcidn, IX, 336.

2 7 Ibid..

341, 345, 346.

2 8 Ibid..

335.
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President Balmaceda, in which he pled for immediate permis
sion to travel to Santa Barbara (in the dead of winter) to
attend to his family's needs.

It was also during this

period that Cruz y Contreras was replaced by two new
comisionados, which may or may not have had a bearing on
Bueno's actions.

These circumstances may have been logically

explainable, but the inconclusive manner in which the hearing
terminated would lead one to suspect that justice was in some
way subverted.
Whether or not Bueno used his rank or influence to
avoid prosecution is a moot question; it is reasonably
apparent that he was guilty of the charges against him.

His

licentious private life and retinue of mistresses are of
minor importance to the theme of this chapter, for morality
was not one of the stronger traits of frontier life.

Rather,

it was his illegal trade arrangements with the Indians, his
dealings in stolen cattle and his association with criminals
that shed light on the ease with which officers could take
advantage of their considerable powers.

That Bueno was a

tyrant cannot be denied; he was practically omnipotent within
Santa Barbara and exercised his authority like a petty baron
over the residents.

While his actions may not be an indict

ment of army officers in general, they illustrate how the
military could be a predatory force in the development of the
colony.

Chapter 8
CHILOE AND VALDIVIA— THE FAITHFUL PROVINCES
Chilo6 and Valdivia were the southeriimost centers of
Chilean colonization, two areas whose existence was justified
in large part only because of their military importance.
They languished in their development, imposed financial
strains on the viceroyalty, and were distinctly set apart
from the mainstream of colonial society by their geographic
seclusion and regional sentiments.

And yet, they had one

redeeming feature— the inhabitants of Chilo 6 and Valdivia
were among the staunchest supporters of the crown and the
most faithful adherents of royalism to be found anywhere.
The ties of monarchism which these provinces held so dear
took on a great deal of importance as the independence era
approached and as the opposing political camps began to
emerge.
*

*

*

During the sixteenth century, the Indian wars pre
vented the Spanish from colonizing Chilo 6 in the same
sequence as other early settlements of Chile.

By 1566, a

semblance of tranquility reigned over Araucania, presenting
164
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President Rodrigo de Quiroga with the opportunity to prepare
an expeditionary party to take possession of the island.
The force was commanded by his son-in-law, Martin Ruiz de
Gamboa, who crossed the Chacao Channel in January, 1567, and
founded the first settlement of Castro later that year .1

The

new province was formally named Nueva Galicia, but the more
common name of Chilhub persisted and over a period of time
became the present Chilob. 2
Isolation and abandonment were the chief Impediments
to the island's growth, and when the first priests of the
Company of Jesus arrived at Castro in 1608, they found only
3
a dozen squalid huts and fifty colonists.
Furthermore, its
location so far to the south made it a favorite target of
pirates and corsairs.

In 1600, Castro was sacked by the

Dutch corsair Baltasar Cordes, who formed an alliance with
the Indians to drive the Spanish from the island.

A group

of survivors led by Captain Luis Pbrez de Vargas organized
resistance in the nearby forests until a column of rein
forcements arrived from Osorno and defeated the invaders .4
In 1615, the Dutch corsair George Spilbergh sacked and
burned the city once again.
The boundaries and jurisdictional limits of the
province of Chilob were never well-defined and varied

■^Barros Arana, Historia general, II, 368-69.
3 01guin,
3 Ibid.

Institucibnes, 18.
4 Ibid.,

19.
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according to the initiative of each governor or the shifting
front of the Araucanian war.

In its formative years, the

province consisted of only Isla Grande, but later on the
boundaries roughly became Osorno to the north, the Magellan
Strait to the south, and the Andes to the east.

The

northern extremity was especially subject to fluctuation as
it bordered on the neighboring jurisdiction of Valdivia.

In

the decades following the destruction of Osorno in 1599, the
provincial limits stretched northward past the destroyed
settlement, occasionally to the north of the Bio Bio River.

5

With the refounding of Valdivia in 1645, the limits receded
again to the area around Osorno. 6
Amat defined the boundaries as:

In the 1760's, Viceroy

the "barbarian Indians" of

the plains near Valdivia to the north; the archipelagos of
Guaytecas and Chonos to the south; and the Andes mountains
and "Patagonia lands" to the east.

The province was thus

quite extensive but almost uninhabited, and the only settle
ments of any note were located on Isla Grande.
Since its original colonization, the province had
fallen under Chilean jurisdiction but for a variety of
reasons was firmly within the sphere of Peruvian influence.
The area between Chilod and Valdivia was inhabited by a host

^Carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripci 6 n . X, 316.
^Tom&s Thayer Ojeda, "Importancia que tenian para
los espanoles las regiones patagonicas," RCHG, XXXIII
(1920), No. 37, 295.
7Rodriguez and P 6 rez (eds„), Memoria del virrey
Amat. 658.
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of hostile Indian tribes, which made this a virtual no-man's
land for Spanish travelers.

All of the island's supplies

and provisions arrived by way of the annual situado from
Lima, as well as the salaries of all troops, royal officials
and the governor.

The islanders were deprived of access to

the Chilean coast, for they possessed no large ships of their
own.

In nearly every facet of its existence, Chilod was a

satellite of Peru.
Viceroy Amat launched a campaign during the 1760 's
to acquire direct control of the province.

His views

mirrored those of his predecessors— there was little use in
sustaining the islanders and assuming the responsibility for
their welfare if the viceroys did not also have corresponding
governmental authority.

In pleading the Peruvian case to

the crown, he argued that the military importance of the
archipelago demanded a strong defense, something which
Chileans were incapable of providing in light of their
O

dismal failures in containing the Araucanians.
reasoning finally prevailed in Spain.

His

In August, 1767, the

king authorized Amat to take all the necessary measures to
insure Chilo^’s defense and to appoint a military governor
for the island.

Q

Although President Jci.uregui opposed this

change and petitioned the crown for a review of the matter,
on March 28, 1768, the viceroy took charge of the province

8 Ibid.,

660.

^Barros Arana, Historia general, VII, 165-66.
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and appointed Captain Carlos de Beranger as governor .10
From this date forward, Chilob remained under
Peruvian authority in the political as well as the literal
sense .11

In this transferral of authority, the province

esqperienced no great economic revival, but the armed forces
were augmented considerably and existing fortifications were
expanded.

Prior to this, the upgrading of defenses was

largely a local problem encompassing little more than an
increase in patrols or the simple repair of batteries.
Governor Beranger was the first in a line of military
governors who presided over the province and was among
several royal engineers who came to assess the defenses and
make proposals for their strengthening.

Several of these

officers compiled detailed reports concerning the island,
its population, administration and urgent problems which
required action. 12

Of special interest were their topo

graphical maps, soundings of the bays and analyses of
batteries and their fields of fire, which placed defense on
a more professional basis.

The militiamen received a more

rigorous military instruction by visiting Peruvian officers

10Rodrlguez and Pbrez (eds.), Memoria del virrey
Amat, 660.
11The only exception to this was in the religious
realm, for the island continued to fall under ecclesiastical
authority of the Concepcibn bishopric.
1^"Relacibn que..., February 15, 1773," Doc. No.
7491, JMDI, CCLIX.
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and were periodically rotated for active duty.

13

All of

these measures were designed to implant a sounder system of
military defense by the islanders, themselves, and to
enhance the degree of Peruvian administrative control.
Despite its long administrative adhesion to Chile
then, Chilo 6 was bound by stronger ties with Peru.

The

situ ado, commerce, communication and the appointment of royal
officials nearly always originated in Lima.

Even before

1768, the military influence and the planning of defenses
were predominately Peruvian.

Chileans could ill-afford to

aid the province in the light of their expenses in the cam
paigns against the Araucanians, and it was realized that
such aid could only constitute an additional burden.
Chilo 6 1s geographic separation from the captaincy-general
and an inhospitable frontier only accentuated its orienta
tion towards Peru.
*

*

*

Valdivia, that envied fortress which attracted the
attention of Spaniards and foreigners alike, was established
in February, 1552, when the conqueror Pedro de Valdivia
founded the town in one of his campaigns of conquest in the
s o u t h .^

Giving the settlement his own name indicated that

he was determined it should serve as the nexus of Spanish

13 "Discurso que hace..., 1782," Doc. No. 7492, JMDI,
CCLIX, 254.
-^-^Barros Arana, Historia general, I, 404.
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colonization in that part of the colony.

From the beginning

the town was plagued by adversities, in large measure due to
its separation from other inhabited areas.

During the

Indian revolt of 1599, Valdivia was overrun by Indians who,
in the space of several hours, massacred over one hundred
residents and captured three hundred others.

Only a handful

of the Spaniards managed to escape by swimming to several
merchant ships anchored in the river in front of the town.

15

In 1602, the town was refounded, this time as a military
fortress.

However, the new garrison of two hundred soldiers

was soon decimated due to death and desertion, and was barely
able to hold its own against unrelenting Indian attacks.
The declining fortunes of the town sank even lower
in 1604, when President Alonso de Rivera obtained royal
permission to withdraw all Spaniards to the north of the Bio
Bio River, utilizing this natural barrier as a shield behind
which they could live in relative safety.

17

Consequently, a

ship sailed for Valdivia, picked up the remaining forty-four
residents and transported them to new homes in Chilofe.
Several years later, after Rivera's experiment had been
discredited by renewed violence, President Laso de la Vega
again broached the subject of Valdivia's settlement to the
king.

In doing so, he played upon the ever-present royal

fear that the Dutch would fortify the bay, especially in the

15ibid.. Ill, 287.
17Ibid., 425.

J-Slbid., 423.
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light of the recent Dutch colonization in northern Brazil. 18
Philip IV became convinced of the project's worth and ruled
on May 18, 1635, that Valdivia's resettlement should be
executed, but that the costs should be borne by the Chilean
or Peruvian t r e a s u r i e s 9

Without royal subsidization, the

colonization project was somewhat less than appealing and
was consequently abandoned as too costly.
Valdivia's neglect continued until it was threatened
by a foreign nation.

By the early 1640's, an influential

Dutchman visualized Chile as a magnificent opportunity to
establish the same type of overseas colony as his countryman
Count Johan Maurits had done on the northern coast of Brazil.
This man was Hendrick Brouwer, the former governor-general
of the Dutch East India Company, who had obtained permission
from the Dutch government to undertake an expedition to the
west coast of America.

90

The Dutch were xll-advxsed xn thexr

scanty knowledge of Chile, believing it to be a land of great
natural wealth.

Brouwer reasoned that the taking of

Valdivia would provide the basis for later colonization and
a commercial foothold in the Pacific.
The tiny squadron of three ships left Holland in
November, 1642, and arrived at the Dutch colony in Brazil
the following year.

Brouwer was received enthusiastically

by Governor Maurits and presented with two additional

1 8 Ibid.,

IV, 339.

1 9 Ibid.,

^9 Guarda, Historia de Valdivia, 58.

339-40.
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vessels.

After passing Cape Horn, he stopped briefly on

Chilo 6 , captured and then destroyed the small forts of
Carelmapu and Castro.^

The commander next set his sights

on Valdivia, but before arriving there, he fell gravely ill
and died at sea.

His nephew, Elias Herckmans, succeeded him

as leader of the expedition and arrived at the deserted bay
of Valdivia in August, 1643.

79

The enthusiasm of the Dutch was dimmed when the
vessel carrying most of the munitions sank, and morale and
discipline deteriorated among the ship crews.

The Dutch had

placed great faith in their ability to make the nearby
Indians their allies; however, they found them unreceptive
to European dominance and adamant in their refusal to supply
the Dutch with food.

Faced with dwindling provisions and

the possibility of eventual starvation, Herckmans decided to
return to Brazil in November, 1643, thus ending Dutch
attempts to settle along the Pacific coast of America.
The presence of the Dutch was a startling revelation
to the Spanish, especially when they learned that Brouwer
intended to create a permanent colony.

President Francisco

L 6 pez Zhhiga was incapable of besieging Valdivia from the
land side because the i^raucanians blocked all transit below
the Bio Bio River.

He had to content himself with

^AmunAtegui, Los precursores, II, 254.
^ Barros Arana, Historia general, IV, 383-84.
23orrego Luco, La patria vieja, I, 93.
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bolstering the port defenses of C o n c e p c i d n . A l t h o u g h Peru
possessed far more military resources than Chile, Viceroy
Pedro de Toledo realized that months would pass before a
naval squadron could be prepared to meet the Dutch challenge.
By the time that serious consideration could be given to
forming an expedition, the Dutch had left of their own
accord.

Nevertheless, Viceroy Toledo resolved to resettle

the town, not only for strategic reasons but also with the
knowledge that success in such an enterprise would bring
prestige to himself and his family.

Preparations were made

for a massive expedition, for which it was necessary to
solicit aid as far away as Quito.

Antonio de Toledo, son of

the viceroy, was placed in charge of the expedition, which
departed from Callao for Valdivia on December 31, 1644.25
This was the largest military force ever seen in the
Pacific up to that time, being composed of twelve armed
galleons mounting a total of 188 cannon (45 of which were to
be placed in the defenses of Valdivia) and 1,800 troops and
s a i l o r s . 26

On arriving at the port, Toledo erected the new

town on the island in the center of the bay, which was named
Mancera after the viceroy's title— the Marquds of Maneera.
As the intent of Toledo was to secure the port against any
further foreign invasions, walled defenses and a large

2^Barros Arana, Historia general, IV, 392.
^Amun&tegui, Los precursores, II, 264.
2 6 Ibid.,

265.

174
garrison of troops took precedence over civilian coloniza
tion.

Accordingly, nine hundred troops were left on the

island when Toledo returned to Peru, a number which he
27
thought would make the port safe from any future attack.

Valdivia's resettlement was a purely Peruvian ven
ture, an accomplishment of considerable importance and a
source of great pride for succeeding viceroys.

The initia

tive of Viceroy Toledo was interpreted as a precedent.

His

successors affectionately regarded Valdivia as their own
special preserve, overseeing its operation and regularly
providing the residents with supplies and arms.

Although

the city had originally been founded through the efforts of
Chilean conquerors, it now became a de facto Peruvian pos
session and an extension of the viceregal domain.

The ties

of authority were blurred, however, and legal jurisdiction
of Valdivia became a long-standing source of contention
between Lima and Santiago.

This controversy involved more

than jurisdictional pride or the appropriation of funds; it
embraced complex issues such as military authority, political
patronage and fundamental concepts of defense.
An acknowledged source of this confusion was the
absence of royal mandates governing Valdivia's fiscal
appropr iat ion s and the method of filling royal positions.
There were no regulations concerning the amounts of money
which could be spent on defenses or the respective troop

27Ibid.
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salaries.

Nor were there rules governing the minimum number

of troops which must be maintained or the method of appoint
ing officials and granting promotions.

Because of this, the

level of assistance varied widely from year to year, accord
ing to the generosity of each viceroy and the fluctuating
status of the Lima treasury.

Adding to this confusion was

the intermittent assistance which came from Chile, either in
the form of troops and convict laborers or the food subsidy
sent each year from Valparaiso.

This led to protracted

litigation over who actually held legal possession of the
city— Chile, by virtue of its proximity to the city, or
Peru, by virtue of its heavy financing.
There were different motives in Peru and Chile for
the resettlement of Valdivia.

For Chileans, resettlement

signified the abandonment of the defensive policy implemented
by President Rivera.

After 1645, Valdivia served as a base

for renewed Spanish colonization of the south and a focal
point of military campaigns against the Indians.

It was no

surprise that Chileans wanted the garrison to be manned by
their own sons of the soil, who had lived in the colony and
were trained in guerrilla-style Indian warfare.

9ft

On the

other hand, the viceroys were not directly affected by the
devastation of the Indian wars.

Their abiding concern was

in using Valdivia as a defensive post against the Dutch or
other European interlopers.

Uppermost in their minds was

28carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripcibn, IX, 172.
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the possibility of foreign invasion and the jeopardy in
which they would find themselves if Valdivia succumbed to
the troops of European powers.

As a consequence, they

desired that officers and elected officials be appointed
from the ranks of peninsular Spaniards who were well-versed
in the accepted manner of European combat and methods of
siege.2^

Especially desired were veterans of the war of

Flanders or similar theaters of action.
In the years following its refounding, the many
royal officials and military officers sent to Valdivia were
appointed directly by the viceroy, usually every two years,
from a list of three qualified candidates for each available
p o s i t i o n . T h e right to oversee promotions, salary bonuses
and other rank advancements was also jealously guarded by
the viceroys.

Valdivia was regarded as a combat zone.

A

tour of duty there was considered meritorious, and troops were
granted remuneration "for living in a presidio so disfavored
by n a t u r e . P e r u v i a n s did not wish to see their own
appointees passed over for promotion or forced to compete
with Chileans.

Leaving aside the normal jockeying for

position within the military chain of command, there were con
siderations of political interest and special privileges
involved in the control of Valdivia.

The chronicler

Carvallo y Goyeneche mentioned the "families" of the viceroys

2%[emorias de los vireyes, II, 399.
3 0 Ibid.,

II, 398.

3 1 Ibid.
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and the necessity of assuring their livelihoods in some form
of public or military service. 4

In his memoirs, Viceroy

Melchor de Navarra alluded to the family and the importance
of relatives and friends receiving benefits from the vice
regal authority.^

This leads to the conclusion that

military appointments and governorships of towns such as
Valdivia were a source of nepotism, intense patronage and a
traditional method of political appointment.

Consequently,

Chilean efforts to obtain jurisdictional control of the city
were met with hardened opposition by the Peruvian bureau
cracy .
In a royal c6 dula of April 9, 1662, Philip IV
ordered that Valdivia be placed under jurisdiction of the
captaincy-general, a measure which seemed entirely logical
in view of its being located within Chilean territory.^4

on

receiving word of this action, Viceroy Benavides vehemently
protested, arguing the traditional merits of Peruvian supply
and financing, plus the fact that Peruvian officers would be
much more adept in combating European invasion.

The

sovereign became convinced of the impropriety of such a
move, suspending execution of the order and allowing Valdivia
to remain under the power of the v i c e r o y s D u r i n g the
following years, Chilean presidents made repeated attempts

•^Carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripcibn, IX, 174.
^ Memorias de los vireyes, II, 403-405.
34ibid

.
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400.

^^Ibid.
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to win what they thought was their natural right to its
jurisdiction.

An example was President Diego D&vila y

Pacheco, who reasoned that a splitting of the colony’s
jurisdiction seriously obstructed war efforts and hindered
coordination among the various military units. °

Unable to

adjudicate between the interests of both parties, the king
finally resolved in March, 1676, that Valdivia was to fall
under Chilean authority due to its proximity to Concepcidn.
The monarch reserved to himself the privilege of appointing
the governors and officers from recommendations of the
president.

The viceroys were left with virtually no

authority, in spite of the obligation of sending the situado
each year.

■a 7

Acrimonious debate and petitions to the crown did
not abate with this ruling but were only intensified on the
part of the viceroys.

They contended that garrison troops

were discriminated against by Chilean authorities in every
thing from their promotions to pay bonuses.

The Archbishop

of Lima and the governor of Valdivia also joined in the
debate.

They presented similar pleas to the crown, which

finally resulted in the proclamation of a cddula on Decem
ber 19, 1680.3®

By this edict Valdivia remained under

Chilean authority, and the crown still reserved the right to

3®Carvallo y Goyeneche, DescripciOn, IX, 171-72.
3^Memorias de los vireyes, II, 400.
3 8 Ibid.,

401.
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appoint the governor and two treasury officials, the veedor
3111(1

contador; but, all military vacancies must now be filled

39
from the ranks of Peruvian officers.

This strained and

unresolved situation was to continue into the 17001s, during
which time Valdivia's administration lacked direction due to
jurisdictional rivalries.

Because of this bickering, the

town remained largely independent of either Peru or Chile.
It was an ideal environment for the despotism of governors
and local corruption which became ingrained characteristics
of the city.
During the 1730's, President Manso de Velasco
recognized Valdivia as an impediment to the colonization of
the south and a city which must fall under the direct
authority of Chile if it was ever to progress.

He presented

his thinking to the king in a letter of February 28, 1739,
relating the corrupt nature of Valdivia's administration and
the commercial monopolies of its governors, which he said
preserved the decadence of the city.4®

The city could not

be suitably defended while it leaned so heavily on distant
Lima for assistance.

After consideration, the king ruled in

September, 1740, that Valdivia should henceforth be entirely
subject to Chilean authority.4^- President Manso accordingly

3 9 Ibid.

4 0 "Carta de..., February 28, 1739," Doc. No. 4123,
JMDI. CLXXXIV, 305-307.
41orrego Luco, La patria vieja. I, 93.
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met in Concepcidn the following year with the Bishop of
Concepcidn, an oidor and the contador of the treasury in
order to compose a series of ordinances regulating the
political and military government of Valdivia.

The result

of their labor was the Reg1amento para la Guarnicidn de
Valdivia (1741), which established the duties of the local
officials, set down rules governing the actions of the
governor, prohibited certain commercial activities and
generally set the tone of local government.

42

Valdivia changed little after the transition to
Chilean authority.

Despite the changing jurisdictions and

the comings and goings of troops the city retained its basic
character— that of a military outpost on the edge of the
Spanish frontier.

Technically, its boundaries encompassed

not only the town, but all the land between the Tolten and
Bueno rivers, from the sea to the cordillera.^

Because

there were no contiguous areas of settlement, Valdivia
became a self-contained society, set apart and developing
its own unique identity.
The most influential factor in the development of
the town was, of course, the military.

From 1645 until 1665,

the garrison consisted of 2 , 0 0 0 men, and nearly 1 , 0 0 0 men
until the end of the 1600's.44

4 ^Guarda,
4 3"La

As the troop level diminished

Historia de Valdivia, 98.

verdad..., 1782, " AFA, XXV, 54.

44Carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripcidn, X, 182-83.
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further to a single infantry battalion the civilian popula
tion expanded, but even in the late 1700's a majority of the
residents were either soldiers or related military personnel.
Here, the career of army officer was in itself a respected
profession, and the members of the Valdivia battalion
selected their brides from among the most prestigious
AC

families of the town. J

Their choices were subject to

approval, and to marry outside of an official army sanction
was to risk harsh consequences.

In the fairly rigid society

of Valdivia, these marriages were subject to rigorous
scrutiny.

Among the requisites were the permission of the

officer's father, proof of baptism, a dowry of at least
AC

2,000

pesos, and occasionally, direct royal approval.

Names such as Guarda, Carvallo, Pinuer and Molina were of
longstanding prestige and belonged to long lines of respected
officers.
According to Carvallo y Goyeneche, the native Valdivians possessed a distinct personality because the insecu
rity of the region had bred a line of descendants who were
robust, courageous and impetuous to the point of arrogance.
Their dominant career inclinations were towards the army,
and even those young men who took up a trade or merchantile
occupation more often than not left it in time to join the

4 5 Ibid.,
4 ®Guarda,

180.
Historia de Valdivia, 180.
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military
arms.

.

^

Youngsters grew up skillful in handling fire

From the age of seven or eight, they took up hunting

as a sport and were inclined to play pranks and do other
mischief with gunpowder.

The women were intelligent, mild

mannered and dedicated to their homes and families.

Because

their husbands were so occupied in military matters, the
women usually had to till the family gardens and handle
49

other menial tasks around their homes.
dialect was affected by army life.

Even the local

It was described as a

polished Castilian reminiscent of that spoken in the military
campaigns of Europe, but without the Chilean provincial
50
slang and lilted manner of speech.

Despite the backward

nature of Valdivia, there was a strong heritage of military
aristocracy and a dedication to the profession of soldiering.
Everyday military life was not confined to the forts
in the bay, but exerted a dominance throughout the town and
local government.

Probably the ultimate military influence

was the fact that the cabildo, the fundamental institution
of Spanish civil government and usually the first creation
of a new municipality, was not formed din Valdivia until
1808.

51

There was a military counterpart of the cabildo con

sisting of alcaldes militares, appointive posts for the

4^Carvallo y Goyeneche, Descripcidn, X, 180.
4 8 "La verdad..., 1782," AFA, XXV, 46.
4 9 Ibid..

48.

5 0 Ibid.,

^Gabriel Guarda Geywitz,
portaliana," BACH (1971), 217.

"

U

n

47.

intendente de la era
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assumption of local administrative duties.

Still, the

military governor exercised complete authority over civil
ians and soldiers alike.

He was normally a colonel or a

brigadier, earning 3,500 pesos a year along with a daily
CO

food ration for six persons.

Should he die or become

incapacitated in office, the sergeant major was first
designate to succeed him and after this, the ranking captain
of the battalion.^
The military establishment in Valdivia touched the
lives of nearly everyone in one form or another.

The most

lasting impression made by the army, and certainly the most
important after 1810, was that of preserving royalist senti
ment and faithful devotion to the Spanish king.

The

discipline and self-denial of army life, coupled with a
rigid heirarchy and social position of the officer corps,
were not conducive to the growth of liberal political
doctrine.

The background of officers and staff were equally

important factors.

A great many officers came directly from

Spain, the focal point of monarchism.

Governors were

invariably peninsular Spanish, and numerous captains, lieutenants and other officers were of the same origxn.

54

52,1Indice alfabetico.. " [n.d.], AV, CCLXXXIII,
"Gobernador de Valdivia."
By royal order of February 14, 1786, the governor's
salary was raised to 4,000 pesos.
5 2R e q l a m e n t o

para Valdivia, 1753, Ord. 46.

54"La verdad..

1782," AFA, XXV, 47.
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*

*

Valdivia and Chilo6 shared many similarities in
their history.

Both developed in environments set apart

from the rest of the colony, which caused them to develop
their own distinct character:

Chilod, a poverty-stricken

island at the fringe of Spanish territory, and Valdivia, a
tightly-knit provincial society with military overtones.
The two

areas underwent jurisdictional changes, but these

shifts in authority were not nearly as influential as
social, economic and military factors.

Both were largely

extensions of Peruvian influence and faithful islands of
royalism in the south of Chile.

Chapter 9
MILITARY REORGANIZATION AND THE INDEPENDENCE
MOVEMENT OF 1810
One of the changes taking place in society during
the last years of the colony was the assumption of a more
influential role by the civilian militia.

The militia had

traditionally been portrayed as rustic provincials, whose
principal duties consisted of participating in public
ceremonies.

Nevertheless, they were a potentially influ

ential political force, especially in the capital area.
They were far more numerous than the veteran troops, and the
nobility and most prestigious colonial leaders were repre
sented in the ranks.
During the last two decades of the 1700's, the
militia acquired growing prominence, in large measure because
of the reforms instituted by President Jciuregui.

His

reorganization of the Santiago militia in 1777 bred a new
esprit de corps, encouraged by measures such as levying
fines on those soldiers who failed to attend military or
ceremonial functions where their presence was expected.-1-

^-Vicuna Mackenna, Historia de Santiago, X, 53-55.
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The increased dangers of attack by foreign powers provided
an additional avenue for the militia to increase their
prestige, for there were too few veteran troops to simul
taneously guard the frontier and the coasts.

In 1780 and

again in 1797, Santiago militia companies were sent by ship
to reinforce the Valdivia battalion against a possible
English invasion.

2

. . .

In another year, 1800, over 750 mxlitxa

served on active duty throughout the colony, and their pay
o
amounted to 62,000 pesos.
However, the real catalyst which placed the militia
into the military arena was the English invasion of Buenos
Aires in 1806, an event which convinced Chileans the next
target of British imperialism would be their own colony.^
President Luis Munoz de Guzman convoked a defense council
in September of that year, requesting that each participant
present a defense plan to combat the English.

The recom

mendation which was finally accepted was that of Judas Tadeo
Reyes, secretary of the colony, who proposed that militia be

2in 1780, a total of 280 men (four companies) were
transported from Santiago to reinforce Valdivia. During the
time that they served on active duty, their total pay was
30,048 pesos ("Expediente formado..., 1780," AGG, DCCCLXIII,
C u a d e m o 10) .
-*To obtain an idea of how this amount ranks with
that of the entire veteran army, in 1800 a total of 277,455
pesos was paid to all troops and auxiliary personnel ("Raz6 n
de los Sueldos..., 1800," ACM, XLIX.
4jos6 P6 rez Garcia, Historia natural, militar, civil
y sagrada del reino de Chile (Santiago: Imprenta
Elzeviriana, 1900), CHPC, XXIII, 442.
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mobilized to bear the brunt of the anticipated invasion.
Reyes' plan was deficient in its assessment of civilian
capabilities; he confidently extolled the skill of machetewielding militia levies in holding crack English troops at
bay

Under the circumstances, however, civilian volunteers

were considered the only alternative for defending the
capital, for there were no funds for creating new veteran
battalions.
On March 18, 1807, President Munoz directed that a
training camp to instruct the militia be established just
west of Santiago, at a place called Las Lomas.

6

During the

four months of its operation (September through December,
1807), over one thousand militiamen from the capital area
took turns training, some firing a musket for the first time.
After their instruction, they were evidently more adept (or
at least more enthusiastic) in their duties, for one witness
reported that the troops could be armed and assembled on ten
minutes notice.

7

After it was learned that the British

expedition under General John Whitelock had suffered an
ignoble defeat to the Argentines, the camp was disbanded and
the militia returned to their homes.
The exercises at Las Lomas were a pleasant diversion

^"Documentos relativos..., 1806-1807," CHDI, XXV,
56-57.
^P 6 rez Garcia, Historia, XXIII, 442.
7Ibid., 446.
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for the civilians involved and a welcomed change in the
routine of their occupations.

More importantly, it gave

these men a perception of their strength and a feeling of
affinity with their victorious counterparts in Buenos Aires.
The creole aristocrats who were militia officers felt a
power they had not known before, which was easily translated
into strong sentiments of institutional loyalty.

As one of

these soldiers later reflected:
We were so enthusiastic with the military service
that we would have happily greeted the landing of
any enemy expedition on our shores, and would have
attempted to merit the glories that the heroic
army of Buenos Aires achieved .8
This civilian involvement in military matters was destined
to become a factor in undercutting the strength of the
veteran army.
While the militia was undergoing a process of growing
awareness, Chile was approaching the brink of a political
abyss.

The first manifestations of this became apparent on

February 11, 1808, when the aged President Munoz died in
office.

According to a royal order of October 23, 1806:

should a colonial administrative head die or become incapa
citated in those jurisdictions where there was an audiencia,
the interim leadership must fall to the senior military
Q
officer not below the rank of colonel.
There were three

®Sergio Villalobos, Tradicibn y reforma en 1810
(Santiago: Edicibnes de la Universidad de Chile, 19617, 63.
9 "Real orden..., February 11, 1808," Doc. No. 5619,
JMDI, CCXIX, 2-3.
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officers who satisfied these qualifications:

Colonel Luis

de Alava, Intendant of Concepcibn; Brigadier Pedro de
Quijada; and Brigadier Antonio Garcia Carrasco, all of whom
were away from the capital.^®
Not wishing to risk the rule of some obscure army
officer, the audiencia oidores met within hours to elect the
regent of their corporation, Juan Rodriguez Ballesteros.
This act precipitated a challenge by the officers in ques
tion, who convoked a council in Concepcibn and mutually
agreed to uphold the right of Garcia Carrasco to become
interim president.

Facing a possible confrontation, the

audiencia deferred to the aging brigadier, allowing him to
take the reins of government.

Accompanying Garcia Carrasco

to Santiago was Juan Martinez de Rozas, the former asesor
letrado of the Intendancy of Concepcibn, who was destined to
have a guiding hand in the early independence movement.

He

became the new president’s personal secretary and attempted
to use his position to influence the passage of liberal
measures
Garcia Carrasco acceded to the presidency at what
proved to be the most difficult of times.

In August, 1808,

word arrived to Chile of the abdication of Charles IV, the
downfall of the Spanish minister Manuel de Godoy, and dis
turbing rumors of Napoleon's true intentions toward the
Spanish monarchy.

The following September it was learned

l^Barros Arana, Historia general, VIII, 11.
H s i m o n Collier, Ideas and Politics of Chilean Inde
pendence (Cambridge: University Press, 1967), 84.
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that Ferdinand VII had yielded the Spanish throne at
Bayonne, allowing Joseph Bonaparte to rule in the name of
his brother.

Amid the proclamations of fealty to Ferdinand,

there were murmurings in Chile that the monarchy was suf
fering an irreversibly fatal decline and that the Seville
Junta lacked the authority to dictate colonial policy.
opposing groups began to emerge in Santiago:

Two

the staunch

royalists, personified by the audiencia, and the proponents
of autonomy, represented by the cabildo.
Garcia Carrasco was not the tactful, diplomatic
president who was needed to soothe the tense political
atmosphere.

Accustomed to discipline and unquestioning

obedience, he attempted to assert his authority by force.
Years of army duty in isolated garrisons had developed an
officer with little of the social polish which characterized
successful career bureaucrats, as evidenced by his penchant
for surrounding himself with lower-class cronies.

Moreover,

he committed a series of mistakes which undermined his
position and fueled the fxres of opposition.

12

In October, 1808, an English vessel, the Scorpion,
was captured by Chilean officials along the northern coasts.
The Spanish in question had feigned a willingness to enter
into contraband trade with the English but at the moment of
finalizing agreements, brutally murdered the captain and

12Ibid., 60-61.
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eight crewmen.^

The cargo was then divided after the con

spirators declared it a fair prize.

Chileans, who were

usually tolerant of smuggling, were incensed at hearing of
this atrocious act.

Their ire was further aroused when it

was learned that Garcia Carrasco had been in communication
with the conspirators throughout the incident.

The populace

soon believed that he had masterminded the plot and had
become wealthy from the sale of the ship's cargo

.

^

During this time the cabildo, led by Juan Martinez
de Rozas, was attempting a course of administrative reform.
It was blocked at every turn by the conservative stance of
the president.

Frustrated in his attempt to impose reform

by gaining the ear of the president, Rozas resigned his
position and left the capital for Concepcibn, confident that
his influence would fall upon more fertile ground in the
south.-*-5
Cognizant of the undercurrent of patriot resentment
and determined to quell any symptoms of political discord,
Garcia Carrasco took matters into his own hands.

Without

■^Domingo AmunAtegui Solar, La revolucibn de la
independencia, 1808-1813 (Santiago: Imprenta Universo,
S.A., 1945), 19.
"Representacibnes que hacen..., October-December,
1808," CHDI. VIII, 117-64.
■^An additional cause for Rozas' departure was his
alleged involvement in the Scorpion affair, from which he
was supposed to have benefited financially (Domingo
AmunAtegui Solar, Jesuitas, gobernantes, militares y
escritores [Santiago": Editorial Ercilla, 1934T, 85-86) .
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prior consultation, he secretly ordered that 4,000 lances
fabricated under the orders of President Munoz in 1807, be
shipped to Lima.

After the act was later publicized, he

justified it by claiming that the lances were needed by the
Spanish army, when in fact he feared that the patriots might
seize them. is
w

The act which turned public opinion against the
president and ultimately brought his downfall was his
imprisonment of three patriot sympathizers in May, 1810.
The men, Jos 6 Antonio Rojas, Juan Antonio de Ovalle, and
Bernardo Vera, were accused by Garcia Carrasco of antimonarchial plots.

Highly esteemed by patriots and royalists

alike, they appear to have been victims of fabricated evi
dence. ^

The cabildo formally condemned the arrests, and

even the royal audiencia urged restraint on the president.
After being presented with a petition by prominent citizens,
Garcia Carrasco agreed not to exile the men to Peru as he
had planned, but to keep them detained in Valparaiso.
However, in June, word arrived in Chile that the creoles of
Buenos Aires had deposed Viceroy Baltasar Hidalgo de
Cisneros and installed a junta.

Apprehensive that a similar

Chilean movement might already be in progress, Garcia
Carrasco quietly shipped Rojas and Ovalle to Lima, leaving

1 6 "oficio de respuesta..., May 9, 1810, " CHDI,
XVIII, 25-35.
"^Galdames, A History of Chile, 148, 154.
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Vera behind because of what appeared to be a grave illness.
The revelation of this action brought about a popular demand
for the president's resignation.

18

The audiencia, aware of the resignation which must
soon come and desirous of naming a favorable successor,
assembled on July 16
down.

and persuaded the president to step

In his place they appointed Mateo de Toro Zambrano,

Conde de la Conquista, a feeble-minded octogenarian whom
they were certain could be manipulated to their policies.
At first taken aback by the initiative of the
audiencia, the cabildo recovered its political composure and
began to press Toro Zambrano for an open cabildo.

Hopelessly

trapped between two opposing factions, the aging patriarch
was alternately besieged by royalists and patriots.

He

reversed his directives almost daily, tending to agree with
the last group with whom he had conferred.

After endless

rounds of vacillation, he finally assented on September 12
to patriot demands for an open cabildo, having been persuaded
Of)

that failure to do so would lead to civil strife. u
During the genesis of political unrest in Santiago,
from 1808 to 1810, the veteran army was generally dis
associated from partisan conflicts.

In its ranks were sup

porters of both political factions, but few officers could

1 8 "Te stimonio d e l . ..,

1810,"

1 9 ”Ban d a en que..., J u l y

CHPI, VIII,

17, 1810,"

^ c o l l i e r , Ideas and Politics,

310-13.

C H D I . XXIX,

47-48.

26.
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be counted among the intelligentsia or the aristocratic
elite.

For the most part, officers remained in their posi

tions along the frontier or in coastal forts, too preoccupied
with the Araucanian situation to contemplate any unified
action.

Those officers stationed in the capital either

adhered to their duties in preserving public order or became
instruments of wiser civilian leaders.
In 1810, the veteran troops in Santiago consisted of
the following;

the dragoon company of the Reina Luisa (50

men) led by Captain Manuel de Ugarte; an artillery company
(70 men) commanded by Colonel Francisco Javier de Reina; and
two companies of frontier dragoons

(200 men) under Captain

Juan Miguel Benavente, who had come to the capital in the
91

entourage of Rozas.^

■

Sergeant Major Juan de Dios Vial,

commander of the city's military forces, was an adherent of
colonial autonomy, as were Ugarte and Benavente.

However,

their sworn responsibility was to insure public order, so
they refrained from overt attempts to force Garcia Carrasco
to resign.
The militia took the initiative in supporting the
drive for autonomy, partially as a result of the training
which they had received during the preceding years.

Within

Santiago there were two militia cavalry regiments of four
squadrons each, the Principe and Princesa, and two infantry
battalions;

the Reqimiento del Rey and a battalion of

21fiarros Arana, H i s t o r i a general,

VIII, 138.
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pardos .22

In September, 1810, these units had been mobilized

and were quartered throughout the city, receiving pay.

They

were augmented by other units from Melipilla and Rancagua.
Altogether, the militia numbered 3,000 men who were nearly
unanimous in their support of the cabildo.

Even if the

veteran forces present had all been unified and supportive
of the audiencia, they would have been unable to overcome
the combined civilian levies.
On September 18, 1810,.

^

\

open cabildo was held in

Santiago, attended by 340 military, civilian and govern
mental officials.

The assembly elected a seven-man junta

gubernativa presided over by the figurehead Conde de la
Conquista, which was to serve until a representative con
gress could be convoked the following April.2^

It was

recognized as the legitimate executive body of the colony by
every cabildo in Chile, including the royalist-tainted
corporations in Concepcibn and Valdivia. ?4

22Manuel Antonio Talavera, Revolucibnes de Chile.
Discurso histbrico, diario imparcial, de los sucesos
memorables acaecidos en Santiago de Chile por un vecino
testigo ocular (Santiago: Imprenta Mejia, 1901), CHDI,
XXIX, 119.
23"Acta de..., September 18, 1810," CHDI. IX, 70-74.
^Governor Alejandro Eagar of Valdivia answered the
communications of the Santiago cabildo with a formal recog
nition, although his terse reply belied a basic mistrust of
the new government. In Concepcibn, news of the junta's
creation alarmed Intendant Luis de Alava so badly that he
fled to Lima by ship. An open cabildo was called which
pledged allegiance to Santiago, and was supported by such
ardent royalists as Tombs de Figueroa and Bishop Martin de
Villodres.

196
One of the most pressing issues facing the new
government was that of military security, for the declaration
of similar juntas in Quito and Upper Peru had brought bloody
reprisals by Viceroy Jos6 Fernando de Abascal.

There were

two opposing factions within the patriot camp, concerning
the defensive measures which should be taken.

A moderate

group emphasized the economic burden of assuming an army
buildup and contended that this would only serve to provoke
viceregal retaliation.

A more vocal faction (spearheaded by

Rozas and the radicals) viewed Peruvian retaliation as a
certainty and favored a military buildup to counteract the
inevitable invasion.

The latter faction predominated, which

led to a three-man commission being appointed to draft a
plan of defense for the colony.

Juan Mackenna, an ardent

patriot and military officer, directed the work of this
commission, the results of which were presented to the junta
on November 27, 1810.
The defense plan of 1810 was intended as a justifica
tion for a thorough reorganization of Chile's military
forces.

Superficially, the stated aim of the plan was the

protection of Chile from a possible French invasion; the
occupation of Spain by Napoleon had bred an exaggerated fear
of French conquests spreading to America.^

In reality, it

25"Plan de defensa..., November 27, 1810," CHDI. XIX,
113-66.
26Ibid., 114, 117.
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was a strategy for defense against a royalist attack from
Peru.

It had the overall effect of relegating the existing

veteran forces to a secondary status and elevating the
civilian militia to a position of prominence.

In terms of

geographic emphasis, it was an effort to bolster the defenses
of the capital area at the expense of the south and what was
thought to be its traditional military importance.

The

Santiago government's disregard of the south1s military
potential and its failure to insure the loyalty of the army
there, was a serious error in judgment on the part of the
patriot leaders.
Mackenna rejected the longstanding axiom that the
southernmost garrisons of Chilo6 and Valdivia were integral
to defense against an invasion around Cape Horn.

To his

thinking, both were so isolated and devoid of supplies that
they could be of no use to any enemy, except for the artifi
cial attraction of their forts.

In addition, they were

located too far to the south to be used as a base for raids
on shipping.

As an example, he pointed to the Dutch attempt

in 1643 to colonize Valdivia, an effort which ended in utter
failure.

With regard to the expedition of Anson, Mackenna

stated that the British crown was obviously as ignorant of
Valdivia's uselessness as was the court of Madrid, which had
infused many millions of pesos into the port in the delusion
o 7

that it was vital.

27Ibid., 119.

As for the frontier forts, in
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Mackenna's judgment they served as little more than a flimsy
screen to protect endangered colonists, and their use in
launching offensive operations was practically nil.

The

logic behind this downgrading of Valdivia and the frontier
was probably an attempt to appropriate the costly situado to
the Santiago area.

O O

According to Mackenna, the only enticements of a
coastal town to an invader were food, a target for pillage,
or a base from which to raid shipping.

The only three

Chilean ports fulfilling these needs (and the only ones
meriting a defense) were Valparaiso, Concepcibn and Coquimbo,
perhaps along with Huasco and Copiapb.29
The plan envisioned by Mackenna involved a complete
reorganization of existing military forces.

Because of the

escalated dangers of attack by foreign nations, he main
tained that there was a need for a much larger army; but the
strained financial situation of the colony did not permit
the paying of even the ordinary expenses, let alone the
creation of additional troop battalions.

The only recourse,

he argued, was to reduce the veteran forces significantly,
to a permanent level of slightly over one thousand men.

on

Considering the uselessness of Valdivia, it was

2 ®Guarda,

La toma de Valdivia. 24.

29,,Plan de defensa..., November 27, 1810, " CHDI. XIX,
136, 146.
2 9 0rrego

Luco, La patria vieja. I, 479.
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proposed that its garrison be reduced by one-half, leaving
only three hundred men to guard the town and forts.

Almost

half of the frontier forts were to be abandoned, and all
veteran troops would be transferred to coastal ports.
Militia units would provide the necessary security for the
remaining forts along the Bio Bio River.

Concepcibn was

one southern city which did merit a much stronger force than
its usual one-hundred man garrison and would now be rein
forced to four hundred twenty men, along with two hundred
more troops in the port of Talcahuano.

With the exception

of the aforementioned troops in the south, all other
military personnel would be transferred to Valparaiso,
Coquimbo or Santiago.
The militia was meant to fill the vacuum left by the
depletion of the veteran forces, and for this purpose would
be increased to some 25,000 men.

19

Mackenna's estimation of

the militia was high, for he termed it "the true army of
Chile."

A minimum of one thousand of these men would be

necessary to defend the capital, as well as numerous other
companies in Valparaiso and adj acent ports.

By forming new

battalions, the loyalties of army personnel could be assured
and molded to the will of the junta.
Mackenna's argument for the reapportionment of the

31"Plan de defensa..., November 27, 1810,” CHDI. XIX,
133-34.
32Ibid., 153.

33Ibid., 152.
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armed forces was recognized as a thinly-veiled plot to shift
troop deployment to areas of patriot sentiment, without
arousing the suspicion of royalists.

He and his associates

were primarily concerned with protecting Santiago by placing
numerous battalions in the city and along the adj acent
coasts.

Had the plan been undertaken in its entirety, the

Santiago government would have had little to fear from
organized resistance in other provinces.

As it turned out,

however, only half of the proposals were enacted.

New army

units were formed in the capital, but there was no effort to
reduce the southern garrisons or transfer their troops to
Santiago where they could be kept under a watchful eye.

It

was the veteran army in the south which was to later become
the base of the royalist invasion from Peru.
Utilizing Mackenna •1s proposals as a framework for
protecting the capital, the junta decreed on December 14,
1810, that new veteran military units be formed in Santiago.
In the heady enthusiasm of the first months of the junta's
existence, there was little reasoned thought for the security
of areas other than the capital

or

in making use of the

standing army which already existed in the s outh.

Santiago

residents of whatever political stripe eagerly enlisted in
the army in order to indulge their sentiments of patriotism
or vanity.

Four new artillery companies were created with a

combined strength of 280 men, 75 of whom were supposed to be
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selected from current veteran companies. ^

An infantry

battalion was formed, the Grenadiers of Chile, with a total
of nine companies and 693 nen.

And last, a cavalry squadron

was drawn up, the Dragoons of Santiago

(or Hussars, as they

were known), of six companies totaling 650 troops.35
Although the full strength of these new corps could not be
immediately filled, their strength on paper almost equaled
the entire veteran army already in existence.
While some veteran officers were used in positions
of leadership in these new units, most of the officer corps
were derived from civilian militia or the nobility of
Santiago.

Political allegiance and social status were the

principal criteria for receiving commissions, rather than
records of distinguished army service.

Juan Martinez de

Rozas was one of the most avid proponents of employing
regular veteran officers to lead these units, arguing that a
rough geographical balance should be maintained with regard
to representing the Valdivia and Concepcibn

g a r r i s o n s

.36

But his efforts were recognized as a scheme to
buttress his personal power by surrounding himself with
military cronies from the south, and were largely counter
acted by the Santiago aristocracy.

Sergeant Major Juan de

34"Documento sobre..., December 16, 1810, " CHDI. XXV,
334-35.
3 5 "Decreto que..., December 22, 1810, " CHDI. XXV,

346-47.
36"Memoria sobre.. "

CHDI, II, 34.
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Dios Vial and Captain Juan Miguel Benavente, two veteran
officers from Concepcibn with admirable records, were
originally promised command of the hussars and grenadiers.
They were later passed over in favor of other candidates.37
Bernardo 0 'Higgins, one of the most capable young officers
on the frontier, was reduced to second in command of a
militia regiment in the Laja district.

38

For the most part, it was the influential families
of Santiago who managed to win military appointments,
despite the fact that they were inexperienced and unfit to
lead their new commands.

The awarding of positions was

favorably influenced by those wealthy aspirants who could
afford to equip and clothe their own companies.

For example,

Ignacio Carrera, father of the influential Carrera family,
was able to confirm his sons Juan Jos 6 as sergeant major of
the grenadier regiment and Luis as an artillery captain.

39

The bonds of kinship extended even to the established army
units.

For example, the Conde de la Conquista was able to

name his son as commandant of the frontier dragoon
squadron .^8

Manuel Antonio Talavera, a royalist witness to

the intense rivalry for administrative and military appoint-

3 7 Ibid.,

36.

38Benjamin Vicuna Mackenna, El ostracismo del general
don Bernardo 0 'Higgins (Valparaiso: Imprenta del Mercurio,
1860), 1 1 0 .
3 9 "Memoria

sobre...," CHDI, II, 35.

^^Vicuna Mackenna, El ostracismo, 110.
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ment, observed that:
The multitude of aspirants to positions of new
creation is incalculable. It is sufficient only
to understand that the partisans that actively
cooperated in the installation of the Junta, went
with the hope of some reward and of improving their
status. This personal interest, which is now called
patriotism, . . . is the most frequent topic con
sidered in the Junta.41
The recruitment of common soldiers did not follow
the rigorous criteria of officer selection.

In order to

fill the ranks of the army, it was necessary to scour the
jails and countrysides for volunteers.

The pitifully small

number of uniforms and armaments gave the new units the
A

0}

appearance of little more than an organized mob. ^

In its

most basic form, it was a rich man's army, and the luxuriant
acouterments of the officers sharply contrasted with the
threadbare appearance of the common soldiers.
The costs of the new Santiago units were insupport
able .

All three branches incurred annual expenditures of

210,252 pesos, simply for the salaries of officers and
troops.43

No area of public finance was too sacred to

escape the demands of military appropriation.

Salaries of

4-^Talavera, RevoluciOnes. CHDI, XXIX, 127-28.
4 2 "Memoria sobre...," CHDI. II, 36.
42The breakdown for the individual units was as
follows:
Artillery. . . . . . . . . 49,104
Infantry
.......... .. .105,696
Cavalry. .
............ 54,732
Two legal counsels . . . . . . .
720
TOTAL
210,252
(Talavera, Revolucidnes, 186).
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all public employees were lowered (including those of the
clergy), a measure designed to increase revenues by 50,000
pesos annually .4 4

Additional taxes were levied on tobacco

and other monopoly items, and work was suspended on public
edifices such as the cathedral of Santiago.

One of the few

economic measures to actually prove profitable was the
proclamation of free trade on February 21, 1811.

This act

opened the ports of Valdivia, Concepcibn, Valparaiso and
Coquimbo to foreign commerce with all allies of Spain and
with neutral nations .45

In only six months, colonial

customshouse receipts nearly doubled .4 5

Article XVI of this

provision merits noting within the context of the military,
for it permitted the duty-free entry of all pistols, swords,
muskets, cannon, gunpowder and all such implements of w a r .4 7
Despite the inexperience of the new troops, the
government sought to provide them with as high a status or
higher than that of the established units.

A comparison of

wage levels reveals that while the veteran artillery companies
received nearly the same wages as those in Santiago, the new
infantry units were generally higher paid than the estab
lished battalions.

4 4 Ibid.,

188.

4 5 "Bando que declara..., February 21, 1811," CHDI.
XXIX, 203. Excluded from this free trade provision were
precious metals, liquors, and such items as tobacco, which
fell under government monopoly.
4^Barros Arana, Historia general, VIII, 274.
4 7 Talavera,

Revolucibnes. CHDI, XXIX, 208.
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Table 6
Annual Pay Scales, Infantry Battalions
of Valdivia and Santiago4 8

Valdivia
Battalion
Pesos

Santiago
Battalion
Pesos

Captain

504

660

Lieutenant

300

440

Second Lieutenant

244

360

Sergeant First Class

144

180

Sergeant Second Class

138

168

96

132

120

144

Corporal Second Class

96

132

Soldiers

80

120

Rank

Drummer
Corporal First Class

By early 1811, the patriot camp had reached a state
of diplomatic limbo with the mother country and Peru, each
side marking time until a definite advantage could be
achieved.

On receiving news of the Chilean junta's instal

lation, the Spanish consejo de regencia was understandably
suspicious, petitioning the Peruvian viceroy for his
assessment of the matter.

Nevertheless, the consejo

announced that it would not oppose the junta as long as it
dedicated itself to preserving public order and professing

4 8 Ibid.,

185.
"Liquidacidn que forma..., 1810," CHDI, VIII, 344-

47.
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loyalty to Ferdinand VII.

Viceroy Abaseal was less concil

iatory towards the junta, acknowledging it in the most
reserved manner.

Abascal would have dispatched an expedi

tion to quell the seditious creoles long before then had not
his troops been spread so thinly in Quito and Upper Peru.

In

addition, a severing of ties with Chile would have deprived
Lima of Chilean grain i m p o r t s . T h e matter of the junta's
legitimacy was brought to the forefront on February 26,
1811, when the Conde de la Conquista died.

Although he had

never been more than a puppet, he was the legally recognized
leader of the colony.

His passing only accentuated the

crisis of the junta's recognition.
Despite the cool reception of the junta abroad, the
internal situation in Chile was more critical than the
danger of invasion.

The royalist faction had endured the

initial moves of the cabildo and junta with only minimal
reaction, partially from an inability to make their voices
heard and their belief in the patriot declarations of
loyalty to the monarchy.

As the radical posture of the

Rozas clique began to gain momentum, monarchial sympathizers
thought of regaining by force the power which they had
lost.'’®

The individual whom they entrusted to carry out

their plans was Colonel Tom&s de Figueroa, a troop commander

4®Mariano Torrente, Historia de la revolucidn de
Chile (Santiago: Imprenta Cervantes,1900), III, 37.
^°0rrego Luco, La patria vieja. I, 492-93.
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stationed in Santiago.
Figueroa was one of the most colorful figures of
late colonial Chile, with a background that was as volatile
as the frontier where he served.

Born in Estepona, Spain,

around 1746, he entered the military as a young man, being
appointed to the palace guard of Charles IV.

SI

Notorious

for his impetuous behavior and amorous escapades, he was
discovered in the chamber of a court lady and forced to
resign from the army.

The incident led to a duel with a

rival, whom Figueroa killed.

The king commuted the normal

death sentence and ordered Figueroa to serve in Valdivia,
but the resourceful convict was able to escape after several
years imprisonment, disguised as a priest.

He returned to

Spain, where he was finally pardoned and awarded an officer's
commission.

He returned to Valdivia as a captain, becoming

a distinguished officer in the fortress where he had once
cp
been imprisoned.
Prior to the independence movement, Figueroa was
stationed in Concepcidn, where he had gained a reputation as
an influential frontier caudillo.

He developed a close

friendship with Rozas, and with the exception of this man,
Figueroa may have been the most influential personality on

51Benj amin Vicuna Mackenna, El Coronel don Tomas de
Figueroa (Santiago: Rafael Jover, 1884), 43.
^"Expediente sobre..., July, 1789," Doc. No. 5194,
JMDI, CCVII, 311-17.
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the frontier.^

When Rozas journeyed to Santiago in 1810 to

take a seat on the governing junta, he took Figueroa with
him in the hope of making him a powerful ally.

Within a

short time, Figueroa broke away from his mentor and formed a
liaison with prominent royalists.
In late March, 1811, delegates began to assemble in
Santiago to attend the national congress, scheduled for
April 1.

Early on the morning of the assembly, Juan de Dios

Vial, commander of the city's forces, instructed Captain
Juan Miguel Benavente to lead a company of fifty frontier
infantry to the plaza where the assembly was to take place,
to guard against possible violence.

After taking the

infantry from San Pablo barracks, Benavente found them surly
and in subord in ate, saying they would follow the orders of no
C
one except their commander, Tomas de Figueroa.
Under the
A

leadership of a corporal, the troops threatened to kill
Benavente if he interfered with their plans and returned to
the barracks to enlist others to their cause.

Besides this

company, in the barracks were housed almost the entire
squadron of frontier dragoons and the new units of Santiago
CC
hussars, altogether totaling three or four hundred men.
The majority of these soldiers were of royalist sympathies,

^^Vicuna Mackenna, El Coronel, 79.
54"proceso seguido..., April 1, 1811," CHDI, XIX,
241.
55
~
Vicuna Mackenna, El Coronel, 83.
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although their primary loyalties were to Figueroa.
A messenger was then sent to bring Figueroa to the
barracks.

On arriving, he lost no time in breaking open the

magazine, distributing cartridges to each soldier and leading
a force of about two hundred fifty men to the plaza of the
consulado to confront the assembled junta and cabildo.

On

finding the square still vacant, he conducted the mob to the
main plaza.

He arrived about nine o'clock and entered the

palace of the audiencia.

The oidores, having been forewarned

of a plot to depose the junta, had been in session since
seven o'clock that morning.

Figueroa conferred privately

with them, after which a note was sent to the junta, asking
for its resignation.
In the meantime, Vial and Benavente had assembled
over five hundred armed soldiers along one side of the main
plaza, along with two cannon. 57

On leaving the audiencia

palace, Figueroa was startled by the sight of organized
opposition but placed himself at the head of his troops and
confronted the patriots.

During a moment of confusion

general firing broke out, followed by panic on the part of
the royalists as they fled from the plaza.

The number of

dead was placed between two and ten men, mostly among the
royalists, with up to twenty persons wounded.
When the gunfire had first begun, Figueroa fled from

5 6 Ibid.,

95.

5 7 Ibid.,

106.

58"Proceso seguido..., April 1, 1811," CHDI, XIX, 240.
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the plaza and sought refuge in a convent, hiding in a court
yard.

After the battle, a search was conducted for him led

by none other than Martinez de Rozas, who offered a reward
of five hundred pesos for the perpetrator of the conspiracy.
Figueroa was apprehended and tried for his actions the same
day, being found guilty of plotting to overthrow the junta.
At four o'clock on the morning of April 2, he was executed
in his cell by a firing squad, and his body later exhibited
xn the plaza.

59

Regardless of the royalist loyalties held by Figueroa,
it appears that personal ambition was the motivation behind
his assuming leadership of the militant troops.

Neither was

he the sole organizer of the rebellion, for evidence tends
to point towards a deliberate attempt of the audiencia to
bring about the overthrow of the j u n t a . I n
execution was only a secondary consequence.

any case, his
The audiencia

was solidly implicated in the revolt, as well as a variety
of other crown officials.

During the following months,

popular pressure forced the resignation of the now thoroughly
discredited oidores, as well as former president Garcia
Carrasco.61

This dissolution of the highest colonial

5 9 Ibid.,

261.

®9In his confession, Figueroa maintained that he had
not acted alone but on orders from higher authorities,
alluding to the audiencia. Ibid., 260.
6 1"Acuerdo para separar..., April 24, 1811," CHDI,
XIX, 348.
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tribunal and the exile of its members temporarily broke the
backbone of organized royalist opposition and paved the way
for the brief ascendancy of the constituent congress.
From the revolt of April 1, the militia and new army
units in Santiago gained renewed prestige and a sense of
their own power.

Promotions were liberally dispensed, and

all those soldiers who had participated in the suppression
of the revolt were presented with shoulder patches inscribed
/r o

with "I saved the fatherland.

In the following weeks,

the junta stationed nearly two thousand troops in the
central plaza and placed the militia on a mobilized status.
These militia came from as far away as Aconcagua, Melipilla
and Rancagua, forming security patrols that roved about the
city each night.

Militiamen were suddenly cognizant of

their role in determining the course of political action,
and civilian leaders were aware that these new units were
now indispensable elements in obtaining their political
ends.
Until this juncture, Chile had occupied the unique
position of not having to overcome great barriers in its
progress towards independence.

The patriots had directed

their movement with moderate firmness and had treated their
most ardent adversaries with respect.

Although there was a

deep animosity between the opposing factions, no open

"Premios concedidos..., April 9, 1811," CHDI, XIX,
348-49.
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violence had taken place.

The revolt of Figueroa once and

for all set the tone of the revolution and irreparably
polarized both camps against each other.

For the moment,

the patriot movement was unified, with both the moderates
and the radicals pitted against a common enemy.

Chapter 10
THE ASCENDANCY OF JOSE MIGUEL CARRERA AND THE
PATRIOT

JUNTAS OF CONCEPCION AND VALDIVIA

The occurrences of April 1, 1811, no matter how
evocative of the need for order, could not indefinitely
quell the deep divisions within the patriot movement.

Once

order had been reestablished the old dissensions returned,
now highlighted by a widespread dissatisfaction with Juan
Martinez de Rozas and the radical stance which he repre
sented.

The moderates, led by the governing junta and

cabildo of Santiago, naturally opposed Rozas' jacobin
philosophy and were jealous of his ascendancy to power.
They

were joined by the clergy and other supporters of the

old regime.

And

Rozas' own party, the radicals, were

alienated by his one-man leadership and the violence which
had resulted under his tutelage."*'
By mid-1811, Rozas was nearing the zenith of his
political influence in the capital.

His support was based

on the rabid loyalty of a minority of the provincial
electors to the rescheduled national congress, which was to

^Barros Arana, Historia general, VIII, 334.
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convoke in July.

Earlier in the year, the Santiago cabildo

had secured the right to send twelve delegates to congress,
a number which seemed excessive to the provincial electors.
This action reinforced their suspicions that the cabildo was
attempting to insure the moderate composition of the congress.
On April 30, a majority of Rozas' supporters assembled
before the junta ejecutiva and demanded participation in
executive decision-making.

The junta acceded to their

demands and a thirty-member executive directory was created,
now predominately composed of provincial representatives
p
loyal to Rozas.
Alarmed at this power play on the part of the
exaltados, combined with the exclusion of the capital from
the new directory, the Santiago moderates immediately
scheduled an election for congressional deputies.

In the

election of May 6 , the moderates scored an outstanding
victory by electing a majority of their members to the up
coming congress.

From this point on, the radical faction

was in a minority, shorn of its former power.

Rozas' down-

fall in the capital was now almost inevitable.
On July 4, 1811, the long-anticipated congress was
finally convoked, and the junta which had served since
September 18, 1810, was formally dissolved.

This congress

was the first real expression of representative government

^Martinez, Memoria histbrica, 99.
■^Orrego Luco, La patria vieja. I, 523-24.
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in Chile, and while meriting a certain historical veneration,
its accomplishments should not be exaggerated.

It was com

posed chiefly of aristocrats with little comprehension of
their representative obligations, for there was no parlia
mentary tradition on which to base their actions.

Rather

than acting as a machine of change, the congress was a
faithful reflection of the structured social hierarchy of
the period.
From its inception, the congress was fractured by
political discord and philosophical differences, which
impeded the course of reform and reduced the regular sessions
to bouts of verbal abuse.

Three distinct groups began to

emerge from this chaotic assembly.

There were the radicals,

led by Rozas, who although possessing only twelve delegates,
were resolute and dedicated to the democratic transformation
of the colony.

The moderates represented a more numerous

faction and included many of the wealthy gentry and socially
prominent colonial leaders.

They were the advocates of an

enlightened, reformed government, but without a sharp break
with tradition.

Finally, there were the royalists, com

prising a definite minority but vehemently opposed to ideas
of autonomy.

A

The congress and the directory were now fast becoming
oriented towards the moderate, and even the royalist, view
point.

As the moderates increasingly consolidated their

'Vicuna Mackenna, El ostracismo, 116.
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power by electing their own adherents to governmental posts,
the Rozas faction desperately attempted to regain lost
political ground.

Inflammatory literature attacking the

moderates was circulated, and they were constantly provoked
in public or accused of treachery against the cause of
liberalism.

Rumors of a revolt by the exaltados spread

throughout the city.

Colonel Reina, the royalist artillery

officer and an instrument of the reactionaries, was ordered
by the congress to redouble armed patrols throughout Santiago to counteract revolution.

5

On July 25, an English warship, the Standart, arrived
at Valparaiso from Cadiz to convey Chilean deputies to the
Spanish cortfes and to collect contributions for the war
against the French.

The congress refused to comply with

either of these demands, which was a temporary political
victory for the exaltados.

Rozas, however, was aware of

his fading prestige and determined to take radical measures
to regain it.

Through his confidants, he circulated a rumor

that the captain of the Standart had landed troops in
Valparaiso, capturing the port and local garrison.

It was

hoped that this ruse would frighten the congress, causing
them to elect Rozas dictator in order to restore tranquility.
The shallow plot was recognized, though, and Rozas' remaining
prestige sank even lower.
5

6

7

Barros Arana, H i s t o n a general, VIII, 358-59.
"Comunicacibnes cambiadas..., 1811," SCL, I, 45-48.

^"Diario militar...," CHDI, I, 34-35.
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The final demise of the exaltados came during con
gressional debate over the formation of a three-man junta
ejecutiva, with one member representing Concepci6 n and two
representing Santiago (based on the 30 to 12 congressional
ratio).

This proposal was overwhelmingly approved, leaving

the south in a nearly

powerless legislative

position.

Realizing that they were no longer a viable political body
in the capital, Rozas and the twelve radical deputies
resigned their posts on August 9, and returned to Concepci6 n.®
The resignation of the exaltados was the ultimate
triumph for the moderates, but marked a retrogress ion in the
progress of the revolution.

The reactionaries now became

dominant, with public

posts being presented

timid patriots but to

outright royalists and enemies ofthe

regime.

not only to

Two appointments which particularly alarmed the

liberals were those of the moribund Conde de la Marquina as
commander of the frontier infantry battalion and Rambn
Jim 6 nez Navia as the battalion sergeant major.

The latter

officer had been implicated with Tom&s de Figueroa in the
abortive coup of April 1.

9

Believing that the potentially violent situation
could be thwarted by a simulated change in government, the
congress convoked a closed session on July 10, 1811, and

®"Exposici6 n que..., August 12, 1811," ABO, I, 115-16.
^Barros Arana, Historia general, VIII, 381.

218
named a three-man governing junta.

In reality, the new

junta was almost powerless and subject to strict supervision
by the legislative body which had elected it.

On August 13,

congress declared its power to decree laws, review military
promotions and appointments and conduct foreign relations.
Even so, government operations reached an impasse as the
legislative sessions degenerated into petty debate and
rivalries.

In the meantime, Rozas had begun to build a move

ment of his own in Concepcidn, dedicated to the destruction
of monarchism and his enemies m

11
the capital.

His actions

were symptomatic of the congressional inability to determine
its own destiny, let alone that of the rest of the colony.
The political impasse was also propitious for the advent of
a military caudillo in Santiago.
At this juncture, Josd Miguel Carrera entered upon
the political stage and in only a short time became the
dominant figure of the revolutionary movement.

Born into

one of the most prestigious families of Chile, Carrera was
sent to Spain in 1806
tile apprentice.

by his father to serve as a merchan-

He instead entered the military, a fitting

occupation for his violent personality, and served valiently
in a militia regiment during the French invasion of the

■^The three junta members were Martin Calvo Encalada,
Juan Jos 6 Aldunate and Francisco Javier de Solar.
■^Several valuable documents relating to the dis
trust and animosity of towns in the south against the
congress can be found in the SCL, I, 58-62.
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peninsula.

On receiving word of the upheaval in his home

land, he returned to Chile to take a place beside his
brothers and father.

He arrived on the Standart in July,

1811, the same vessel which had brought the orders for finan
cial assistance from the Spanish cort 6 s .

At once, he placed

himself in contact with radical leaders who advocated
violent methods of obtaining power.

12

The exaltado supporters in Santiago were quick to
court the support of Carrera and convinced him that the
moderate congress, supported by Colonel Reina, intended to
reinstitute the old monarchist regime.

Carrera refused to

lend his support until he was assured that he and

his two

brothers would assume the command and execution of the
revolt.^

At noon on September 4, Carrera carried out a

revolt against the royalist artillery barracks and the con
gress, with the death of only one soldier.

He was supported

by almost all of the officers and troops of the grenadier
and hussar battalions, in addition to part of

theartillery

corps, led by his brother Luis
The movement of September 4
element back in power.

placed the radical

On the same day, a junta ejecutiva

of five members was installed, one of whom was Juan Martinez

12,,Diario militar..., " CHDI, I, 17.
•^iri Carrera's own version, he implied that there
was vacillation on the part of the radicals as to who would
lead the revolt, and he offered his services to break the
impasse ("Diario militar..., 11 CHDI, I, 20) .
14Ibid., 20-23.
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de Rozas

This body implemented a harsh reaction to the

supporters of the former government, such as demanding the
loyalty of all religious orders and their membership.

On

September 14, the junta absolved itself from future recrimi
nations it might carry out against royalists by ordering
that all political dissenters register with the government
1C
in thirty days.
Those who did not do so would be subject
to deportation, should they be judged as subversive.

While

the residents of Santiago were being distracted by struggles
among these immature political factions, equally vigorous
but unconnected movements were being organized in the South.
On his arrival in Concepcidn in late August, Rozas
received an enthusiastic reception by the townspeople and
manifested his plans of creating a local junta in opposition
to Santiago.

A gathering of patriots met in the home of a

young lawyer, Manuel V&squez de Novoa, and proclaimed their
desires for an open cabildo.

Colonel Pedro Jos 6 Benavente,

the provincial military governor, was himself partial to the
cause of reform and gladly decreed the meeting for September
5.

On that day, an assembly of over 180 delegates met for

the stated purpose of electing new deputies to the capital,
but went much further by forming a provincial junta of four

Other members of this junta were Juan Enrique
Rosales, Martin Calvo Encalada, Juan Mackenna and Josd
Gaspar Marin. Two secretaries were designated: Agustin
Vial and Jos 6 Gregorio Argomedo.
16"Proclama sobre..., September 14, 1811," CHDI,
XXIX, 439.
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members, presided over by Colonel Benavente.

17

One of these

was Rozas, who now enjoyed the distinct privilege of occupy
ing positions in the governments of both provinces.

Only

the most rabid opponents of the junta failed to give their
affirmation of support.
The new junta made it quite clear that it submitted
to the authority of the capital, but reserved for itself the
right of all provincial appointments, both military and
civilian.

One of these was the replacement of the Conde de

la Marquina by Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Calder6 n as
commander of the frontier infantry battalion.

18

Rozas and

the principal architects of that movement were aware of the
difficulties they might incur from the viceroy or from
Santiago, and began to deliberately replace officers of
doubtful loyalties with others devoted to their cause.

The

following letter, from Rozas to Bernardo 0 'Higgins (dated
December 3, 1811), is illustrative of the extent to which
political loyalties were beginning to distort the composi
tion of the veteran officer corps.

This in itself is not so

extraordinary as the fact that civilians played the leading
role in determining appointments and promotions, not regular
army officers.

The document is pertinent to an understanding

of the political metamorphosis of the military chain of
command.

17"Noticias sobre..., September, 1811, " CHDI, XXIX,
439.
18,,Diario militar..

” CHDI, I, 33.
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Dear Friend,
I have written to don Juan Mackenna concerning
the necessity of reorganizing the artillery corps,
in which everything is maligned and defective; time
is of the essence. What is most urgent is the
appointment of officers. I can say to you that we
do not have any, and without officers there is no
artillery train, nor is there artillery, nor is
there defense. Don Jos 6 Zapatero, who was retired
for being incompetent, is the [artillery] captain
and commander. He knows nothing nor is he capable
of learning anything, nor of applying or upgrading
himself. He is a European; moreover, he is a
saracen [royalist] in his conduct, and besides, you
must know that he is feeble, sick and without char
acter . If the Limenos [Peruvians] or other enemies
come, what will become of us with such a commander?
We will be denounced and betrayed without recourse.
You must quickly order that Zapatero return to his
retirement with the pretext of saving money or with
that of his infirm condition and not being fit for
combat duty, and replace him as commander with don
Juan Torres. And if he cannot serve, then with don
Francisco Formas, but in any case, he must come
voluntarily and he must be a dedicated and active
patriot.19
Valdivia represents another course taken by the
patriot movement.

There, the isolation of the city, the

dominant military spirit of the inhabitants and the selfcontained, provincial society were seemingly anathema to the
growth of political liberalism.

Valdivia was the only dis

trict in Chile which had abstained from sending delegates to
the national congress in Santiago, in spite of ample notification. 20

Nonetheless, the seeds of liberalism had been

planted under the guidance of a small group of devout
patriots in 1811, but they were assisted by several

176-77.

■^■^Rozas to O'Higgins, December 3, 1811, ABO, I,
--20"Lista de los diputados..., 1807," ACG, DCDLXXVII,
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influential officers of the local garrison.
The first signs of this movement became apparent
21
when Valdivia's first cabildo was formed.

At a time when

other cabildos were taking upon themselves the duties of
governing entire colonies, their counterpart in Valdivia was
still uncertain of the bounds of its legal authority, a
graphic reflection of the predominance of the military
government.

From its inception, it was viewed by army

leaders as seditious and revolutionary.

The arch-opponent

of the cabildo was Governor Alejandro Eagar, a Spanish
officer of long and obedient service to the crown, who had
governed the city since April, 1807.

?2

In its first year of operation, the cabildo was
attacked by Governor Eagar, who attempted to nullify the
first election of its regidores.

The corporation promptly

petitioned President Garcia Carrasco for protection of its
rights, which led to a reprimand of the governor and instrucoo

tions not to impede cabildo deliberations. J
By 1810, another confrontation had arisen, stemming
from Governor Eagar1s fear that the cabildo would emulate
the actions of the open assemblies in Concepcibn and
Santiago.

In a legal brief which he drew up proposing the

cabildo's abolition, the governor argued that the military

21"El gobernador..., April 10, 1810, " ACG, DCLVIII, 6 7.
22 Guarda,

Historia de Valdivia, 214.

^Guarda,

"Un intendente, " 218.

staff capably and efficiently resolved all aspects of city
government, without the necessity of civilian inter
ference .24

As evidence of this, he cited that while the

cabildo had recently petitioned the right to jail common
criminals in the city, there was not even a prison which
could be used for this purpose.

A more expeditious method

was to simply remand lawbreakers to one of the forts in the
bay, as had always been done.

The harsh reaction of Eagar

constituted more than a fear of alien political doctrine; in
Valdivia, the tradition of military rule was the most
deeply-ingrained precept of the town's existence, an almost
sacred privilege which resisted all innovation.
This city under my command has the perrogative of
being purely military but also has the nullifica
tion of a newly-created cabildo, contrary to all
law and custom of a military presidio. . . .26
After receiving news of the downfall of President
Garcia Carrasco and his replacement by a junta, Eagar became
even more concerned with the effects on the Valdivia cabildo.
Concerning the proclamation of the Santiago junta, he wrote:
"This occurrence has raised the spirits of this cabildo so
much that they are continually in private councils, playing
capriciously with the established authority. . . . " 27

24"El g o b e m a d o r ..., 1810," ACG, DCLVIII, 6-7.
2 5 Ibid.,

8

.

26"Carta de..., September 9, 1810," CHDI, VIII,
350.
27Ibid. 354.
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Eagar regularly communicated with the royal audiencia and
other governmental branches in the capital, his most intimate
correspondence was with Viceroy Abascal, whom he regarded as
his immediate superior.

In a letter of October 7, 1810,

Eagar wrote that the spirit of rebellion had spread to the
regular troops because of ", . . the relations of kinship
and affinity that exist among the officers of this battalion,
the cabildo, and the citxzenry.

As a consequence, the

only officers in whom he felt he could place his trust were:
Miguel Maria Atero, the commandant of engineers; Lucas de
Molina, sergeant major of the battalion; plus the treasury
official, Francisco Marin O'Ryan.

29

The governor was all too aware of the unique depen
dence of the garrison on outside assistance and foresaw an
eventual breaking of relations with the capital.

On

September 9, 1810, he petitioned to Viceroy Abascal for 200
to 300 additional troops and a small warship, letting the
viceroy know that the very existence of the city might hang
in the balance .38

He added that the fiscal condition of the

army merited equal consideration, with only 7,446 pesos
remaining in the treasury.

Eagar proposed that the situado

be remitted directly from Peru, which would assure the
garrison1s lifeline should relations with Santiago be
severed.

28Ibid., 355.

29Ibid.. 354.

30Ibid., 355.

31Ibid.
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The patriot leaders in Valdivia did not represent
the majority will, but due to the ambiguity of their goals
they were able to win numerous followers.

They received

intellectual support from the analogous movement in Concepci6 n.

The philosophical leader of the movement was Father

Camilo Henriquez, a native Valdivian and self-appointed
delegate to the Santiago congress. ^

Henriquez was one of

the first fiery advocates of complete separation from Spain,
and while not actually present on the day of the revolt, he
indirectly influenced the actions of the participants.
Two more priests, Isidro Pineda and Pedro Jos 6
Eleisegui, actually led the movement.

Pineda, the vicar of

the local church, used his pulpit to equate patriot dogma
with righteousness and religious salvation .33

Eleisegui,

chaplain of the royal hospital, was the guiding hand in
arousing cabildo resentment against the military govern
ment.-^

These clerics were able to convert a number of

prominent officers to their cause, and with their support
instigated a movement which was referred to as the "revolt

"Lista de los diputados..., 1811, " SCL, I, 30-31.
Camilo Henriquez was b o m in Valdivia in 1769 and educated
in Lima. He returned to Chile in 1810 and assumed the
editorship of the colony's first newspaper, La Aurora de
Chile, which he used to promote his revolutionary ideals.
During the course of the revolution, he became the editor
of ten different newspapers in Santiago, using the pen name
of Quirino Lem&chez.
^Guarda,

"Un intendente, " 220.

34,1'Causa contra..., 1814," ACG, MXLVII, 4-13.
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of the priests."

35

The day of the revolt was a religious festival,
November 1, 1811.

On that date the town residents met at

the parish church for a Mass, including Governor Eagar and
the engineering officer, Miguel Maria Atero.

During the

Mass, the priest (either Pineda or Eleisegui, the account
is not clear), produced a pair of pistols from beneath his
robe and took Eagar and Atero prisoner.

Eagar managed to

send a soldier to the troop barracks to obtain assistance
from Sergeant Major Lucas Molina, but on arriving the
messenger found most of the battalion already called to arms
in support of the rebellion.3®
On that same day, the local citizens assembled in
the presence of the cabildo and formally deposed the
governor, replacing him with a provincial junta of five
members under the authority of Concepcidn.

Heading this

junta was Colonel Ventura Carvallo, the ranking officer after
Governor Eagar, who despite being a devout monarchist was
awarded the post because of his popularity among the
troops . 7

Other junta members were Father Pineda, Chaplain

Eleisegui, Vicente G 6mez, Jaime de la Guarda, and a secre
tary, Diego P 6 rez de Arce.

Command of the battalion was

35orrego Luco, La patria vieja, II, 43.
36,,Noticias tomadas..., 1811, " AMV. LIV, 230.
37Carvallo came from a renown family of Valdivia and
was the brother of the soldier-chronicler Vicente Carvallo y
Goyeneche (Guarda, Historia de Valdivia, 223).
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presented to Captain Gregorio Henriquez, a local patriot who
had been politically converted by his nephew, the priest
Camilo Henriquez.
It was decided that Governor Eagar and Atero should
be sent to Concepci6 n under the guard of a twelve-man
detachment.

For this purpose the junta requisitioned a ship

consigned to a Spanish merchant from Concepcidn.

The mer

chant was Antonio Quintanilla, who later became a distin
guished royalist officer and governor of Chilod during the
last years of the war of independence.

Quintanilla prevailed

upon the ship's captain to sail to Chilod, rather than
Concepcidn, which kept the prisoners from falling into the
OQ
hands of the patriot junta.
Eagar and Atero later served
in the royalist army of Peru.
During the period of the revolts in Valdivia and
Concepcidn, the Santiago junta was busily assembling new
troop units or reassembling existing ones in the capital.
The militia battalion of pardos, one of the few units which
had not taken part in the revolt of September 4, was now
accepted as a loyal a m of the government.
presented to Colonel Juan de Dios Vial .^8

3 8 Ibid.,

Its command was
The veteran

219.

Q Q

Antonio de Quintanilla, "Autobiografia del mariscal
del campo don Antonio de Quintanilla," ADC, c, 4th trimester
(1955), 115-17.
4 ° "Sesion del congreso..., September 12, 1811," SCL,
I, 71.
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company of the Reina Luisa was dissolved and its troops
placed in the asamblea de caballerla. so that the increased
force might better train the militia.

A new militia unit of

eight companies was created, called the patriotas voluntarios
de Santiago, and the militia infantry regiment del rey was
divided into three separate battalions, each strengthened
considerably.^

The ancient batallOn de comercio, composed

principally of peninsular Spaniards, was disbanded and its
infantrymen interspersed among other patriot units.

4-2

On

October 29, 1811, a decree was published in Santiago that
all free men between 16 and 60 should present themselves
within twenty days to the military units of their choice for
enlistment or classification, should they be needed at a
future d a t e . ^
All of these measures were oriented towards the
capital, with little concern for incorporating the southern
command.

The net effect of this mad dash for army appoint

ments by the Santiago citizenry was to insulate the capital
from the rest of the colony and to deny the importance of
the regular forces in the south.

The composition of these

new battalions was regulated to insure personal obedience to

4 1 "Decreto aprobando..., October 17, 1811, " CHDI,
XXIX, 556.
42jyiartlnez, Memoria histOrica, 377.
43"Bando para..., October 29, 1811," CHDI, XXIX, 556.
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the individual commander, not to the institution.

44

Such

sentiments paved the way for military praetorian ism and the
politics of coercion.
The news of two patriot juntas being proclaimed in
the south brought popular acclaim in Santiago,

Yet, the

struggles for political power in the capital made the
announcements more of a novelty than a significant political
event.

Carrera made only slight mention of the Concepcidn

coup in his Diario militar, for the most part noting the
regretable fact that the jtinta was so adversely affected by
the personal ambition of Martinez de Rozas,4^
Those influential persons in Santiago who might have
shown concern for the future of revolutionary ideals were
over shadowed by the figure of Jos 6 Miguel Carrera.

Although

distrustful of the entire Carrera family, the congress
awarded military promotions to its members in an effort to
AGL

placate their hostile temperaments.

But Jos 6 Miguel felt

snubbed by receiving no high appointment, despite his
leading role in the revolt of September 4.

Under the guise

of preserving the patriot movement but with the real goal of

44

Carrera, himself, ruefully noted that all of the
positions in these military units were reserved for friends
or relatives ("Diario militar...," CHDI, I, 36).
4 5 Ibid.,

33.

4^Ignacio Carrera, the father, was awarded the rank
of brigadier. Juan Josd was made commander of the grenadier
battalion and Luis received command of the artillery brigade
(Orrego Luco, La patria vieja, II, 51).
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attaining personal control, he secretly drafted plans for
another coup.

He realized that his success could not be

attained only with support of the army; it was vital that
the movement have the collaboration of civilians.

Although

disaffected with the controversial actions of the radicals,
the moderates were unwilling to risk violence as an alterna
tive .

It was the saracen, or royalist element, which was

the declared enemy of the government.

Its members vividly

recalled the September 14 decree ordering all dissidents of
the government to leave the colony, and quickly lent their
support to Carrera.
With the weight of the combined civilian and military
support behind them, the Carreras acted on November 15, 1811.
Juan Jos§ Carrera led the grenadier battalion against the
government by surrounding congress with his troops.

The

only forces capable of opposing Carrera's were the newly
reorganized militia under Colonel Juan de Dios Vial and the
hussars led by Joaquin Guzman, both of whom deliberately
abstained from opposition. 47

The congress met with the

Carreras in an attempt to win a return of power to the
legally elected body, but Jos 6 Miguel refused to negotiate.
Instead, he called for a popular assembly to ratify his
accession.

On November 16, this public assembly was con

voked, and its approval of Carrera led to the resignation of

47
I, 185-90.

"Documentos relativos..., November 15, 1811," SCL.
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the junta ejecutiva.

A three-man executive triumvirate was

selected to replace it, composed of one representative from
each province-— Jos 6 Miguel Carrera (Santiago), Jos 6 Gaspar
A

Q

Marin (Coquimbo), and Juan Martinez de Rozas (Concepcidn).
Neither Marin nor Rozas were present at that time, and both
later refused to serve in the farcical junta.

Bernardo

0 'Higgins was designated to replace Rozas but likewise
declined to take part.
The patriot composition of the new junta made the
royalist supporters of the coup realize that they had been
badly deceived.

And members of the congress were similarly

disappointed in Carrera's dictatorial mandates.

For all his

power, however, Carrera still chaffed under the presence of
a congress and two other junta members.

These could techni

cally veto his mandates, and any decrees on his part would
lack full legitimacy.

For Carrera, the only alternative was

the abolition of the junta and congress.
Within the army, there was considerable discontent
with the caudillo image which Carrera was forging for himself.
In November, 1811, a conspiracy was contrived by several army
officers to depose the Carrera family.

Two army captains,

the brothers Jos 6 Antonio and Jos 6 Domingo Huici, were the
leaders.

They planned to capture Juan Jos 6 Carrera, com

mander of the grenadier battalion, and use his troops as a

"Diario militar...," CHDI, I, 42. The province of
Coquimbo was created by the first national congress on
September 23, 1811.
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fulcrum to subvert other troop units .4:9

The Carreras were

forewarned by one of the conspirators and arrested several
plotters on the night of November 27, as they attempted to
kidnap Juan Jos 6 „

Neither of the Huici brothers were appre

hended, but Josd Miguel Carrera arrested a number of patriot
leaders, based on the denunc i at ion s of a conspirator.

Among

these were the influential veteran officers Juan Mackenna
and Juan de Dios Vial, who were proclaimed guilty in a
cn

hastily-called trial and imprisoned.

Carrera's rapid and harsh reaction was greeted with
mass anger by the citizens of Santiago.

Members of congress

accused Carrera of having contrived the entire episode to
further his suspected plans for a military dictatorship.
There was ample justification for such a theory, for Mackenna
and Vial were the only two military leaders capable of
mobilizing troops against Carrera.

Yet, no documented

evidence was presented to prove their complicity.

Cl

And the

leaders of the revolt, the Huici brothers, somehow managed
to escape to Concepci6 n unharmed.

The entire affair was

viewed with suspicion by both patriots and royalists, who
saw how beneficial the plot had been to the fortunes of the
Carrera family.

49"proceso por la conspiracibn..., November 27,
1811," CHDI, XX, 1-341.
50"Diario militar...," CHDI. I, 45, 51.
Cl
,
3 X0rrego Luco, La patria vxeja, II, 80.
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Josd Miguel was now absolute commander of all the
troops in the capital, including those commanded by his
brothers and the militia of Santiago, Rancagua and Melipilla.
There were no troops at the disposal of the congress.
Fortified with undisputed armed force, Carrera carried out
the last phase of his dictatorial designs.

On the morning

of December 2, 1811, a troop review was called in front of
the convened congress, and its deputies were forced to sign
a document dissolving their corporation .33

Carrera excused

his actions with the justification that Chile was as yet too
politically immature to dally with democracy.

He also made

use of the Huici conspiracy by claiming that the congress
53
was full of assassins and conspirators.

A factor on which

he counted for his supremacy was the political ignorance or
apathy of the populace and the gullibility of many sup
porters .

His power was complete, and throughout the province

there was not a single local assembly which failed to pledge
loyalty to him.
The coup of December 2

and the abolition of con

gress marked the third armed revolt by Josd Miguel Carrera
in little more than ten weeks after he had arrived to his
native land.

When the congressional delegates began

returning to their homes, Carrera detained the representa
tives from Concepcibn until he was convinced that no

^"Diario militar..., " CHDI, I, 50.
5 3 Ibid.,

48.
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retaliation would be attempted against him.

He was mistaken

in his thinking, for the abolition of congress crystallized
hostility towards him in the south.

The refusal of Marin,

Rozas and O'Higgins to serve on the junta widened rather
than narrowed the breach between Santiago and Concepcidn.
These events destroyed the last vestiges of unity between
the two provinces and revealed the fragility of their
democratic institutions.

Chapter 11
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SANTIAGO AND CONCEPCION
After the series of revolts by Josb Miguel Carrera
which culminated in the December 2, 1811, coup and the
abolition of congress, the two governments of Santiago and
Concepcibn began to drift apart, each suspicious of the
other's intentions.

The dissimilarities between the two

cities were historical, each developing as an opposite pole
on either end of the colony.^

But much of the political

animosity between the provinces was heightened by the diplo
matic blunders of Carrera and his quest for power.

As the

most forceful leader of the independence movement during
this time, he alienated Concepcibn and completely disre
garded the army in the South, especially in Valdivia.

1812

was the crucial year of the patria vieja, for during it,
mass political aspirations were channeled by resolute
leaders and loyalties were permanently cemented.

During

that year, the stage was set for Chile's division into a
royalist south and a patriot north, each arming for open

^In terms of effective settlement, colonial Chile was
only about 700 miles long. Because of this, the two provin
cial capitals were closer to the ends of the colony, rather
than the center.
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warfare.
When word of events in Santiago since November
reached the Concepcibn government there was justified con
cern and even fear, for until that time it had been in
strict accord with the congress and ruling junta.

The arrest

of prominent patriots and members of congress alarmed the
Concepcibn junta.

Also, the avowed loyalty of the new junta

ejecutiva to the patriot cause rang hollow when it was con
sidered that two of its members refused to take their seats,
leaving Carrera as de facto ruler.

On December 5, 1811, the

Concepcibn junta addressed a letter to the national congress,
asking for details about the state of affairs and offering
military assistance and troops, if needed.

2

This letter and

other correspondence with the junta revealed a determined
opposition by leaders in the South to the Carrera family.
Carrera1s apologists attribute his dictatorial
actions to impatience in implanting reforms; however, his
detractors present a more plausible interpretation, as
evidenced by his deceit and chicanery with Concepcibn. 3

In

anticipation of conflict, Carrera had dispatched agents to
the South to intercept dispatches of the provincial junta,
and in this way learned of its offer of troops to the
national congress.

He persuaded Bernardo 0 'Higgins to return

^Encina, Historia de Chile, VI, 369.
^Roger M. Haigh, The Formation of the Chilean
Oligarchy, 1810-1821 (Salt Lake City: Historical S. and D .
Research Foundation, 1972), 38.
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to Concepcibn to manifest his peaceful intentions and work
for the resolving of differences.

0 'Higgins was deceived by

the false pretenses of Carrera and naively accepted the
commission.

4

After the abstention of Gaspar Marin and Martinez de
Rozas from the ruling triumvirate, Carrera launched a quest
for political legitimacy by obtaining substitute junta
members.

He desired two figureheads, respected and well-

known but without any strength to oppose him.

In a farcical

election on December 16, 1811, by the cabildo and military
commanders, Juan Josb Aldunate and Josb Nicolas de la Cerda
were elected.

They were two figures who aptly fulfilled the
C
qualifications of weakness and impotence.
Aldunate refused
the post and was subsequently replaced by the customshouse
administrator Manuel Manso on January 10, a known enemy of
the patriots .6

The selection of these men, without any

participation of the provinces they supposedly represented,
was convincing evidence of the real intentions of Carrera.
Invoking the name of the junta in all his actions,
Carrera began to mobilize troops along the provincial boundary
to forestall a possible invasion by forces from Concepcibn.
On December 14, the same day in which 0 'Higgins departed on

^Junta to 0 'Higgins, Santiago, December 13, 1811,
ABO. I, 160.
5Barros Arana, Historia general. VIII, 507.
6 Ibid..

508.
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his peacekeeping mission to the South, Carrera ordered the
subdelegado of Talca to marshal the provincial militia along
the Maule River and to impound all of the launches that were
used to ferry passengers across the river.

7

In Santiago,

new recruits were added to the grenadier battalion, raising
its strength to 1,200 men.

The recently-formed artillery

corps was dissolved and reorganized over a base of 500
O
dragoons called the hdsares de la gran guardia.
Carrera
could not risk another attempted coup by leading the troops
southward himself, but appointed his father, Ignacio Carrera,
to do so.

The appointment of the old patriarch was a

repudiation of the talents of regular military officers in
Santiago, which led to his being ignominiously called the
Q
"New Ceasar.
Ignacio Carrera left Santiago on December 24,
with a force of 200 troops.

During the following weeks,

hundreds of additional soldiers marched southward to the
boundary line between the provinces, increasing the chances
for accidental war.
The Concepcibn government followed suit by calling
all available troops to arms.

These included the provincial

militia units, the veteran artillery brigade and two
frontier dragoon squadrons.^®

Food, horses and donations of

^Ibid.
®"Diario militar...," CHDI, I, 52.
^Encina, Historia de Chile, VI, 371.
-*-°Vicuna Mackenna, El ostracismo, 159-60.
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money were solicited from provincial inhabitants in the name
of preserving the autonomy of the province.

Before these

troops could reach the Maule, Rozas received peace proposals
from Carrera in Santiago.

Bernardo O'Higgins was entrusted

by Carrera to deliver these messages, which outwardly appeared
to be genuine.
Rozas feared civil war above all else and eagerly
grasped at this opportunity for conciliation with the
capital.

The provincial junta of Concepcibn assigned Manuel

Fernando Vbsquez de Novoa to work with 0 'Higgins in drafting
a treaty acceptable to both provinces, which would serve as
Chile's government until a permanent constitution could be
drawn up.

On January 13, 1812, the junta ratified the

treaty of twenty-five articles, providing for the creation
of a new national junta of three members (one from each
province) to govern for three y e a r s . ^

The principle of

regional autonomy was upheld, each province confirming its
own military and civil appointees.

One of the articles

sponsored by Rozas provided for the creation of a small,
permanent senate to manage issues of national importance such
as foreign treaties, the coinage of money, taxation and the
declaration of w a r I t

was believed by the drafters of

this document that the Santiago government would quickly
ratify it and put an end to the impending conflict.

"Convencibn entre..., January 12, 1812," ABO. I,
181-86.
12Ibid., 183.
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Carrera feigned an interest in signing the document,
praising 0 'Higgins profusely for his ambassadorial efforts.
In reality, he had no intentions of peaceful coexistence
with Concepcibn but was stalling for time while military
mobilization took its financial toll on the rival government.
Concepcibn possessed its own provincial treasury but was
traditionally dependent on the capital for

thesalaries

governmental functionaries and the situado

for payingthe

frontier army.

l "3

of

These funds were now cut off by Carrera,

which dictated that sooner or later the province must
succumb to the pressure of Santiago.
By this time, Concepcibn's leaders had amassed over
8,000

troops along the frontier, among them nearly 1 , 0 0 0

veterans

.

^

The forces of Santiago were considerably fewer

in number but were numerous enough to present a formidable
appearance.

Neither side attempted to violate the territory

of the other, but the stalemate along the Maule and the
mutual suspicion between the bivouaced armies caused a
virtual devastation of the regional economy.

Inter-provin

cial commerce came to a halt as merchants and travelers were
detained, searched and occasionally arrested.

Those mer

chants who attempted to transport their goods past the
blockaded river often found them requisitioned by the army.

-^Encina, Historia de Chile, VI, 377.
"^Guillermo Feliti. Cruz (ed.), Conversacibnes
histbricas de Claudio Gay (Santiago: Editorial Andrbs
Bello, 1965), 17-19.
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Agricultural production came to a standstill, for the mobil
ized militia were deprived of tending their fields.

Bands

of undisciplined soldiers roamed at will throughout the
countryside, stealing and looting from the populace.

15

Carrera's deliberate stall technique was all too
effective, for with no funding from Santiago the army of the
South almost reached the point of disbanding.

On March 7,

1812, the junta of Concepcibn met for the purpose of electing
its representative to the proposed triumvirate in Santiago.
Instead, the assembly selected an agent, Luis de la Cruz, to
confer with Carrera and ascertain his reasons for not signing
the a c c o r d . B e r n a r d o 0 'Higgins was elected to accompany
Cruz to arrange for the resumption of the situado and
government funding.

On April 13, Rozas made a desperate

plea to the Buenos Aires government for 100,000 pesos to be
used to support the army during the remainder of the year.

17

The refusal of that government to meet his request left
Rozas with little hope for continued resistance.

It also

heightened his apprehensions that his regime might be over
thrown by dissatisfied military elements within the province.
During the first months of 1812, Bernardo 0 'Higgins
actually proposed leading a division of troops north of the

15Noya to 0 'Higgins, Los Angeles, January 13, 1812,
ABO, I, 194.
^ V i c u n a Mackenna, El ostracismo, 506-507.
17

Amunategui Solar, Jesuitas, 115.
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Maule to defeat the carreristas, pointing to that army's
greatly reduced strength of only 500 men.

18

Rozas resisted

this movement, fearing a bloody civil war would result.

The

sentiments of Pedro Josb Benavente, the ranking provincial
army officer, bordered on cowardice.

He also urged that

O'Higgins avoid an outbreak of war by any possible means,
even to arbitration with Bishop Martin Villodres of Concepci 6 n, a noted royalist.

19

In the meantime, Carrera had found the provincial
disunion to be injurious to his rule.

His unsteady coalition

of royalist and patriot supporters was weary of the finan
cial sacrifices imposed by an army in the South and the
continued obstinacy of Concepcibn.

Divided, the colony was

even a likelier target for Peruvian reprisals.

Finally,

Carrera advised Rozas that he wished to reach some sort of
conciliation, and in late April, the two met near Talca to
hammer out an agreement.

Their talks were cordial but

unproductive in reaching a permanent accord.

The only

benefit derived from this was the withdrawal of both armies
to thexr respective capitals

90
.

^

While the governments of Concepcibn and Santiago
were engaged in antagonistic saber-rattling along the

•^Stephen Clissold, Bernardo 0 ‘Higgins and the
Independence of Chile (New York: Praeger, 1968), 97.
•^Benavente to 0 'Higgins, Concepcibn, March 19,
1812, ABO. I, 198.
20"Diario militar...," CHDI. I, 55-56.
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frontier, the Valdivia patriot junta serenely went about its
own affairs.

The movement of November 1, 1811, was a

genuine expression of patriot sentiment, but its success was
due to the endeavor of a handful of fanatical liberals, not
the majority of the local residents.
ripe for another political change.

By 1812, the city was
Throughout the colony,

the early phase of the patria vieja was characterized by
ideologically-confused patriots and royalists alike who
experienced mental anguish in choosing sides.

It was a

crucial phase in which time, circumstance and the influence
of a few chosen leaders swayed the loyalties of the great
mass of the population.

In Valdivia, however, a long tradi

tion of monarchism was the factor which was to ultimately
determine the city's political course.
Jos 6 Miguel Carrera's interests in Valdivia were
purely mercenary.

Although the city had declared its support

of Santiago, it remained administratively subject to the
province of Concepcibn.

On encountering strong resistance

from Martinez de Rozas and his followers, Carrera thought of
instigating another revolt in Valdivia and replacing it with
a junta loyal to himself.

Such an act would help to isolate

Concepcibn and further reduce the power of his rivals there.
In Santiago resided an officer of the Valdivia
garrison named Pedro Asenjo Pinuer, who possessed a degree
of influence by virtue of his family relations. 21

“^Guarda, Historia de Valdivia. 226.

In late
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1811, Carrera persuaded Asenjo to return to the city to
establish contact with military officers dissatisfied with
the governing junta and to eventually supplant it with
another.

p p

Pinuer seems to have been intellectually limited

and a mere tool of Carrera, but he successfully completed
the task assigned to him.

Among the contacts which he made

were Sergeant Major Lucas Molina, Captain Julian Pinuer and
the artillery commander Jos 6 Berganza, who would lead the
planned revolt.
On March 15, the day before the uprising, post com
mander Jose Berganza took the precaution of reinforcing
Valdivia's forts with trustworthy troops.

At four o'clock

in the morning of March 16, he fired three cannon shots, the
signal for conspirators in the city to take action .33
eight o 'clock the bloodless revolt was complete.

By

According

to the official account of the rebellious officers which was
later sent to Santiago, the battalion troops and townspeople
gathered in the plaza with shouts of "Long live King
Ferdinand VII!

Long live the Supreme Spanish Regency!

Long

live the president of the capital, don Jos 6 Miguel Carrera,
and death to the disloyal . 1,34
The previous government was declared defunct and

2 2 Ibid.,

226.

23"Manifiesto individual..., March, 1812," CHDI,
XXIII, 51.
24Ibid., 52-53.
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replaced by a new consejo de guerra, temporarily presided
over by Captain Jos 6 Ulloa.

This council elected to retain

Colonel Ventura Carvallo as the junta president, in conO C

sideration of his being the ranking senior officer.

The

members of the former government were placed under house
arrest but freed several days later, with the exception of
Captain Gregorio Henriquez and Father Eleisegui.

Henriquez,

the battalion commander, was imprisoned in Niebla until the
last days of the captaincy-general .26

Father Eleisegui was

given six hours to leave Valdivia and departed for Concep
cibn under escort the same day
The position of the new council of war was precarious
in that the troops depended for their survival on the situado,
an allotment which was no longer forthcoming.

The Lima

authorities had placed this responsibility on the shoulders
of Chileans during the first decade of the 1800's.

Since

1810, however, preoccupation with the independence movement
and the forming of new army units in Santiago had brought
the discontinuance of the Valdivia subsidy.

When the junta

drafted a communiqub to Carrera concerning the events which
had taken place, it was couched in terms of their urgent
need for the subsidy.

2 5 Ibid.,

51.

2^Guarda, Historia de Valdivia. 230.
2^"Manifiesto individual..., March, 1812, " CHDI,
XXIII, 51.
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The junta's composition was thoroughly royalist, but
the officers astutely refrained from revealing their true
sentiments.

Playing on the vanity of Carrera, their com

munique of March 22

was steeped in adoration and praise of

the dictator, a measure intended to convince him of their
loyalty.
By the act of this council of war and testimony that
we include, you will be advised of the events in this
plaza and the motives which inspired us. It has been
a deed that we have believed absolutely necessary to
vindicate our honor. Be calm, then, most excellent
sir, and approve it, secure in what we have achieved.
Since the province of Concepcibn had the audacity of
arming itself against the capital, we regret that no
orders from you have arrived, or at least correspon
dence that would advise us of your will. The govern
ment of Concepcibn wished to make you believe that we
were your disloyal party. And although we only
possess seven thousand pesos in this treasury, we have
resolved to submit ourselves to the greatest efforts
and self-denial rather than turn ourselves over to
jurisdictions other than our capital of Santiago.28
In consideration of this dedicated loyalty, the officers
asked for a resumption of the situado, depicting in no
uncertain terms the consequences of not doing so:
We conceive of ourselves as isolated
tion cut with the rest of our army,
orders of Your Excellency. In this
for you to remit the subsidy to us,
without doubt we will p e r i s h . 29

and with communica
that is under the
situation, we wait
because if not,

The junta sent the letter overland through the
province of Concepcibn to Talca, where Carrera was encamped.
He received the letter on May 5, the same day on which he

28"Oficio a..., March 22, 1812," CHDI. XXIII, 39-40.
2 8 Ibid.,

40.
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ordered his troops to retire from the Maule River .30 Carrera
could only hear the acclamations of his name and the slander
of Concepcidn, completely misreading the intentions of the
o f f i c e r s . i n his reply to the consejo de guerra, he
feigned innocence of complicity in the revolt, referring to
it as "this determined and brave group of officers" who
worked to destroy tyranny and oppression .32

He aiso pledged

his steadfast commitment to Valdivia and to provide it with
the subsidy and any other assistance needed:
The [Valdivia] governing junta, to whom the documents
have been remitted, protect this city and its worthy
defenders under my jurisdiction, and extending their
pleas, I will not deny them any manner of assistance.
The noble Valdivians are valorous and persevering and
we are all at their disposal. I received the previous
correspondence from Valdivia. I remitted it to the
capital in order that the subsidy be sent, for which
purpose I allowed a boat to sail from Valparaiso.
Yesterday I received word that it had left port .33
The Santiago junta and knowledgeable counselors were
not misled by the officers of Valdivia, clearly recognizing
their subversive intentions.

They chided the officers for

their stated affirmation of support for the Spanish regency
and the "president of Chile,"

J

o

s

6

out that Chile had no president.3<^

30

Miguel Carrera, pointing
Before any subsidy could

Orrego Luco, La patria vieia, II, 141.

3 1 Ibid.,

142.

32"Oficio al..., May, 1812," CHDI. XXIII, 54.
3 3 Ibid.,

55-56.

3^Orrego Luco, La patria vieja, II, 143.
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be sent, the junta demanded a formal declaration of obedience,
but by this time Carrera1s will had prevailed.
The Nueva Limeha, owned by a Valparaiso merchant,
was the vessel which Carrera selected to be loaded with food
stuffs and military supplies.

As soon as it anchored at

Valdivia and was unloaded, the consejo de guerra drew up a
declaration expressing its true intentions.

Dated June 26,

1812, this proc1amation renounced the authority of Santiago,
the officers stating they had been deceived in their belief
35
that Carrera was a faithful supporter of the crown.
. . . if this plaza has continued until now dependent
on the capital of Chile, it was out of the belief that
the new government erected by it was substantially
devoted to the cause of our king, Ferdinand VII. . . .
The officers now placed themselves under the authority of
the viceroy and until further instructions from him would
obey orders from the governor of Chilo6 , Ignacio Justis.
They returned this reply to Carrera on the same vessel which
had brought the subsidy after first stripping it of all gun
carriages, arms, and other materials which might later be
used against them.
The actions of the consejo de guerra placed the
Valdivia military in the forefront of the monarchist movement
in Chile.

The port was to become the open door through which

the invading Peruvian army entered, and would remain faithful

33"Acta de la..., June 26, 1812," CHDI. XXIII, 77-85.
3 6 Ibid.,

78.

3 7 Ibid.,

84.
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until its conquest by Lord Thomas Cochrane in 1820.

Nearly

all of Valdivia's troops and officers fought in the name of
the mother country, and many distinguished themselves in the
early clashes of 1813 and 1814.

Among the members of the

consejo who rose to prominence were Lucas Ambrosio de Molina,
who was promoted to colonel and commander of the royalist
troops at Chilian (August 10, 1813), where he was killed.^®
Julian Pinuer fought at Chilian, Rancagua, and was later
made commandant of the Valdivia battalion.

Jos 6 de Berganza

became general of the second division in the royalist army
and served as Intendant of Concepcibn.^
It is ironic that nearly all of the members of this
consejo de guerra were not peninsulars, but creoles.
fourteen members, thirteen were army officers.

Of the

Only one of

these, Jos 6 Berganza, was a peninsular Spaniard; the rest
AO

were native-born Chileans. ^

The strong royalist feelings

Jaime de la Guarda, one of the exiled members of
the patriot junta of 1811, returned to Valdivia in 1820 with
the conquering expedition of Lord Cochrane. He found the
city much the same as he had left it eight years earlier—
loyal to the crown ("Carta a..., May 25, 1820," AVM, LXXXVII,
48) .
■^included among these faithful troops were nearly
all of the cadets of the battalion (Nicanor Molinare, Los
colejios militares de Chile, 1814-1819 [Santiago: Imprenta
Cervantes, 1911J, 35) .
40Quarda, Historia de Valdivia, 236.

^ Ibid.
^ T h e Chi1ean-born officers were: Colonel Ventura
Carvallo; captains Josb Ulloa, Dionisio Martinez, Julian
Pinuer; lieutenants Diego Adriasola, Teodoro Negron, Juan de
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of these creoles supports the writer's contention that
political loyalties in the army did not polarize along the
traditionally-conceived lines of Spaniard and Chilean, but
according to geographical and cultural factors.

As pre

viously discussed, the isolation of the port, a steady con
tact i*/ith either Peru or Spain, and the composition of the
local aristocracy were more powerful determinants of mili
tary loyalty.

This theory helps to explain Francisco

Encina's contention that the war of independence was one of
creole patriots against creole royalists.

AO

As virtual dictator of Santiago, Jos 6 Miguel Carrera
shares much of the responsibility for the loss of Valdivia
to the royalist c a m p . ^
was totally inept.

From a military standpoint, Carrera

His judgments were swayed by arrogance

and the vainglorious notion that he could manipulate all of
the colony’s military forces at will.

He ignored the city's

patriot junta until he thought it could be manipulated in his
feud with Rozas.

Suspicious of its loyalty, he indirectly

brought about its downfall, only to find it replaced with

Dios Brito, Juan Manuel Lorca; second lieutenants Juan de
Dios Gonz&les, Antonio Adriasola, Jos 6 Antonio Martinez, and
Sergeant Major Lucas Ambrosio Molina ("hojas de servicio,
..., December, 1805," ACM, CLXV). The single civilian was
the royal treasurer, Juan Gallardo.
^Francisco Encina, Resumen de la historia de Chile,
Leopoldo Casteda (ed.) (Santiago: Zig Zag, 1953), I, 592.
^Encina, Historia de Chile. VI, 408.
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another government of staunch monarchist sentiments.
Carrera was not the only figure guilty of misjudgment.
Martinez de Rozas, Bernardo 0 'Higgins and other leaders of
Concepcibn were so engrossed in the struggle with Santiago
that they paid no attention to Valdivia.

After the instal

lation of the consejo de guerra, Rozas stated:

"This is an

incident of no concern, of no importance and results.
The prophecy of Juan Mackenna came to haunt those leaders
who had not heeded his plea for disbanding the garrison in
1810.

Their failure to take advantage of those early oppor

tunities had lasting consequences on the course of the war.
*

*

*

The province of Concepcibn had managed to weather
the confrontation at the Maule River without recognizing the
one-man government in Santiago.

Rozas hoped to maintain

this position until the following summer, by that time
forcing the capital to accept a national pact based on
representative, constitutional government, similar to the one
proposed the preceding year.

Great financial difficulties

prevented the realization of this goal.

The junta and the

expanded military forces were near the point of collapse
because of Carrera's continued withholding of funds to pay
their salaries.

In desperation, Rozas called a meeting of

deputies from the surrounding districts in June, 1812, to

45()rrego Luco, La patria vieja. I, 145.
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solicit contributions for funding the public administration.
Instead of volunteering assistance, the deputies complained
of the financial hardships imposed on them during the pre
ceding months of besiegement by Carrera's army and called for
Bishop Villodres to effect a conciliation between the two
p r o v i n c e s R o z a s realized the dangers of allowing a con
firmed monarchist to speak in the name of the junta and
offered himself to negotiate with Carrera.
Before these plans came to pass, a military revolt
occurred in Concepcibn, on July 8 .

Led by the dragoon com

mandant Juan Miguel Benavente, Captain Josb Zapatero and
Sergeant Major Rambn Jimbnez Navia, the veteran troops of
the city imprisoned the junta members

(with the exception of

its president, Pedro Josb Benavente) and its most active
supportersThe

following morning the former junta was

officially dissolved and a military consejo de guerra formed,
consisting of four officers and again presided over by Pedro
Jos 6 Benavente.

Several of the officers were thought to be

staunchly royalist in their sympathies, a suspicion which
was borne out by their succeeding actions.
Rozas was the only member of the former regime who
was not jailed or detained.

Lieutenant Jos 6 Manuel Zorrilla,

a confidant and assistant of Rozas, was exiled to the fort
of Arauco.

Father Pedro Jos 6 Eleisegui having already been

46Barros Arana, Historia general, VII, 571.
^"Diario militar...," CHDI, I, 57.
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exiled once from Valdivia, found himself again under arrest
on the pretext of subverting the troops.4®

To the exaltados,

these radical reactions were ample proof that the consejo
would imitate the Valdivians by turning itself over to the
viceroy.
Instead, the officers of Concepcibn addressed them
selves directly to Santiago in an effort to obtain money
with which to pay their military expenses.

Whatever the

political sympathies of these men, their immediate concern
was in remedying the financial crisis of the treasury .4 9
While they did not specifically mention the subsidy, their
letter quite clearly expressed their needs.

As with the

letter of the Valdivian officers, there was an effort to
convince Carrera of their submission to his authority:
We are pleased that this junta, this noble capital
and all of its cities, towns and countrysides
receives with great pleasure the union and most
intimate fraternity of the capital [Santiago] and
fully submits itself to the central government,
affirming its obedience until death. As recom
pense for its loyalty, vigilance and dangers
incurred, the council of war asks that Your Excel
lency approve the necessary dispositions, com
municating to us your judgment relative to our
general welfare. . . .5°
The first reaction of the Santiago junta to news of
the revolution was exuberance, for it at last seemed that
Concepcibn was falling under the authority of the central

48Encina, Historia de Chile, VI, 378.
49Felid Cruz, Conversacibnes, 20.
^Barros Arana, Historia general, VIII, 573.
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government.

Many of the faint-hearted patriots now lent

their active support, convinced of the ultimate victory of
their cause.

Carrera demurred from enthusiasm, fearful that

while Rozas remained in the South there was a danger of his
regaining power through another armed revolt.

To prevent

this, he ordered that Rozas and the rest of his jailed
followers be escorted to Santiago for confinement, to which
the consejo readily complied.
career of Rozas to an end.

51

This brought the political

After a period of house arrest

in Santiago, he was exiled to his boyhood home in Mendoza,
Argentina, where he died in May, 1813.
The imprisonment of Rozas did not allay Carrera's
mistrust of the consejo de guerra. for the deceit of the
Valdivian officers was still fresh in his memory.

In August

of 1812, he again resorted to treachery in order to assure
his continued predominance.

Juan Antonio Diaz Munoz,

sergeant major of the dragoon regiment and an enthusiastic
supporter of the dictator, was sent to Concepcibn for the
avowed purpose of arranging conciliation between the two
CO
protagonists. ^ In reality, he was entrusted with instiga
ting another revolt which would place the province firmly in
the orbit of the capital, for which purpose he was provided
with a considerable amount of money.

According to testimony by Juan Miguel Benavente,
Carrera sent forty to fifty thousand pesos to Concepcibn in
return for Rozas and other prisoners (Feliti Cruz, Conversacibnes, 2 0 ).
5 2"Diario militar...," CHDI, I, 58.

256
On his arrival in Concepcibn, Diaz Mufloz capitalized
on the discontent of the patriot faction there and persuaded
its members of the ease with which they could gain control.
At two o'clock in the morning of September 24, Colonel Pedro
Jose Benavente and a number of officers armed part of the
local garrison and placed the members of the consejo de
guerra under house arrest.

The versatile Benavente took

command of the new government as governor-intendant of the
CO
province and declared allegiance to the Santiago junta.
The establishment of a government in the South
pledging subservience to the capital did not in itself
signify colonial unity.

In Concepcibn province there was a

deep undercurrent of monarchist sympathy which could not be
erased by mere administrative changes.

Moreover, the

defenders of the king were active in propagating their
beliefs among the inhabitants.
Perhaps the most indefatigable of these propagandists
were the members of the provincial clergy, both regular and
secular.

They had ample justification for their hatred of

liberal institutions, for since the first Santiago junta was
formed, they had been harassed

and mistreated.

Convents

such as the Colegio Carolino de Naturales, for example,
found their allotments of food, clothing and other supplies
cut off in an effort to bring their c l o s u r e . T h e majority

-^Encina, Historia de Chile, VI, 380.
54"Relacibn de conducta..., April 1, 1816," CHDI,
IV, 14.

257
of the priests were peninsulars, respected for their posi
tion.

In all of their proselytizing activity, they invoked

the venerated names of the king and the Catholic faith.

With

such a formidable doctrine, they were able to favorably
influence most of the rural population, who did not grasp
CC
the import of revolutionary teachings.'’''
Along the frontier there were more missions and
reduccibnes than forts, each led by a small group of priests
attending to the needs of the nearby Indians and Spanish
settlers.

After 1810, these fathers visited their Indian

wards frequently, promising them continued financial aid and
presenting the patriots as robbers who would steal the lands
given them

by the k i n g . ^

Several of the more militant

priests of the frontier were Angel Gatica of Chilian, Luis
Josb Branas of Yumbel, Juan Antonio Ferrebu of Rere, and
Juan de Dios Bulnes of Arauco.

Dios Bulnes was one of the

more notable priests who served as agents in receiving secret
correspondence from the vxceroy.57
The most powerful of these clerics, however, was the
Bishop of Concepcibn, Navarro Martin de Villodres.

A native

of Granada, Spain, Villodres was appointed to the Concepcibn

S^Diego josb Benavente, Memoria sobre las primeras
campanas de la guerra de la independencia de Chile
(Santiago: Imprenta de la Opinibn, 1845), 36.
S^TomAs Guevara, Los araucanos en la revolucibn de
la independencia (Commemorative Edition, ADC, 1910), 242.
57Ibid., 243.
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diocese in 1807, after obtaining a doctor of theology degree
at the University of Salamanca .68

He was an invincible

opponent of representative government and was a major factor
in preserving the frontier intact for the royalist cause.
In 1812, he personally toured the frontier missions to
assure the political loyalties of the Indian parishioners in
what was officially designated as church business.

RQ

When

hostilities finally commenced in 1813, practically all of
the Indian tribes from the coast to the cordillera avidly
upheld the cause of the king.
The Araucanian population, arch enemy of the Spanish,
was to be of considerable importance during the independence
movement.

By 1810, there were perhaps 180,000 Indians, and

if their active military support could not be obtained it
was imperative that at least their tacit friendship be
secured .60
The patriot forces had attempted to gain Indian
allegiance, although in haphazard manner.

On October 24,

1811, over 400 warriors attended a parliament in Concepcidn,
sponsored by the ruling junta.

After rounds of drinking and

gift-giving the Indians departed, swearing loyalty to the

CQ
Galdames, A History of Chile. 154.
6 ^"Relaci6 n de conducta..., April 1, 1816, " CHDI,
IV, 23-24.
6 ° "Revista

de la guerra...," CHDI. V, 312.
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provincial cause .61

Other parliaments followed in 1812 and

1813, although they were too feeble and too late when com
pared to the organized royalist efforts.
During the preceding decades, the Araucanians had
built up close relations with the capit&nes de amigos, who
lived with them and conducted their legal affairs.

Many of

these officials were loyal to the crown, and their influence
naturally diffused to their native dependents.

62

The work

of these Spaniards, coupled with the evangelical grip of the
reducei6 n fathers, constituted a grassroots hold on the
Indians which was to last through the independence wars.
After the liberation of Chile in 1817, Indian participation
degenerated into plundering and looting, but it was nearly
/• q

always done in the name of the king.

The failure of the

patriots to propagandize effectively in the South enabled
the Peruvian expedition of 1813 to enter the colony unopposed,
while the forces of Carrera and 0 'Higgins were distracted by
mutual mistrust and fear of attack by the other.

61Benavente to O'Higgins, Concepcibn, October 24,
1811, ABO. I, 174.
^Guevara, Los araucanos, 241.
63collier, Ideas and Politics, 216.

Chapter 12
THE EXPEDITION OF BRIGADIER ANTONIO PAREJA, 1813
The state of internal discord between the provinces
and the antagonism among the various political factions
which characterized Chile in 1812 was about to enter another
phase.

The Peruvian viceroyalty, which for so long had

watched patiently from the sidelines, was now ready to enter
the colony1s affairs in the name of preserving monarchial
integrity.
Viceroy Abascal was not desirous of coexistence with
Chile, but the need of its grain exports and the engagement
of his forces in other rebellious colonies had until that
time prevented him from taking punitive measures.

He also

desisted from the fear that he might push the Chileans into
an alliance with Buenos Aires.

By late 1812, however, the

viceroy could no longer ignore the situation in Chile, no
matter how limited his military strength.

The petition of

the Valdivia consejo de guerra to be placed under Peruvian
authority provided ample justification for initiating hostil
ities against the colony

^Fernando Diaz Venteo, Las campanas militares del
virrey Abascal (Sevilla: Artes Gr£ficas, 1948), 377.
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In late 1812, the Chilean estanco de tabaco pur
chased a shipload of tobacco in Havana, but the vessel
carrying it to the colony was detained in Montevideo and its
2
cargo seized by the Spanish governor.
This official then
remitted the tobacco directly to Peru in order to cancel
part of a debt which was owed to the viceroyalty .

Abascal

not only approved the action but gratefully accepted the
tobacco as payment, which placed him in a position of
belligerency towards Chile.

In October, he began to issue

letters of marque to Peruvian captains for the capture of
foreign vessels trading in Chilean waters.

These provoca

tions were compounded by the knowledge that the viceroy had
asked the Bishop of Concepcidn to incite royalist disobedi
ence to the government.
The Chilean junta had wished to avoid an open schism
with Peru.

Its previous correspondence with the viceroy had

been firm, but without the disrespect or enmity which would
place it in the ranks of an unfaithful sister colony.

How

ever, these deliberate acts of aggression moved the junta
(or properly, Carrera) to issue a vigorous protest.

In a

letter of August 29, 1812, the tobacco seizure was con
demned, as well as the purported legitimacy of the Valdivians

2 "Oficio al virrey..., August 29, 1812, " CHDI,
XXIII, 8 6 .
•^Orrego Luco, La patria vieja. II, 203-204.
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in their secession from the colony.^

Concerning the cor

sairs which raided shipping in Chilean waters, the junta
wrote;
To prohibit the introduction of European and even
Spanish goods which are imported by this route, is
an act rarely practiced between civilized nations,
even when they are at war, . . .
In a reply of October 12, Abascal accused the junta
of being power-hungry, ruffian malcontents who had defied
the highest magistrates in America with their anarchist
behavior.

He refused to reimburse the Chileans for the

tobacco and justified the corsairs in their scouring the
coasts for "contrabandists.

He warned the Chileans that

by continuing in their present course they could expect an
invasion as soon as royalist troops had liberated Upper Peru
7
and defeated the Argentine insurgents.

His remarks

amounted to a definitive economic and political break with
Chile, and a virtual declaration of war.
The publication of this letter in Santiago brought
resounding public support for the junta from the majority of
the populace and induced frenzied military preparations in
anticipation of invasion.

In a junta de corporacidnes

^"Oficio al virrey..., August
XXIII,

2 9 ,

1 8 1 2 ,

" CHDI.

8 5 - 9 1 .

5ibid., 8 8 .
6 "0 f i c i o

XXIII,

a la Junta..., October

9 1 - 1 0 1 .

7Ibid.. 100-101.

1 2 ,

1 8 1 2 , "

CHDI,
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convoked in the capital on November 17, 1812, all those
present agreed on war as the only alternative but prudently
Q
desisted from offensive actions.
Many entrenched mercan
tile interests were opposed to a rupture which would close
Chile's primary export market and bring severe internal
disruption of the economy.

In his Diario militar, Carrera

recorded the mixed emotions of the assembly— the desires of
redeeming wounded pride for the brazen viceregal threats
versus the economic consequences of such a stance.
Everyone present agreed that these insults of the
viceroy were tantamount to war, but it was wisely
noted that our armament was not yet sufficient to
begin a campaign. We held our efforts in abeyance
until after we had subjugated Valdivia, all the
time benefiting from the commerce with Lima. Now,
the season and advanced state of all my efforts
offered me the opportunity of securing southern
Chile„^
As this statement reveals, Valdivia was by that time
a painful thorn in the side of the patriot movement and a
source of concern to Carrera.

Obviously, Carrera considered

it indispensable to restore the city to his personal
authority but was ignorant of the obstacles of such a
venture.

By then, the early opportunities for winning that

garrison's loyalty had been frittered away, and the young
dictator was increasingly beset by political enemies in
Santiago.

Before leading any army southward, he found it

imperative to assure his continued dominance in the capital.

®Orrego Luco, La patria vieja, II, 208-209.
^"Diario militar...," CHDI, I, 65.
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This was a continual struggle, for the powerful Larrain
branch of the aristocracy was thoroughly alienated by
Carrera's self-proclaimed leadership and was eager to sup
port any charismatic figure who could unseat him.^®

And the

adherents of the exiled Martinez de Rozas were also sus
pected of revolutionary designs against the Carrera family.
On January 28, 1813, Jos 6 Toribio Torres revealed to
Juan Josd Carrera a plot to assassinate the entire Carrera
family by a certain Manuel Rodriguez and his brother,
Ambrosio.

The scheme involved falsifying the signature of

Jos 6 Miguel Carrera to release 200 troops from the national
guard barracks and unite them with the artillery corps led
by Ram 6 n Picarte.

11

The conspirators were arrested before

enacting their plans and were either exiled to Argentina or
l!7
sentenced to prison terms on Juan Fern&ndez. A

This ill-

fated conspiracy more closely resembled a comic-opera plot
than a genuine threat, but it was a factor in convincing
Carrera of the dangers in temporarily leaving his base of
power.
As if the discontent and political opposition were
not enough to discourage a Valdivia expedition, Carrera
encountered general apathy among the populace of Santiago.

l^In his diary, Carrera repeatedly accused members
of the Larrain family of instigating the coups against him
("Diario militar...," CHDI, I, 65).
H'Troceso por la conspiracidn..., January 28, 1813,"
CHDI, XXI and XXII.
■*-2 "Diario militar..., " CHDI, I, 67-69.
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To have mobilized the militia and veteran units would have
required them to forsake their agricultural pursuits and
abandon their fields, an impossible task during the crucial
spring and summer months.

Large landholders were equally

vocal in their opposition to a campaign.

It was argued that

such an expedition could be formed no sooner than March,
after the harvesting of the crops .13
Viceroy Abascal possessed neither the funds nor the
troops to undertake a Chilean venture.
bearing of his October 12

The aggressive

letter was fortified by an invasion

plan proposed by Brigadier Antonio Pareja, a Spanish naval
officer and veteran of Trafalgar.

Parej a had come to Peru

in 1810 after being appointed military governor of ConcepciOn, but was unable to take his command because of opposi
tion by the newly-created Santiago junta .14
His plan for subduing Chile centered around taking a
small detachment of soldiers to the royalist strongholds of
Chilo 6 and Valdivia, joining with the troop battalions there,
then moving northward in a campaign to bring the capital of
Santiago to its knees.

Information had been supplied to the

viceroy by Chilean agents concerning the divided sentiments
of Concepcidn province and the disinterest or frank opposi
tion of many officers to the independence movement.

Abascal

I3orrego Luco, La patria vieja. II, 218.
14Vicente Rodriguez Casado and Jos 6 Antonio Calderdn
Quijano (eds.), Jos 6 Fernando de Abascal y Sousa, Memoria de
Gobierno, II (Sevilla: Editorial Catdlica, 1944), 166.
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believed that the mere presence of Pareja in the South would
be sufficient to restore the traditional order and bring the
capitulation of Santiago .15

In any case, it was thought

that there would be little or no resistance from Concepcibn
and other cities in the South.

Parej a was given one ship,

fifty infantrymen and the modest sum of 6 , 0 0 0 pesos for the
support of his anticipated army, the rest of the money to be
furnished by the treasuries of Valdivia and Chilo6 . °

The

small expedition left Callao on December 12, 1812, led by
Pareja who carried with him a small group of officers.
On arriving in Chilo 6 on January 18, 1813, Pareja
was cordially received by its governor, Ignacio Justis.
Since the last years of the eighteenth century, the veteran
battalion of the island had been increased to over 400
troops, with over twice that number of militia.

These

troops and the rest of the island population were practically
untouched by the spirit of the revolution.

Their isolation

denied them intellectual stimulation and kept out subversives, which left them blindly loyal to the king.

17

Juan

Tomcis Vergara, the island's royal treasurer, presented Parej a
with the sum of 160,000 pesos to be used to further his
campaign.

1R

And the civilian populace enthusiastically

l^Barros Arana, Historia general, IX, 10.
l^Diaz Venteo, Las campahas militares. 377.
17 "oficio al rey..., April 1, 1822," CHDI, X, 196.
ISorrego Luco, La patria vieja, II, 218.

enlisted as soldiers.
In three weeks Pareja reorganized and trained the
militia of Castro, which was formed into a unit renamed the
Volunteers of Castro.

The treasurer Tomas Vergara and

Governor Justis were sent to Valdivia to prepare its troops
to join the taskforce, which was accomplished without diffiQ
culty.
In late March, Pareja departed for Valdivia,
\

carrying with him an army of over 1,300 men.

It was composed

of the veteran battalion of San Carlos (450 men), the
Volunteers of Castro (800 men), and an artillery brigade
(120

men) with eight cannon.
On arriving in Valdivia the expedition was joined by

that city's entire troop battalion, including many experi
enced officers.

Numerous civilians also joined the army.

Pareja remained there only three days in order to outfit a
gunboat and merchant vessel to accompany the force.

On

March 23, the expedition left for ConcepciOn with a total of
nearly 2,500 men, a testimony to the royalist solidarity of
southern Chile.2^
The Concepcidn junta had received prior notice of
Pareja's arrival in the South from the crew of a merchant
vessel from Valdivia.

By this time an invasion should have

■*"9 "Apuntes sobre la guerra..., 1843, " CHDI, IV,
209.
?0

"Revista de la guerra...," CHDI, VI, 54.

21"Noticias de...," [n.d.], AMV, LIV, 233.
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come as no surprise, although distressingly few defensive
measures had been taken by the government,
troops were garrisoned in the city;

A total of 1,535

870 veteran infantry

under Ramdn Jimenez de Navia; 180 additional veteran infantry
in the port of Talcahuano, led by Captain Rafael de la Sota,
and 485 militia under Captain Pedro Barnechea.

22

These were

only a portion of the total veteran and militia forces which
at that moment were stationed within twenty-four hours travel
from the city.

For some inexplainable reason, they were not

summoned. 23
A certain amount of this inactivity was due to the
sharp division of political loyalties within the officer
corps.

Even more was attributable to the incompetency and

lackluster performance of such men as Colonel Benavente.
Although he was a firm advocate of the patriot cause,
Benavente's lack of initiative was often mistaken for
royalist sympathy.
Neither did the city fathers reveal any sense of
urgency in their actions.

In the weeks prior to the invasion,

the cabildo enacted measures concerning such mundane matters
as public hygiene, fixing the hours of duty of regidores,
and providing for the food supply of the city.

24

On the afternoon of March 26, the invading squadron

22"Relacidn hecha..., 1813," CHDI. I, 80.
^Feliti Cruz, Conversacidnes, 226.
2 4Amun&tegui

Solar, El cabildo de Concepcidn, 558-59.
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of two frigates and three transports arrived at the prom
ontory of San Vicente, behind which was located the port of
Talcahuano.

Captain Rafael de la Sota, the port commander,

placed his 150 man force on alert and advised Colonel
Benavente in Concepcidn.2^

The intendant immedictely dis

patched 80 men to reinforce Sota and began to organize the
bulk of the city's forces under Jimdnez Navia to relieve the
garrison.

On the following morning, the royalists attacked

Sota's small force along the heights of San Vicente and
crushed it, sending Sota and a handful of uncaptured soldiers
in retreat to Concepcidn.^

After this initial victory,

Pareja fortified the approaches to the city and asked for
its capitu1 ation.
The entire patriot defense was a fiasco.

Amid the

confusion of Pareja's arrival, Benavente and his staff had
failed to attack the troops as they disembarked from their
ships, and consequently found themselves foolishly surrounded
by an army overlooking them from the bluffs around the city.
Even worse, dissension had begun to spread among the troops.
Jimdnez Navia, who led most of the patriot relief column to
San Vicente, declined entering the battle and ordered his
troops to station themselves on a nearby hill, observing the
rout of Sota. ?7

On returning to the cxty he presented

excuses for his actions, but his prior record of pro-royalist

25"carta del g o b e m a d o r ..., 1813," CHDI, II, 273-74.
2 6 Ibid.,

277.

2 7 Ibid.,

278.
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activities led to his being branded a turncoat.
The intendant of the royalist army, Juan Tomes
Vergara, delivered an ultimatum demanding surrender of the
city in twenty-four hours.

An open cabildo was called to

consider the proper course of action, in which it was
resolved that the city should be abandoned.

During the night

the provincial treasurer and a military escort fled to
Santiago, carrying with them the 36,000 pesos remaining in
n

the treasury.

o

The patriot forces were assembled in the

main plaza to stage an orderly retreat, when the troops
under Jimenez Navia revolted and declared themselves in
support of the k i n g . ^

Sota and a few loyal soldiers were

forced to flee the city, and Jimenez Navia took charge until
the arrival of Pareja.

Without this action by Jimenez

Navia, the invaders would have entered a deserted city; as
it was, they were able to add hundreds of troops to their
growing force.

Benavente and several leaders agreed to

remain behind to devise a formal capitulation and provide a
smoother transition for the new government.

Pareja entered

Concepcidn on March 24, and was greeted on the outskirts of
the city by the friendly troops of Jimenez Navia.
The entire south of Chile was now in royalist hands,

28one of those who helped to convey the treasury
funds to Santiago was the radical priest, Pedro Jose
Eleisegui. He and the members of the escort were presented
with medals by the Santiago government for their actions (El
Monitor Araucano. April 6, 1813).
29"carta del gobernador..., 1813, " CHDI, II, 281-82.
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involving no more than a skirmish and the loss of a handful
of men.

In large measure, it was possible because of the

lack of solidarity and breakdowns in the chain of command
within the patriot army.3®

After combining his forces with

those of Jimbnez Navia, Pareja found himself with a total
force of 3,570 infantry, 300 artillerymen and 250 dragoons.31
The commander also found that he enjoyed the support of a
majority of the provincial population, especially in the
Laja district.

From here he was soon reinforced by hundreds

of militia and those veteran units remaining in the frontier
forts.

Parej a wisely retained Benavente and other patriot

functionaries in their posts, which enabled him to exercise
complete control over predominately patriot areas.

He

issued orders for troops, horses, and supplies to be sent to
Concepcibn, each order bearing the signature of Benavente.
In this way the royalist army was able to accrue invaluable
reinforcements and supplies in a short time, while local
authorities believed they were obeying the instructions of
Intendant Benavente.

39

After refitting in Concepcibn, the royalist army
pushed on to Chilian, picking up 2,000 additional militia
men along the way.

The frightened government of Santiago

30Felitl Cruz, Conversacibnes, 227.
31Diego Josb Benavente, Memoria sobre las primeras
campahas, 30.
32orrego Luco, La patria viela, II, 227.
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hurriedly invested Jos6 Miguel Carrera with supreme military
authority and sent him south to Talca with the patriot army.
This confrontation along the Maule River set the scene for
the first round of the war of independence.
Both armies were composed mainly of creoles, a civil
war of Chileans against C h i l e a n s .33

There was little to dis

tinguish the opposing armies in their armament, uniforms or
their fighting

ability.

The combating armies were encum

bered by thousands of raw militia and green recruits who fled
during battle or whenever they became discontented with army
life.

Many troops were loyal to the landowners or caudillos

under whom they enlisted, not to the concepts of liberalism
or c o n s e r v a t i s m . 3^

what followed was a winnowing process in

which many troops deserted, fought for the opposing side, or
were directed by mercenary or personal motivation.

By the

end of the first stage of fighting, the loyalties of the
armies had been cemented, largely along the lines of hatred
or retribution.
As in the three previous centuries of its unstable
and often violent existence, the South played a leading role
in this future struggle.

Rather than serving as a base of

action against the Araucanians, it now became the head-

33it was not until 1814 that the first peninsular
troops arrived, the Regiment of Talavera, under General
Osorio ("Apuntes sobre la guerra...," CHDI, IV). The only
Spanish officers of Parej a 's expedition were two infantry
colonels and the merchants Quintanilla and Elorreaga.

3^clissold,

Bernardo 0 'Higgins, 101.

quarters of the royalist forces in Chile.

It was of vital

importance, if only for the alliance and military assistance
of the Indian tribes.

The ports of Valdivia, Chilofi and

Talcahuano provided easy access points for Peruvian rein
forcements and all manner of supplies and arms.

The

inhabitants of the frontier were practiced in the use of
weapons and accustomed to the privations of military cam
paigns.

Under the enthusiastic leadership of the clergy and

military officers, an almost invincible public solidarity
was formed.

CONCLUSION
The Chilean military performed a distinctive role for
the Spanish monarchy during the late eighteenth century— it
was engaged in an on-going frontier war against the
Araucanian Indians, a conflict which over a period of nearly
three centuries had diminished but not subsided.

This was in

sharp contrast to other areas of Spanish America, where the
subjugation of the native race had been completed in a few
short years after the conquest.

While other colonies were

approaching the zenith of their development, Chile was
engaged in a costly and debilitating war of attrition along
its southern frontier.
As a result of its continuous protection of Spanish
society against the Indians, the military became one of the
most influential institutions of the colony.

This promi

nence was characterized by the constant presence of a
mobilized army, a network of forts along the Araucanian
frontier and a military budget which nearly equaled all other
expenses of the colonial treasury combined.

Officers occu

pied civil bureaucratic posts in conjunction with their
military duties and governed many towns and districts.
Throughout the south, all of these features combined to
create a strong military tradition, personified by an
274
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intimate association between the king's army and society and
the ascendency of the professional soldier.
An additional factor accentuating the army's impor
tance was the threat of foreign attack along the coasts,
either by corsairs or European invaders.

Southern Chile was

considered highly vulnerable to such encroachments because
of its limited population and because it was the first
Spanish territory an enemy would reach on rounding the tip
of South America.

In the second half ofthe 1700's, the

decline of Spanish fleet commerce in the Caribbean and the
initiation of registry shipping in Pacific waters attracted
numerous foreign interlopers to the Chilean coast.

However,

piracy was not nearly so attractive to Europeans as the
natural resources of the Pacific and the potential for
opening up new commercial markets.

Chile experienced an

influx of smugglers, whalers, and foreign fishermen whom
Chileans fearfully regarded as a threat to Spanish omnipo
tence in that part of America.
As a result of these dangers, Chileans were forced
to divide their army, stationing nearly half of all the
veteran troops in coastal fortresses.

It was impossible for

either the coast or the frontier to be adequately protected
as long as half the army had its back to one enemy at all
times.
Most of the army was stationed in the south, a
factor which largely isolated it from contact with the
capital of Santiago and the mainstream of colonial society.
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However, there was also a great deal of status isolation,
brought on by the army's predatory role and its reputation
for crime and corruption.

Lawlessness and violence within

the army were closely linked to the rough frontier existence
and were also factors which set the army apart culturally
from the rest of the colony.
Military men possessed considerable powers along the
frontier, either as Indian intermediaries, fort commanders
or military governors.

Through their position, numerous

officers (utilizing enlisted men or Indians as underlings)
became involved in extortion rings, illegal businesses and
smuggling.

The unpopu1arity of army life, the low pay, and

a lack of able-bodied men forced army officials to accept
substandard recruits or impress other men to keep the bat
talions at full strength.

This led to high rates of crime,

larceny, and desertion within the ranks as well as low
levels of professionalism.

Military penal codes were

deliberately relaxed to comply with the reality of garrison
life, and there was a tendency to reemploy deserters and
other miscreants in the army.
Overcrowded civilian penal facilities led to the
coastal fortresses being used as detention centers for
criminals.

These conviats admittedly performed a useful

service by constructing fortifications, as in the case of
Valdivia; however, their predilections for escape, criminal
ity or arson distracted the troops, preventing them from
carrying out their normal duties.

The shortage of troops
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dictated that these desterrados be inducted into the army,
where they became a worse burden.
One of the most influential factors in the Chilean
army's development was the dominant role played by Peru. The
influence of the viceroys was solidified through the Lima
situado, a mechanism for supplying the isolated garrisons in
the far south.

This, combined with Peruvian jurisdiction

over Valdivia and Chilo6, partially drove a wedge between
the army and the government in Santiago.

A steady flow of

Peruvian and Spanish officers, money and bureaucrats,
instilled in the inhabitants of these districts the notion
of the viceroys as their patrons and protectors.
The military was a vital component of life in the
south, where it was the major force in combating Indian or
foreign aggression.

Culturally and geographically, it was

segregated from the capital.

Reinforcing factors were the

disreputable nature of the army, the low morale and predatory
militarism of the troops, which set the army apart from the
rest of Chile.

Army officers did rise to positions of

prominence in the colony through hard work, but they were
disassociated from the aristocracy and the more cosmopolitan
atmosphere of the capital.

For the most part, these officers

were socially and politically unsophisticated, more at ease
with the monotony and routine of garrison duty.
The army was destined to exert a strong influence
during the patria vieja (1810-1814), the early phase of the
independence movement.

The political attitudes of the
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officer corps during this period were attributable to its
colonial heritage and its relations with Lima and Santiago.
After the creation of the first patriot junta in
Santiago in 1810, the veteran forces in the south were, if
possible, even more isolated from the capital and the course
of the liberal movement.

In Santiago the civilian militia

began to emerge as the base of the new patriot army.

Since

the last years of the colony, militia had been periodically
trained and called to active duty, which enhanced their
institutional prestige and sense of importance.

An entirely

new standing army was created in the capital, composed
principally of former militia and members of the aristocracy.
While the veteran forces in the south should have logically
served as a trained nucleus for this new army, they were
completely disregarded.

Juan Mackenna was one of the influ

ential leaders who openly spoke against these measures,
arguing the importance of veteran troops to the patriot
cause and the danger of allowing them to remain unsubordi
nated in the south.

He urged that the forces there be

drastically reduced, and the remainder brought to the capital
where they could be placed under close supervision.

His

recommendations were not followed, and the army vacancies in
Santiago were filled through patronage and the appointive
power of civilian, aristocratic elements.
After 1811, the divisions within the patriot move
ment overshadowed all other issues, in large part because of
the personal ambition of a few leaders.

The rift between
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Jos6 Miguel Carrera and Juan Martinez de Rozas nearly
resulted in civil war as the provincial armies of Santiago
and Concepcibn confronted each other along the Maule River.
In the capital, Carrera’s major concern was to achieve com
plete power for himself through a succession of armed
revolts.

He showed little concern for the problems of the

south or the potential power of its military.

An example of

this disregard was the deposing of Governor Eagar in Vald
ivia and the creation of a patriot junta in the city, which
Carrera mistakenly interpreted as a threat to his power.

He

succeeded in bringing about its abolition, only to find it
later supplanted by a military government of definite
royalist sentiments.
The dissension and lack of foresight on the part of
patriot leaders was definitely a factor in the south turning
towards the royalist side.

However, the features discussed

previously were even stronger forces which impelled the army
to take the course it did.

The separation of the army from

the capital, its close ties with Peru and dependency on the
situado, and the deep-rooted loyalty to the king, were not
conducive to sympathy for the patriot cause.
The political loyalties of the veteran army prior to
1814 were not significantly influenced by the traditionallyconceived division between creoles and peninsulars.

For

example, the entire membership of the Valdivia royalist
consejo de guerra of 1812, with one exception, were all
Chilean-born.

In both the army and in colonial society, the
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war of independence was one of creoles versus creoles.
The majority of Chilean troops and officers opted
for the royalist cause, including the entire battalions of
Chilob, Valdivia, and most of the Concepcibn garrison.

When

Brigadier Antonio Pareja came from Peru in 1813 to invade
Chile, he brought with him only one company of soldiers and
a handful of officers to serve as instructors.

By the time

Pareja reached the Maule River, his force numbered several
thousand soldiers, which comprised the bulk of Chile's
veteran army.
Pareja's success in recruiting these troops directly
hinged on the army's geographical and status isolation from
central Chile and a long history of economic and administra
tive dependence on the Peruvian viceroys.
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